Parmenides of Elea

Fragments

A TEXT AND TRANSLATION

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

DAVID GALLOP

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1 Parmenides of Elea *Fragments* A Text and Translation with an Introduction by David Gallop

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DAVID GALLOP

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PREFACE

This volume contains a text and a new translation of the extant fragments of Parmenides' philosophical poem. It also offers the first complete translation into English of the contexts in which the fragments have come down to us, and of the ancient testimonia concerning Parmenides' life and thought. All of these secondary materials are collected in the comprehensive work of Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratir* (6th edition, Berlin 1951), hereafter referred to as D-K, and all have been included here.

The purpose of the translation is to provide an English version that will be of service to modern readers who wish to explore the poem in detail. All the fragments have been translated in full, and appear in the order that has become canonical since the fifth edition of Diels-Kranz. References to the fragments are given in the conventional style derived from this order. Thus, 8.50 refers to line 50 of fragment 8.

As far as differences of word-order allow, the translation of the poem has been arranged in lines corresponding to those of the Greek text. This style has been adopted purely for ease of reference, and not with the aim of producing a poetic version. No attempt has been made to capture the literary qualities of Parmenides' verse or the archaism of his language.

Richard Robinson, in the introduction to his translation of Aristotle's *Politics* III-IV (Oxford 1962, p xxx), has characterized a translation as 'a shameful form of book.' For by offering a translation of each sentence in his original, the translator 'implies that he knows that this is what the original sentence means. But sometimes he does not know what it means, and is only guessing as well as he can.' In publishing a fresh version of Parmenides' poem the present translator makes no claim to know what every sentence in the original means. To signal the worst uncertainties, alternative renderings have been appended for passages whose meaning is disputed, or where

major questions of interpretation hinge upon the text or translation adopted. In these places the reader will find it instructive to compare alternatives. He will then quickly discover how completely he puts himself at the translator's mercy, if he relies entirely upon any single version. He may also find it useful, especially if he is wholly dependent upon translation, to consult the short glossary of terms that present special problems of translation or interpretation.

The introduction advocates one plausible, modern interpretation of Parmenides. It also tries to bring out the more important points still in dispute, and some major philosophical questions raised by the poem. It has seemed better to write an extended essay, cross-referenced to the translation, than to provide a separate series of exegetic and critical notes. This arrangement, regrettably, has made it necessary to skate all too lightly over much significant detail. But it also avoids dispersing editorial comment too widely for convenient use; and by allowing a more continuous exposition of the poem than is possible in separate notes, it may better help the explorer to find his bearings in the Eleatic jungle.

The notes to the introduction occasionally qualify or enlarge upon points made in the text. Their main purpose, however, is to provide guidance to the secondary literature, supportive either of views adopted in the text without argument or of defensible alternatives. Almost every line of Parmenides is controversial, and it is not possible, in the space available, to discuss every problem, let alone to argue for definitive solutions. Although the present exposition is thus unavoidably 'partisan,' it attempts to air disagreements sufficiently to provide some awareness of what is at issue. Given this limited aim, the use of secondary sources is necessarily selective. Fuller treatment of the literature would have incurred the risk of producing a work impenetrable to all but specialists. And of such works Parmenides has perhaps received his due share already.

Discussion has therefore been confined mainly to a small number of leading studies in English. All sources used, together with others readily accessible, have been listed in the Bibliography. The reader who needs fuller bibliographical guidance is referred to the exhaustive survey of literature down to 1963 in L. Tarán's edition (Princeton 1965); to the bibliographies in A.P.D. Mourelatos' *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven and London 1970) and *The Pre-Socratics* (New York 1974), and in J. Barnes's *The Presocratic Philosophers* (London, Henley, and Boston 1979); and for more recent years to the annual volumes of *The Philosopher's Index* and of *L'Année philologique*.

ABBREVIATIONS

For references to the alternative translations appended to the 'B' fragments, and in source references for materials translated from Diels-Kranz, the following abbreviations have been used. Further particulars of all works mentioned will be found in the Bibliography and in 'Sources and Authorities.'

B	J. Burnet (*Early Greek Philosophy*[4])
C	F.M. Cornford (*Plato and Parmenides*)
D-K	Diels-Kranz (*Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*)
KR	G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven (*The Presocratic Philosophers*)
M	A.P.D. Mourelatos (*The Route of Parmenides*)
R	T.M. Robinson ('Parmenides on Ascertainment of the Real' in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 1975)
T	L. Tarán (*Parmenides*)
AGP	*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*
CJP	*Canadian Journal of Philosophy*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CR	*Classical Review*
HSCP	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
PR	*Philosophical Review*
RM	*Review of Metaphysics*

Comm. Arist. Gr.	*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*
Dox. Gr.	*Doxographi Graeci*, ed H. Diels, Berlin 1879

Introduction, Notes, and Glossary

INTRODUCTION

I PARMENIDES AND TRADITION

The development of western philosophy was once said by A.N. Whitehead to have consisted in a series of footnotes to Plato. In a similar vein, and with hardly more exaggeration, Plato's own writings might be said to have consisted in footnotes to Parmenides of Elea. In his philosophical poem Parmenides bequeathed an enormous legacy, not only to his immediate successors, Zeno and Melissus, but to all subsequent Greek philosophers, and beyond them to later western intellectual tradition. A recent author has rightly credited him with 'a rational intuition of immense scope and power, within which most of the central principles of Greek science and ontology are contained in concentrated and compressed form, like the Japanese flowers which unfold from tiny capsules dropped into water.'[1]

From this inheritance contemporary philosophers have continued to draw profit. Parmenides is their earliest ancestor whose work contains explicit and self-conscious argumentation. The severe conceptual difficulties posed for the first time in his verses are of perennial interest, and many of them remain in the forefront of discussion today. Recent study has thus brought his thought, in the words of another critic, 'astonishingly close to some contemporary preoccupations.'[2] He should be viewed not only as 'the most original and important philosopher before Socrates,'[3] but as the first extant author deserving to be called a philosopher in a present-day sense of the word.

Of Parmenides' life virtually nothing is known. The tradition that he was a disciple of Xenophanes of Colophon (A1–2, A6–7, A22) probably stems from a misreading of a remark in Plato's *Sophist* (242d).[4] Several sources connect him more reliably with the Pythagorean school. According to

Diogenes Laertius (A1) he associated with a certain Ameinias, who converted him to the 'quiet life.' But that he was no mere quietist is suggested by the report that he gave excellent laws to his native city of Elea, preserved by Plutarch (A12) in a rebuttal of the charge that philosophers are useless in practical affairs. There is conflicting evidence regarding his dates. Diogenes Laertius (A1) says that he 'flourished' in the sixty-ninth Olympiad (504–501 BC), which would place his birth around 540 BC. A more plausible conjecture rests on Plato's depiction of him as visiting Athens at about sixty-five years of age, and conversing with Socrates, when the latter was 'very young' (A5). If such a meeting is assigned to 450 BC, Parmenides would have been born around 515 BC. Plato's portrait of him, though not based on direct acquaintance, need not be supposed entirely imaginary. In several passages (A5) he is represented as a venerable, even formidable, figure. In the dialogue that bears his name he assumes a didactic manner and an air of intellectual authority that are well in keeping with the magisterial tone of his poem.

II PARMENIDES' POEM

1 / Composition and Style

We are told (A13) that Parmenides left only a single work, a poem said to have been 'on nature' (A9), which was presumably the source of all the surviving fragments. There is no reliable evidence as to its date of composition. Assuming that Parmenides was born about 515 BC, a date of 490–475 BC is sometimes inferred from 1.24, where the poet-narrator is addressed as 'Youth.' But this inference is precarious. It assumes that the narrative records a visionary experience of the author's own youth, and that the work was composed soon after it took place. Both assumptions are questionable, since the visionary setting may well be merely a literary device. But even if the narrative were an autobiographical record, the mode of address would not need to be taken literally as referring to the poet's age.[5]

The poem is couched in the archaic hexameters of Greek epic tradition, and contains numerous thematic and stylistic echoes of the *Odyssey*, which are unquestionably deliberate.[6] It does not make easy reading. The austerity of Parmenides' diction, though well suited to his theme, renders his verses unusually difficult to construe. His syntax is replete with multiple ambiguities, that are often so teasing as to argue wilful obscurantism, or at least a certain perversity, on their author's part. In antiquity his verse style was criticized as obscure and dry, reading 'more like prose than poetry,' as Proclus remarks (A17–18). Plutarch (A15–16) regarded his verse as a mere 'vehicle' to convey an essentially prosaic message. But such judgments are

superficial, altogether failing to give Parmenides his due. They miss the integral connection between his thought and its mode of expression. His venture as a philosopher-poet is consciously modelled on the bold enterprise of an epic hero, Odysseus, and it is in that light that it deserves to be judged. As has been well said, 'Parmenides' own achievement is to be an intellectual one; but that is only a new form of heroism.'[7] His treatment of a wholly novel and abstract subject-matter within the rigid constraints of heroic hexameters is, indeed, a literary feat of heroic proportions.

2 / The Extant Fragments

About one hundred and fifty lines, amounting perhaps to one third of the original poem, have come down to us.[8] They range from mere scraps of verse to a passage of sixty-one lines (fragment 8) preserved by Simplicius, the sixth-century Neo-Platonist, in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*. This fragment is of the utmost importance as 'the earliest example of an extended philosophical argument.'[9] Fortunately, Simplicius transcribed it in full, because – as he tells us (A21) – copies of the text were rare in his time. Also of great value is the thirty-two line proem (fragment 1) preserved mainly by Sextus Empiricus. None of the other seventeen fragments, however, runs to more than nine lines. In several cases their location in the original cannot be fixed with any assurance. Nor can those who cite excerpts from the poem always be relied upon to have interpreted them, or even quoted them, correctly. There are thus numerous textual uncertainties which leave Parmenides' exact wording and meaning in doubt, sometimes in key passages. The task of reconstruction is therefore fraught with difficulty. It resembles the challenge of a jig-saw puzzle with many missing or damaged pieces, and no picture on the box. Nevertheless, the foreground of the picture is now discernible in outline, even if many details and much of the larger background remain enigmatic.[10]

The extant fragments fall into four main groups. In the proem the poet describes his conveyance upon a horse-drawn chariot, escorted by the Daughters of the Sun, into the presence of a goddess. She greets him and promises to impart to him both the truth and the beliefs of mortal men. In a number of short fragments (2–3, 6–7), the goddess then lays down certain principles of what has come to be called 'the Way of Truth' (or *Alētheia*). Next 8.1–51) follows a lengthy set of deductions, proving that reality is a single, continuous, changeless, and motionless plenum. Finally, some forty-five lines (8.51–61 with fragments 9–19) have survived from the so-called 'Way of Seeming' (or *Doxa*) giving the beliefs of mortals.[11] Too little of this section is extant for its role to be determined with certainty. Fortunately, however, Parmenides' claim to originality rests upon the arguments in the Way of

Truth, the greater part of which appears to have survived intact. His historical influence, as evidenced by his followers and critics alike, can also be traced to the doctrines of the Way of Truth. The Way of Seeming, if interpreted correctly below (section V), was totally misunderstood both by Aristotle and in later antiquity. In any case, it proved of no lasting philosophical significance.

III THE PROEM (FRAGMENT 1)

The narrative prelude provides a context of the first importance for appreciating all that follows.[12] The poet tells of being driven through the Gates of the Paths of Night and Day to visit an unnamed goddess. She receives him kindly and reassures him as to the nature of his visit. The guidance that she will offer him is clearly to be patterned upon the supernatural directives given to mortal adventurers in the *Odyssey*. He is a 'youth,' to be counselled as to the road on which he must travel. And travel is, in fact, the *leit-motif* of the whole poem.

The imagery of the chariot-ride contains numerous pre-echoes of the goddess's instruction. Thus, the road along which the youth is conveyed, 'straight' through the Gates (1.21), foreshadows the route of inquiry that she will recommend as 'attending upon truth' (2.4). This route, like the poet's own journey, is an unfamiliar one, 'far indeed from the beaten track of men' (1.27), remote from ordinary modes of human experience (cf 'habit' at 7.3). Yet, he is promised, it is no ill fortune that has set him on this road, but 'right and justice' (1.28). 'Justice,' who opens the Gates of the Paths of Night and Day (1.14–17), and who will reappear in the Way of Truth (8.14), guarantees the legitimacy of the goddess's teaching: it is 'right' that he should learn all things from her (1.28–29). He is an initiate into mysteries that she will reveal, 'the man who knows' (1.3),[13] in contrast with 'mortals knowing nothing' (6.4). The same apocalyptic note is struck by the 'unveiling' of the Daughters of the Sun (1.10).

Perhaps the most notable point, however, concerns the direction of the initiate's journey.[14] It has often been supposed that he is travelling from darkness into light, that light symbolizes 'being' and darkness 'not being,' and that his conveyance into the light (1.10) represents his conversion from ignorance to knowledge. But the words for 'into the light' are most plausibly connected both in grammar and sense, not with the traveller's own journey, but with that of the Daughters of the Sun, immediately after they have left the House of Night. They come into the light, we may imagine, to collect their passenger, and they then escort him back into the House of Night. Thus his privileged access to truth will be gained, like that of Odys-

seus visiting the underworld, through descent into a magic region.

Entry to it is gained through the Gates of the Paths of Night and Day. These gates, whose structure and machinery occupy no fewer than ten lines (1.11–20), have a special significance. They are a point at which Night and Day meet, a place where opposites are undivided, and where the familiar contrasts of human experience can therefore no longer be drawn. Thus, the youth's encounter with the goddess is located where all difference or contrast has disappeared. Even the antithesis between Night and Day, which will later emerge as the foundation of all other mortal dualisms (8.53–59, 9. 1–4), has there been transcended. In that region all is a single, undifferentiated unity. Hence the scene of Parmenides' poetic 'vision' anticipates the conclusion of his philosophical argument. The setting of his 'revelation' neatly encapsulates its content.

IV THE WAY OF TRUTH

1 / The Basic Argument (Fragments 2–3, 6–7)

The goddess begins her instruction by distinguishing two 'routes of inquiry,' and insisting that only one of these 'attends upon truth' (2.4). This is the route that she characterizes as '[it] is, and [it] cannot not be' (2.3). The necessity for taking it is proved by eliminating the second route as erroneous. It is introduced as '[it] is not and [it] needs must not be' (2.5), and is condemned as 'wholly unlearnable,' on the ground that 'you could not know what-is-not ... nor could you point it out' (2.7–8). Subsequently (6.3 ff), a further route is condemned as one on which 'mortals knowing nothing wander, two-headed' (6.4–5), and as 'a backward-turning path' (6.9). Mortals are 'two-headed' and their path is 'backward-turning,' it appears, in that they espouse *both* 'is' *and* 'is not.' But this, the goddess declares, is impermissible. The choice between 'is' and 'is not' is a stark disjunction admitting of no compromise: '[it] must either be completely or not at all' (8.11). Hence, given the rejection of 'is not,' only the route of 'is' remains (8.1–2).

The argument therefore takes the following logical form: i / *either* 'is' *or* 'is not' (and not both); ii / *not* 'is not'; *therefore* iii / 'is.' It is expressly summarized in these terms at 8.15–16. Unfortunately, however, its interpretation is beset by two fundamental difficulties. First, what is the meaning of 'is' and 'is not'? Is 'is' to be read existentially (= 'exists'), or as a copula (= 'is *F*'), or veridically (= 'is true'), or in some combination of these ways? Second, since the subject of 'is' and its complement (if it is a copula) are left unexpressed in its first appearance at 2.3 and elsewhere (eg, 8.2), how are they to be understood?[15]

The most plausible candidate so far suggested for the subject is the phrase that occurs at 6.1, 'what is there for speaking and thinking of.'[16] Given such a subject, and given an existential interpretation of 'is,' the goddess's opening moves may be represented as follows. The first two routes she mentions in fragment 2, 'is' and 'is not,' embody alternative answers to the following disjunctive question: 'does what is there for speaking and thinking of exist or does it not?'[17] The disjuncts are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive: the respondent must choose one and is forbidden to choose both. He must admit that what is there for speaking and thinking of either does exist or does not. But, the goddess argues, the only tenable option is that it does. For what exists is 'there' or 'available' to be spoken and thought of and is thus a possible object of speech and thought.[18] By contrast, the non-existent is 'not to be said or thought' (8.8), 'unthinkable, unnameable' (8.17). For what does not exist is precisely nothing at all. Thus, to assert that 'what is there for speaking and thinking of' does not exist is self-contradictory. For if one says of some supposedly nameable and thinkable item, X, that *it* does not exist, one has equated a named subject, X, with nothing. The reference that the subject term, 'X,' purports to effect is nullified by the assertion that, after all, no such subject exists. The predicate 'does not exist' (= 'is nothing')[19] has taken away with the right hand what the subject has tried to give with the left. One has said, in effect, that something is nothing; and that is absurd.

On this interpretation, when the goddess points out to her listener that he could neither know nor point out[20] what-is-not (2.7–8), she is precluding reference in thought or speech to the non-existent. The negative route is thus 'wholly unlearnable,' and consequently only the affirmative one remains: '[it] is and [it] cannot not be' (2.3). That is, the acceptance of the first route follows necessarily from the rejection of the second.[21] This view can be reinforced by reading two further passages in conjunction with fragment 2. The first is the single incomplete line given as fragment 3. Its placing and interpretation are controversial, and it is not certain that it is continuous with fragment 2.[22] But metrically it fits perfectly with 2.8 to make one whole line. And logically it provides an appropriate support for condemnation of reference to the non-existent. For if translated, as in the present version,'... because the same thing is there for thinking and for being,' it may be taken to mean that any possible object of thought ('what is for thinking') is available or 'is there' to exist ('is for being'). What can be thought of is 'there' to exist; hence, what is not there to exist cannot be thought of. Thinking requires an existent object.[23]

The second related passage is the opening couplet of fragment 6: '(Q) it must be that what is there for speaking and thinking of *is*: for (P) [it] is there

to be, whereas nothing is not'. So translated this couplet embodies the following argument:

i what is there for speaking and thinking of is there to exist; whereas
ii nothing is not (sc. there to exist). Hence,
iii what is there for speaking and thinking of cannot be nothing. But
iv what is not nothing is something. Hence,
v what is there for speaking and thinking of must be something, ie, it must exist.

The propositions at the end of 6.1 and the start of 6.2 (jointly labelled 'P' above) are represented by steps (i) and (ii) in this argument, and the conclusion in the first half of 6.1 (labelled 'Q') appears at step (v). Steps (iii) and (iv) have to be supplied. The gist of the argument will then be as follows: since what is there for speaking and thinking of is – unlike nothing – available to exist, it cannot be equated with nothing, and therefore *must* exist. The argument both strengthens and parallels the goddess's earlier endorsement of the route of 'is' and her condemnation of the route of 'is not.' In fragment 2 what-is-not cannot be known or pointed out; in fragment 6 nothing is 'not there' to exist. In both passages the argument exploits an apparent difficulty in making reference to the non-existent.

This difficulty has a striking affinity to the contemporary problem of understanding negative existential statements.[24] It seems that the subject terms of such statements cannot be assigned a referent without self-contradiction. Yet if their subject terms have no referent, how can such statements have meaning? One who speaks of nothing, it appears, is not saying anything, but is talking nonsense.[25] We should recognize, however, that the Parmenidean interdict against speaking or thinking of the non-existent is not directed against the non-entities that have loomed largest in modern philosophical discussion – unicorns, mermaids, centaurs, and the like. If Parmenides were perplexed merely by the ascription of non-existence to fictional objects, it would remain unclear why he should draw the strange conclusions that he does about non-fictional ones. It would be hard to understand why problems about the non-existence of unicorns or mermaids should be thought to jeopardize ordinary beliefs in the existence of lions and tigers. But it seems unlikely from fragment 7 that the non-entities impugned by the goddess are meant to include fictional objects. For after denouncing mortal beliefs in strongly abusive terms (6.4–9), she proceeds to inveigh against trusting in the 'aimless eye and ringing ear and tongue' (7.4–5).[26] What she is condemning here can hardly be fictional objects, but must rather be items to whose existence the sense organs bear witness, the sensible objects of mortal belief. But then it must be asked how the interdict against speaking or thinking of the non-existent entails the

downfall of those objects. Why is the world of plurality and change to be dismissed as some kind of illusion?

Mortals accept a plurality of diverse objects answering to the names of their language. Among these are the traditional 'opposites' of Greek cosmology, 'hot' and 'cold,' 'wet' and 'dry,' 'light' and 'dark.' Such names are applied by mortals to some regions of space and time but not to others: hot or wet or light exists here but not there; cold or dry or dark exists now but not then. Our ordinary application of such names necessarily excludes application of their opposites: if hot or wet or light exists here and now, then cold or dry or dark does not. Such exclusions are clearly entailed by any description of the world in sensible terms. Without implicit contrasts our names could not have the determinate significance that they do. Thus, if we may not say that cold does not exist here and now, then 'hot' will no longer mean what we think it does. Our language, purporting to name a host of different things, will thus reflect a pervasive illusion. And this is precisely the conclusion that the goddess draws in two later passages.

First, at 8.38–41, she claims that all things established by mortals in the belief that they are real or true will be (mere) 'name'; or else, with the alternative text preferred here, which has much to be said for it,[27] all names established by mortals in the belief that they are true have been given with reference to the unique reality that she herself affirms. On the first interpretation she is saying bluntly that all mortal talk of the sensible world is mere *flatus vocis*. On the second she is suggesting that all mortal names have been applied in a dim or groping apprehension of the one reality. But on either view she is drawing the consequences of her interdict against speech or thought of the non-existent. None of the things that mortals believe to be real can possibly be so. Their beliefs that these things 'come-to-be and perish, are and are not, shift place and exchange bright colour' are all alike chimerical.

The second passage is 8.53–54. Unfortunately this couplet is more than usually ambiguous, and it is impossible to be sure of its meaning. It says that mortals established two forms for naming, 'of which it is not right to name one – wherein they have gone astray.' Amongst several other uncertainties, it is unclear whether the clause 'of which it is not right to name one' expresses *the goddess's* disapproval of mortals for naming one form or *mortals' own* belief that they must not do so. It is also unclear whether it is the naming of one form, or of one only, or of both forms (ie, even as many as one), that is being condemned. But an appropriate sense is obtained by taking the clause as saying, from mortals' perspective, that one form within any specific pair of opposites must not be named.[28] For, given the dualities that they name, to be instanced by the primordial opposites 'fire' and 'night' in the following lines (8.55–59, cf fr 9), mortals think that they must always

exclude one member of such a pair from regions of space and time occupied by the other.[29] Such exclusions are necessary, as we have seen, for mortal names to mean what we think they do. But it is with just these exclusions that the goddess is finding fault, when she adds 'wherein they have gone astray.'[30] Mortal error consists not in the naming of two forms *per se* but in treating them as mutually exclusive, so that in any given context 'it is not right to name one.'[31] This reading accords with the view of mortal naming suggested above. Moreover, the 'straying' of mortals, if understood thus, aptly echoes the imagery of fragment 6, where they were depicted as wandering helplessly adrift (6.5–6), and as following a 'backward-turning path' (6.9). In both places they have erred through embracing 'is not' equally with 'is,' an embrace to which their espousal of difference and contrast has committed them.

In fragment 6 they were traduced as 'uncritical tribes, by whom being and not-being have been thought both the same and not the same' (6.7–9). There has been prolonged and inconclusive debate as to the target of this polemic.[32] Many have taken the couplet as an attack upon the Heracleitean doctrine of the identity of opposites. Reference to Heracleitus' views has often been seen in the words 'the path of all is backward-turning' (6.9). But the case for connecting these words uniquely, or even primarily, with Heracleitus is greatly weakened if the 'path' in question is one travelled not by 'all things' (ie, all elements in nature) but by 'all men.'[33] The word for 'path' has already occurred in 'the path of Persuasion' (2.4), where it must mean a road to be travelled by a seeker of truth rather than by natural elements. As for 'backward-turning,' this could as well refer to the vacillations of inconsistent people as to reciprocal processes in nature. It need not be denied that Heracleitus might be condemned here along with other mortals, in as much as he too subscribed to the reality of change. But it seems unlikely that Parmenides should have quoted or paraphrased an abstruse Ionian intellectual in order to represent beliefs held by 'uncritical tribes' of anonymous 'mortals.' On a Heracleitean reading, moreover, the whole passage 6.4–9 will contain virtually no argument, but will simply consist in abuse of mortals for believing Heracleitean teaching. Logically, the passage becomes far more effective if the final couplet is read not as merely stating or paraphrasing its opponents' position, but as drawing out the paradox inherent in that position by reducing it to self-contradiction. It is not that mortals explicitly hold that 'being and not-being are both the same and not the same,' but that their beliefs in plurality and change have this absurd implication.

But why should they have this implication? It is obvious enough why mortals should be supposed to regard being and not-being as 'not the same.' But why should they be accused of simultaneously identifying them? The

point is perhaps as follows.[34] In holding that, for example, hot exists here and now, mortals are committed, as we have seen, to the belief that cold does not. They naturally suppose that these beliefs concern two different things, hot and cold, and that two different, indeed opposite, things are being held about them: of the former that it does exist here and now, and of the latter that it does not. But in saying of cold that it does not exist here and now, mortals are implicitly treating it as existent. For it has already been argued that the non-existent cannot be spoken or thought of. Hence in speaking of cold at all, mortals must – if they wish to say anything meaningful – be presupposing that it does exist, even in the very act of maintaining that it does not. Hence they are treating the non-existent as if it were existent. They are 'uncritical' (*akrita*, 6.7) in that they fail to maintain a consistent separation (*krisis*, cf 8.15) between 'is' and 'is not.' Even in trying to distinguish existence from non-existence they confuse them. They speak of non-beings as if they were beings. And this, the goddess insists, is intolerable: 'for never shall this prevail, that things that are not *are*' (7.1).

So far Parmenides' argument has been expounded primarily in terms of the traditional opposites. In view of their role in the poem[35] these have seemed the terms in which he would most likely have framed the argument himself. But it is clear that the argument need not be restricted to those terms. It would hold for any term whose application to a given region of space and time excludes the application of at least one other. Thus, it would hold for descriptive or classificatory terms quite generally. Names like 'lion' or 'tiger' do not stand for traditional opposites, but there are a host of other terms whose application is excluded by their use. The argument might therefore be generalized as follows: where '*N*' is any name of mortal speech with a determinate sense, we may say neither that *N* exists nor that it does not. Any attempt to say either of these things will prove to be incoherent. *N* cannot be meaningfully spoken or thought of at all. Given such stringent criteria for what *can* be spoken and thought of, it follows that nothing in the sensible world is a possible object of speech and thought. There can be only one such object, and that is the unique reality whose description occupies most of fragment 8. To that description we may now turn.

2 / The Nature of Reality (Fragment 8.1–51)

a / The program

At 8.2–4 the goddess sets forth a group of attributes that she calls 'signs' on the route. The word rendered 'signs' (*sēmata*) will be used at 10.2 of the stars, doubtless with reference to their role as markers in navigation.[36] Presumably, here too 'signs' are marks enabling the traveller to recognize the route,

features that must characterize a genuine subject of thought and discourse. These features are as follows: 'ungenerated' and 'imperishable' (8.3); 'whole,' 'single-limbed,' 'steadfast,' and (probably) 'complete' (8.4). The exact wording remains uncertain because of textual difficulties at the beginning and end of 8.4.[37] But the list just given corresponds reasonably closely to the tasks undertaken in what follows. Thus, from 8.6 to 8.21 the subject will be proved 'ungenerated and imperishable'; at 8.22–25 'indivisible,' ie, 'whole' or 'single-limbed'; at 8.26–31 changeless and motionless, ie, 'steadfast'; and at 8.32–33 'complete.' There follow eight lines (8.34–41) that seem intended as a résumé of the argument thus far. If so, the program mapped out in 8.2–4 has by that point been completed. The rest of the Way of Truth (8.42–49) will lie outside the scope of the program as originally stated. Its role will perhaps be to characterize the subject in more positive terms than those used hitherto.[38]

b / Is Reality 'Timeless'? (8.5–6, 8.19–20)

Before embarking upon her disproof of genesis and perishing, the goddess says of her subject:

> Nor was [it] once, nor will [it] be, since [it] is, now,
> all together,
> One, continuous. (8.5–6)

Do these notoriously difficult verses contain the idea that her reality is 'timeless' or 'atemporal'?[39]

An alternative, and more usual, rendering of them runs: 'Nor was it *ever*, nor will it be, since etc.' This makes the goddess deny that her subject existed at *any* time in the past or will exist at *any* time in the future. Given this interpretation, Parmenides has been credited with the conception of an 'eternal present' or with the discovery of the 'timeless' use of the present tense. On this view, he anticipated Plato's denial that 'was' and 'will be' are applicable to his Forms (*Timaeus* 37d–38a). Since Parmenides' universe is utterly changeless, no temporal phase of it can be distinguished from any other. Consequently, no temporal distinctions can be meaningfully drawn, and all times must be identical. Thus, the present lines have been read as a reaction against Heracleitus' dictum, 'This world order ... none of the gods or men did make, but it always was and is and shall be ever-living fire ...' (D-K 22 B30). Moreover, when the later Eleatic, Melissus, wrote 'it is and always was and always will be' (D-K 30 B2, cf B1), it has been suggested that he was reverting to a more simple-minded view: reality is not timeless but merely of infinite duration.

It is, however, doubtful whether the more sophisticated thesis is to be found in Parmenides' text. It is a major difficulty for the 'atemporal' view

that the goddess should use the temporal terms 'now' and 'continuous' in the very act of denying that temporal distinctions can be drawn. But even if this difficulty can be overcome, it remains far from obvious how the words 'since [it] is, now, all together' could be supposed to prove the subject altogether devoid of past or future existence. In general, an inference from 'X exists now, all together' to 'X never existed in the past' or 'X never will exist in the future' is invalid. The fact that Mount Everest, say, exists 'now, all together' does not entail that it never existed in the past or that it never will exist in the future. To be sure, if the premiss 'it is, now, all together' were simply to *mean* that all supposed phases of the subject's history are really co-existent, then indeed it could have no past or future. But in that case the 'premiss' would not provide a ground for the conclusion, but would be merely an alternative way of stating it.[40]

An intelligible argument is obtained if we connect the words 'since [it] is, now, all together' with the disproof of genesis that lies immediately ahead (8.6–21). The goddess will insist (8.11) that the subject must either exist completely or not at all. Since the latter alternative is ruled out, it must exist 'now, all together.' Moreover, since it exists as 'one, continuous' entity (8.6), as will be proved later (8.22–25), it must enjoy unbroken existence both past and future. Hence it is not the case either that it once existed (but does so no longer), or that it will (one day) exist (but not yet).

The subject is accordingly declared to be neither a mere 'has-been' nor a mere 'will-be.' This will be the sense of 8.5 on the translation preferred above. Such a declaration would form an apt preface to the section proving the subject incapable of genesis or perishing. For a mere 'has-been' would already have perished, and a mere 'will-be' would still remain to be generated. So the possibilities rejected here are special cases of those to be disproved in what follows. Moreover, the section finishes with a close counterpart to the present declaration. For at 8.19–20 the line of thought, at least with respect to the future, is recognizably similar. The goddess there argues that the subject 'is not,' if it is going to be at some time in the future. Once again, she could not validly infer the subject's non-existence in the present merely from its existing at some point in the future: that would be like arguing that Mount Everest does not exist now, since it will exist next year. What she can validly argue is that if the subject *is going to* (ie, will begin to) exist in the future, then it does not exist as yet. And that inference would be comparable with her claim regarding the future at 8.5, as we have just interpreted it.[41]

The present verses can, then, be understood and related to their context in a way that does not commit Parmenides to the conception of a 'timeless' reality or truth.

c / 'Ungenerated and imperishable' (8.6–21)

As a disproof of genesis and perishing this section is well marked, with the conclusion clearly stated in the closing line. Its internal structure is, however, far from easy to understand, and hinges largely upon the text adopted in one critical line (8.12). With the text and translation given in the present version, the argument has often been understood as follows: 'If there is genesis, then *either* the subject arose from what-is-not, *or* it arose from what-is. But it did not arise from what-is-not; nor did it arise from what-is. Therefore there can be no genesis.' This reading of the argument requires an emendation at 8.12 which has not been universally accepted. It is, however, a plausible one, and a strong case for it can be made. It allows the logical structure to be taken as dilemmatic: if *p*, then either *q* or *r*; but not-*q*; and not-*r*; therefore not-*p*.[42]

The disproof of *q* (genesis from what-is-not) consists of two arguments. The first (8.7–9) repeats the prohibition against saying or thinking that any possible subject of discourse 'is not.' To suppose that the subject arose from what-is-not is forbidden, since no such source could legitimately be thought of or mentioned. The second argument (8.9–10) is framed as a rhetorical question: why should the subject, if it arose from what-is-not, have arisen later rather than sooner? No reason (it is implied) could be given for its arising just when it did, or (on a stronger interpretation) at any particular time at all. This argument, which is paralleled in the antithesis to Kant's First Antinomy, depends upon the principle of 'sufficient reason.' For it assumes that the subject could not have arisen at a given point in time, unless there had been sufficient reason for its doing so; but evidently, no such reason could be adduced, since, if it came from nothing, *ex hypothesi* no prior state of affairs obtained.[43]

The rejection of *r* (genesis from what-is) is to be found, on the present interpretation, at 8.12 (as emended). The goddess does not, however, explicitly argue against *r* at this point. She must be taken to assume that what-is is unique: it could not have been generated from anything else besides itself, simply because there is nothing else. The claim that there is, and will be, nothing else is, indeed, made subsequently (8.36–38). But in as much as that later stage of the argument depends upon the results of earlier ones, some suspicion of circularity will arise at that point (see (f) below).

Finally, it is important to note that although this section purports to disprove not only genesis but also perishing (8.14, 8.21), the text, as just interpreted, deals explicitly only with the former. Presumably, an isomorphic argument against perishing has to be assumed: perishing would entail the subject's subsequent non-existence, or its dissolution into nothing; and

this would be as inconceivable as its emergence from nothing. But such an argument is nowhere expressly stated, and has to be supplied from the context.[44]

d / 'Indivisible' (8.22–25 with fragment 4)

This section proves the subject a continuous 'whole.' Reality is an indivisible plenum: '[it] is all full of what-is' (8.24). In saying 'what-is is in contact with what is' (8.25), the goddess does not, presumably, mean to recognize two or more discrete entities adjacent to one another: she is expressing the idea of an unbroken continuum, with no 'gaps' to separate one region of it from another, 'keep it from holding together' (8.23). A similar line of thought is suggested by fragment 4:

> Look upon things which, though far off, are yet
> firmly present to the mind;
> For you[45] shall not cut off what-is from holding fast
> to what-is. (4.1–2)

The location and meaning of this fragment are uncertain, but its point seems akin to that of the present passage. Even things far off are 'present to the mind,' since they cannot mentally be distinguished from what is close at hand. The continuum precludes any such distinctions from being drawn.

The crucial premiss of the argument occurs at 8.22. The subject is indivisible, 'since [it] all alike is.' These words are often given as 'since it is all alike,' thereby representing the subject as homogeneous. But the argument is more cogent if 'alike' is taken adverbially.[46] The subject exists alike at every point: there are no gaps in which it 'is not.' It does not exist any more at one point than at another (8.23–24). This interpretation enables the premiss to be derived from the earlier argument (8.15–18, cf 8.11). The alternative version is less attractive, since no argument has yet been given to prove the subject homogeneous. Nor would homogeneity render it 'indivisible' in the most obvious sense of 'not dissectible.' But whether or not the goddess means to assert here that her subject 'is all alike,' it remains true that no differentiation within it would in fact be possible. For in claiming that it was *F* at one point but not *F* at another, one would be committed to saying that *F* existed at the former point but not at the latter. And since no genuine subject admits of being so characterized, reality must be perfectly homogeneous.

It is hard to decide whether the continuum proved here is spatial or temporal or both.[47] If 'continuous' at 8.25 picks up the same word from 8.6, and if that is to be read temporally, as its context seems to require, there is a good case for regarding the present passage as at least including temporal continuity. Moreover, if its argument is taken as exclusively temporal, a

later section (8.44–48), in which a closely similar argument is deployed, will not be an otiose duplication of the present one. Its purpose will be to transfer the reasoning from a temporal to a spatial context. However, Parmenides' language in the present section is far more naturally read as spatial, and will bear a temporal interpretation only with considerable strain. Moreover, if taken as an argument for a spatial plenum, the passage contributes powerfully to the case for the subject's being completely 'chained up,' which follows immediately.

e / 'Changeless, motionless, and complete' (8.26–33)

The subject is now shown to be incapable of undergoing any kind of change, either qualitative alteration or locomotion. The image of 'enchainment' (8.26, 8.31) is used here, as earlier (8.14), to express absolute invariance. The subject is 'tied up,' so that it cannot move or alter in any way.

Two arguments are advanced. The first (8.26–28) invokes the earlier disproof of genesis and perishing. If nothing can be generated or perish, change is thereby eliminated. For a change from, say, white to black would entail the perishing of white and the genesis of black. More generally, where *F* and *G* are taken to be incompatible properties, then if the subject is to be *F* at one time but *G* later, *F* must perish and *G* must come into being. But if all genesis and perishing are impossible, no such change could take place.

The scope of the above argument will depend upon the meaning of 'changeless' (*akinēton*) at 8.26. Is the 'change' here disproved merely 'qualitative' or does it include movement in space? The later Greek concept of change (*kinēsis*) embraces both notions (cf Plato, *Theaetetus* 181c–d); and that the goddess means to eliminate both is clear from 8.41, where she rules out 'shift of place and exchange of bright colour.' But it is not certain that locomotion is meant to be excluded by the foregoing argument as a form of change or process. For it is not obvious why the elimination of genesis and perishing should, of itself, suffice to immobilize the subject. Possibly, Parmenides did not distinguish change from motion; or he may have supposed that a denial of either one entailed denial of the other. Alternatively, 'changeless' in 8.26 refers only to qualitative change, in which case the disproof of locomotion must be sought in what follows.

In the second argument (8.29–33) the subject's immobility is connected with its self-identity, and is then linked with its completeness. It is said to remain 'the same and in the same (sc. place),' and thus to lie 'by itself' firmly where it is. Its self-identity guarantees its complete stability: in changing its position, the subject would cease to be itself.[48] The exclusion of all difference proves total lack of variation, including change of place. What is not

unambiguously present in these lines, however, is an argument often attributed to Parmenides from the non-existence of void space in which the subject would have room to move. Such an argument against motion is explicit in Melissus (D-K 30 B7.7). But Parmenides does not use the term 'void' (*kenon*). Whether this line of thought is to be found here, or elsewhere in the poem, remains controversial.[49]

The goddess proceeds to derive the subject's static state from its being held by Necessity 'in the chains of a limit, which fences it about.' She then says: 'wherefore (or because)[50] it is not right for what-is to be incomplete; for [it] is not lacking; but if [it] were, [it] would lack everything' (8.32–33).[51] The text and logic of these lines are extremely doubtful. With the text printed, the best interpretation is probably that, if the subject were lacking in anything, it would lack everything, in virtue of the original disjunction between 'being completely or not at all' (8.11). Hence, what-is is not lacking anything; hence it must be complete. But even if this reconstruction is correct, the main point remains obscure, because it is not clear what is meant here by 'chains of a limit' or by 'incomplete.' Some have taken 'limit' literally as a physical boundary: the subject is not boundless; it is 'fenced about,' hence (or because) it is spatially finite. But the concept of a spatial boundary gives rise to intolerable difficulty for Parmenides.[52] 'Incomplete' seems more likely to mean 'imperfect,' 'in need,' or 'deficient,' as will appear from the elaboration at 8.42–49 (see (g) below). 'Chains of a limit' need not mean spatial boundary, but may be merely an image, like the 'chains' at 8.26, to express the subject's incapacity for variation of any kind whatever. The subject is metaphorically rather than literally chained up. Certainty about this passage is, however, unattainable.

f / Résumé (8.34–41 with fragment 5)

The goddess now recapitulates her argument thus far. She begins by reiterating the basic principle that thinking is inseparable from what-is (8.34–36). She then reaffirms the subject's uniqueness, wholeness, and changelessness (8.36–38). Finally, she disparages mortal beliefs in genesis and perishing, being and not-being, and change of place or colour (8.38–41). Thus her broad strategy seems clear: she recalls the claim of what-is to be the sole existent, reviews its essential features, and finally rejects the changing manifold of mortal belief.

The linguistic section of this passage (8.38–41) has already been discussed, and its connection with the basic argument as outlined above (section IV(1)) is fairly obvious. But the passage is perplexing in other respects, more particularly in its logical structure. For it introduces at least

an appearance of circularity into the wider argument. At 8.36–38 the subject's uniqueness is sometimes held to be proved as follows:

> For nothing else <either> is or will be
> Besides what is, since it was just this that Fate
> did shackle
> To be whole and changeless.

Here the subject's present and future uniqueness seems to be derived from its being 'whole and changeless.' But changelessness was, in its turn, derived from the disproof of genesis and perishing (8.26–28). And yet the elimination of genesis, if correctly interpreted in (c) above, itself required the assumption that what-is is unique. For only on that assumption could the goddess earlier (8.12) exclude the hypothesis that it was generated from what-is. There is therefore at least some reason to suspect circularity. Parmenides here invokes changelessness in order to affirm uniqueness. Yet he earlier needed uniqueness in order to disprove genesis, and thus change.[53]

Such circularity will seem vicious, if we think that a closed circle of propositions carries no guarantee of objective truth. But an interpretation of Parmenides that renders his argument circular need not thereby be vitiated. For circularity might be redeemed by the argument's divine provenance. The goddess's discourse is a speech and thought 'about' truth (8.50–51).[54] It would not be inappropriate for it to reflect the sphere-like character of its subject, just as it clearly reflects the constraints of Necessity in its logical rigour. If fragment 5 is genuine,[55] the goddess somewhere says:

> And it is all one to me
> Where I am to begin; for I shall return there again.

If this mysterious remark characterizes her own procedure in the Way of Truth, it suggests that her starting point is a matter of indifference, because her path is somehow a circular one. It has even been taken to mean that 'every attribute of reality can be derived from every other.'[56] This goes far beyond the available evidence. No such ordered pattern of circular reasoning has ever been traced; nor perhaps could it be, given the fragmentary state of the text. But the possibility that the original discourse contained self-conscious circularity remains an intriguing, even if unprovable, speculation.[57]

g / 'Like a well-rounded sphere' (8.42–49)

In the final section of the Way of Truth the goddess introduces the striking image of a 'sphere' or 'ball.'[58] The subject is said to be 'like the bulk of a

well-rounded sphere, everywhere from the centre equally matched' (8.43–44). The purpose and implications of this comparison are puzzling. Certainly, it need not entail that the subject is thought of as corporeal, or even as spatially extended. 'Like a sphere' might be used to describe a physical object, such as an orange. But it might also be used as 'circular,' 'triangular,' and 'square' are often used in English, to characterize a non-spatial item bearing some important resemblance to the relevant shape. From the fact that the goddess calls her reality 'sphere-like,' it therefore cannot be inferred that she did, or that she did not, conceive of it in material or spatial terms.

The words that introduce the comparison (8.42) have sometimes been supposed to show that she did. For the usual translation, 'since there is a furthest limit (*peiras*),' suggests that the subject has a spatial boundary. And since Parmenides' disciple, Melissus, expressly affirmed the subject to be spatially, as well as temporally, unlimited (D-K 30 B3), he has traditionally been supposed to have deviated from his master's teaching on this point.

However, even if 'spatial boundary' were the correct interpretation of Parmenides' word *peiras*, his choice of a sphere would remain opaque. There would seem no reason why he should opt for a sphere, as opposed to a cube or a cylinder or any other definite shape that could be said to have a 'furthest limit' in this sense. Yet an interpretation is surely needed that will make the sphere uniquely apt to express his point.[59] In any case, it is clear that a description of the subject as being literally either spherical or of any other definite shape would be virtually impossible to reconcile with the goddess's basic argument. For it would immediately invite the question 'what lies beyond the limit?'; and to this she could hardly answer 'nothing,' without violating the fundamental principle of her whole discourse. Given her strictures on the concept of 'nothing' (6.2), or 'what-is-not,' which are repeated in this very passage (8.46–47), it seems quite inconceivable that she would have tolerated a void outside of the universe any more than gaps inside it.[60]

It is therefore better to understand 8.42 not as attributing to the subject literally 'a furthest limit,' but rather as asserting it to be absolutely 'complete,' 'perfect,' or 'finished.' The line picks up the conclusion reached earlier (8.31–32), that the subject is 'not incomplete,' and argues accordingly that its perfect state leaves no room for further development of any kind. On this view the comparison with a 'well-rounded sphere' comes into its own. Like a ball well turned on the potter's wheel, the subject exhibits perfect symmetry, and has no deficiency from any perspective. The sphere, as has been well observed, is 'the only solid that displays the same shape from every

angle.'[61] It is thus uniquely fitted to express the notion of an absolutely invariant reality that is 'complete,' 'finished,' 'lacking in nothing.'

V THE WAY OF SEEMING
(8.51–61 WITH 1.31–32 AND FRAGMENTS 9–19)

It remains to consider the Way of Seeming in relation to the earlier parts of the poem.[62] If the conclusions of the Way of Truth are accepted, then what measure of truth, or even of probability, can be accorded to the account of the physical world contained in the Way of Seeming? And if the answer is, as it seems to be, 'none at all,' why did Parmenides include it? The question is all the more pressing when one considers the likely preponderance of the Way of Seeming in the original poem. On the usual estimates it will have been at least twice as long as the Way of Truth, amounting to at least two thirds, and possibly a much greater proportion, of the whole work.[63]

On the face of it, the goddess's teaching seems quite impossible to square with the beliefs of mortals. If reality is indeed a single, continuous, changeless, and motionless plenum, then not only must their ordinary beliefs be false, but so must the dualistic cosmogony attributed to them in 8.53–59 and in fragment 9. If the arguments of the Way of Truth are sound, there could not exist even as many as two non-identical things such as fire and night. Nor could a cosmogony developed from them claim even a degree of 'probability' or 'approximation' to the truth. The thesis of the Way of Truth, in which all genesis has been totally eliminated (8.21), would be too radical to leave room for any such development.

What light is thrown on this problem by the text? Unfortunately, two crucial lines which look forward to the Way of Seeming are particularly problematic. The last couplet of the proem runs:

> But nevertheless you shall learn these things as well,
> How the things which seem had to have genuine existence,
> permeating all things completely.
> (1.31–32)[64]

'These things' in the first line is best taken as referring back to the beliefs of mortals just declared to have 'no true trust' in them (1.30): ie, despite their admitted falsity, Parmenides is to learn those beliefs as well as the truth. The text and sense of the second line are uncertain, but the gist of it is perhaps roughly as follows: mortals were obliged to take appearances as genuinely existing, owing to their all-pervasive character. Since mortals' whole experience is permeated by phenomena, appearances were bound to have genuine existence for them. On this interpretation, no assertion is

made here by the goddess herself as to the genuineness of appearances. She merely reports, without endorsing, mortal views as to their status. But she does speak as if some explanation of those views will figure in what her listener is to learn.

It is therefore sometimes supposed that the Way of Seeming was intended to provide such an explanation. If the thesis of the Way of Truth is correct, it is suggested, then Parmenides still needs to be shown how appearances had to exist genuinely for mortals. Universal human illusions must somehow be accounted for.

But this solution is not persuasive. In the first place, a project of this kind would hardly call for an elaborate cosmology of the sort that the Way of Seeming appears to have contained. Eight of the eleven extant fragments (10–15, 17–18) deal with astronomical, biological, or theological matters, whose bearing upon universal mortal illusions is, to say the least, remote. The only fragment with obvious relevance to human cognition is 16:

> For as each man has a union of the much-wandering limbs
> of the body,
> So is mind present to men; for it is the same thing
> Which the constitution of the limbs thinks,
> Both in each and every man; for the full is thought.[65]

This is often interpreted as asserting some sort of causal linkage, or at least correlation, between thought and the constitution of the body. But even if that interpretation were certain, its application to our present problem would yield a highly paradoxical solution. It would be to suggest that mortals believe falsely in physical bodies because of their own bodily constitution. Yet presumably, if their beliefs in physical bodies were totally false, then all statements about their own bodies, including those linking their mental with their bodily states, would be equally false. And needless to say, any explanation of beliefs that are *ex hypothesi* false would be rendered incoherent, if it presupposed that those same beliefs were true. Fortunately, no such paradox need be foisted upon Parmenides. A good case has been made for assigning this fragment not to the Way of Seeming, but to the Way of Truth.[66] It has been plausibly interpreted as affirming the close relation between thought and reality maintained early in the goddess's discourse. But whatever its original context, its interpretation is too uncertain for it to lend much support to any particular view of the Way of Seeming as a whole.

In any case, the goddess does not speak like someone adducing a theory to explain illusions, as one might – for example – adduce the refraction of light to explain the appearance of sticks in water, or brain fatigue to explain mirages. A speaker adducing such a theory would neither attribute it to the

illusion's victims, nor ascribe the illusion to their holding the theory; for they may perfectly well experience it, whether they know the theory or not. Nor would the speaker himself represent the theory as false. In giving it as the explanation, he would be committed to its truth. But this is not at all the stance adopted by the goddess. On the contrary, she attributes to mortals a theory about the physical world, from which she not only stands aloof, but which she expressly declares to be mendacious. There is, she has insisted, 'no true trust' in the beliefs of mortals (1.30); and she prefaces her account of those beliefs by saying: 'from here onwards learn mortal beliefs, listening to the *deceitful* ordering of my words' (8.52).

What then are her motives? First, we should recall that at the outset of her discourse (2.1) she had charged her listener to 'convey' the story. Presumably, he is meant to spread the word to his fellow mortals and win them over to her teaching.[67] But if so, he must be forearmed to meet the objections or competing theories that they may urge upon him. He must be, as it were, immunized against their false views. Accordingly, he must be equipped with an account of the physical world, which, though typical of mortals' best efforts, is nonetheless specious, in that it rests upon dualistic principles previously diagnosed as their primal fault. For any such account must assume that at least two, mutually exclusive, forms of existent can be distinguished. Hence the goddess prefaces the Way of Seeming by making this basic mortal error the focus of attention (8.53–59). A 'plausible arrangement' (8.60) constructed upon such a false basis is, we may guess, what she intends to provide. On this interpretation, she claims no greater measure of truth for her cosmogony than for its rivals. If the physical world is wholly illusory, then all theories as to its genesis will be equally false, and it will be pointless to champion one such theory against another.[68] But if a comprehensive cosmogony, constructed on the best available 'scientific' principles, is revealed as specious, then *a fortiori* so are all other mortal accounts. In this way the goddess's teaching in the Way of Truth is secured against mortal rebuttal. Thus (8.61) no mortal opinion shall ever overtake[69] her disciple, the youth whom she has directed to 'convey' her story.

VI SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT NOTHING

Let us now return to Parmenides' starting point. As we have seen, his cardinal principle is that what-is-not, or nothing, cannot be spoken or thought of. For 'nothing is not' (6.2); it is 'not there to exist' and is therefore not a possible object of speech and thought. Since so much hinges upon this principle, it will repay some further attention.

How should the statement 'nothing is not' (S) be understood? If we equate 'nothing' with 'what-is-not,' the statement asserts that what-is-not is not (S1). S1 is a necessary truth. For (S2) necessarily, what does not exist, does not exist. But S2 neither means nor entails that (S3) what does not exist, necessarily does not exist.[70] Yet it is S3 that is needed to prove that what does not exist *cannot* exist, hence cannot be spoken or thought of; and hence to prove that what can be spoken and thought of *must* exist (6.1).

On the reading of 'nothing is not' just entertained, the goddess has committed a distressing modal fallacy.[71] Since this diagnosis seems fatal to her enterprise, let us consider an alternative interpretation. In saying 'nothing is not,' she might be insisting that there is no entity named 'nothing,' and casting doubt, accordingly, upon the use of 'nothing' in ordinary contexts. If there is no entity named 'nothing,' and if mortal speech and thought assume otherwise, then mortal speech and thought need correction. Hence her veto upon speaking or thinking of the non-existent.

To be sure, the word 'nothing,' as normally used, does not name an entity. To say, for example, 'nothing is in this box' is not to affirm the presence in the box of an entity called 'nothing,' but is simply to deny the presence in it of anything. But although this is true, it would be perverse to impugn the word's normal usage by insisting that an entity named 'nothing' does not exist. One may agree that no such entity exists. But since no ordinary user of the word thinks otherwise, the meaning or truth of what he wishes to say with it is not imperilled by this admission. Of course, if statements like 'nothing is in this box' somehow committed the speaker unawares to the idea that it contains an entity called 'nothing,' then by scouting that idea, the goddess would be undermining such statements. But it would be unfair to insist upon construing them eccentrically, and then to draw paradoxical consequences. Thus, it would be fallacious to argue that since there is no such entity as nothing, it must be false that nothing is in any part of the box; hence there must be something in every part of the box; and hence the box must be full. Yet may not the goddess's basic argument, and her subsequent deductions, be understood in this light? Is she not treating 'nothing' as if it pretended to the status of a genuine name? If so, since 'nothing,' as used in mortal speech and thought, makes no such pretensions, she now seems guilty of attacking mortal men of straw.

Her argument, on this view of it, recalls a logical pun of a kind made famous by Lewis Carroll,[72] but actually as old as Homer. In the ninth book of the *Odyssey*, the Cyclops, Polyphemus, is tricked by being told that Odysseus' name is 'No-one.' Parmenides' familiarity with this memorable incident can hardly be doubted, and his own treatment of the word

'nothing' may even be a conscious echo of it, in keeping with the Odyssean character of his poem.[73] It will therefore be worth digressing briefly, to consider what relation the Cyclops incident actually bears to the goddess's argument.

The ambiguities in Homer's story are more intricate than is often recognized. Thus, Polyphemus is sometimes said to have answered 'No-one' in reply to the simple question *who* is killing him.[74] But no such question is ever asked. First, Odysseus tells the Cyclops that his name is 'No-one' (IX.366–7). Later (398–412), when he has been blinded, he cries out in great pain, and awakens his fellow Cyclopes. They gather outside his cave, and say:

> Surely no one of mortals can be driving your sheep
> off against your will?
> Surely no one can be killing you yourself by fraud
> or by force?[75]

Polyphemus tries to answer: 'No-one is killing me by fraud, and not by force' (408). He means that an assailant named 'No-one' *is* killing him in the first way, though not in the second. His hearers take him to mean that he is not being killed by anyone in either way. So they say (410–412):

> Well, if you are alone, and no one is using force
> against you,
> There is no avoiding the sickness sent by great Zeus;
> So you had better pray to your father, the lord Poseidon

whereupon they go away.[76]

A recent critic has seen the Polyphemus incident as 'a dramatic illustration of Parmenidean philosophy.'[77] Polyphemus, he suggests, commits the same error as the mortals attacked by Parmenides' goddess, namely, that of trying to speak and think about 'Nobody.' His fellow Cyclopes, on the other hand, are supposed to agree with the Parmenidean premiss: 'you cannot recognize or attend to that which is not.' They realize that 'nobody' or 'no one' cannot be an object of thought or conceived of as an agent. It is their agreement with this premiss that gives Odysseus his advantage.

But this view of the incident is not convincing. Stupid though Polyphemus is, he does not suppose that one can recognize or attend to 'that which is not.' He does not imagine that he is being attacked by a pseudo-subject. He thinks, correctly, that he is being attacked by a genuine one. He also thinks, incorrectly (though with good reason), that this subject's name is 'No-one.' He is mistaken not with regard to his assailant's reality, but only with regard to his name. Nor do the other Cyclopes harbour the Parmenidean view that 'no one' cannot be an object of thought or conceived of as an agent. It is not this that gives Odysseus his advantage. It is simply their

failure to interpret 'no one' in its unfamiliar use as a proper name.[78] To be sure, they think that Polyphemus must have gone mad. But they think this, not because he claims to be assailed by a pseudo-subject, but because, even though he seems to be all alone and says himself that he is not being tricked or assaulted by *anyone*, he is making a terrible hullaballoo.[79]

Polyphemus' mistake is not, in fact, akin to any error actually committed by mortals, whatever Parmenides' goddess may say about them. They do not make his mistake of thinking the name of an existent person to be 'No-one.' Nor, therefore, when they use the word 'no one,' are they trying to think or speak of a person with that name. And likewise, when they use the word 'nothing,' they are not reifying its bearer, because it never occurs to them to suppose that it has one.[80] So if Parmenides *did* mean to suggest a parallel between mortal error and that of the Cyclops, it is he who was in error. If anyone is mistreating 'nothing' by assimilating it to a name, it is not mortals but the goddess herself.

This accusation may be thought unfair to her. Far from mistreating 'nothing' as the name of something, it might be said that she is insisting, quite rightly, that it is not a name at all. The route of 'is not' is expressly said to be 'unnameable' (8.17), and what else is this but to deny that 'nothing' is a genuine name? Moreover, her own usage of the word seems perfectly innocent. When she abuses mortals as 'knowing nothing' (6.4), she is not asserting that they know an entity called 'nothing'; she is simply denying that they know anything. Likewise, when she says 'for nothing else <either> is or will be besides what-is' (8.36–37), she is not asserting that besides what-is there is or will be an entity called 'nothing'; she is simply denying that there is or ever will be anything besides what-is. Again, when she refuses to allow that her subject could have originated from what-is-not or nothing (8.7–10), she does so because one may not say or think that the subject 'is not.' It is precisely because the word 'nothing' has no bearer that what-is cannot be identified with it at any time, and thus cannot have developed from it. So far from committing the Homeric equivocation, she is actually denying the very assumption upon which it relies.

It is doubtful, however, whether this defence of her can succeed. For the conclusion which her argument at 6.1–2 purports to prove cannot be secured by taking the premiss 'nothing is not' in the purely formal way that the defence suggests. The goddess wishes, or so it would appear, to argue for the existence of an actual object for speech and thought. Her claim is not merely that *if* anything can be spoken and thought of, it exists, or that whatever can be spoken and thought of (if anything) exists. She is making the stronger claim that there *does* and *must* exist something to be spoken and thought of. For the attributes that she deduces in fragment 8 seem to

characterize not merely whatever there is (if anything) that can be an object for speech and thought, but rather the unique reality that is such an object.[81] In advocating the route of 'is' as the only tenable one, she is claiming that such an object does indeed exist.

But is such a claim legitimate as an inference from 'nothing is not' (6.2), if we interpret that premiss in the way just suggested in the goddess's defence? It seems that it is not. For if the premiss is taken simply as a denial that the word 'nothing' is a genuine name, then no existential conclusion follows. From the fact that the word 'nothing' has no referent, we cannot infer that anything does in fact exist at all. To be sure, if we interpreted the words 'nothing exists' in their ordinary sense, then their negation would entail 'something exists,' just as the negation of 'nothing is in the box,' taken in its ordinary sense, entails 'something is in the box.' But this entailment does not hold if we interpret 'nothing is not' in the purely formal manner suggested above. If the goddess is merely making the 'metalinguistic' point that 'nothing' is not the name of anything, it does not follow that there exists any actual object for speech and thought. Someone might grant that whatever can be spoken and thought of must exist, and yet deny that anything actually need exist at all. For he might accept the consequence that there is no genuine speech or thought. What passes for speech and thought might be mere nonsense.

How could Parmenides counter such an objection? Perhaps he might reply that it is forestalled by the very framework of the goddess's discourse. She can take it for granted that there is speech and thought, *because she is speaking and thinking herself*. One cannot say that one is not speaking, or think that one is not thinking, without seeming to contradict or contra-think oneself. 'I am speaking' (as spoken) and 'I am thinking' (as thought) are self-verifying in a way in which, for example, 'I am eating' is not. Hence the importance to Parmenides' argument of the concepts of 'speech' and 'thought.'[82] The goddess ends her discourse on truth with the words 'here I stop my trustworthy *speech* to you and *thought* about truth' (8.50–51). The nouns are cognate with the verbs she had used for speaking and thinking at 6.1. And this suggests that the self-verifying character of her own speech and thought was in the poet's mind.[83]

How much weight would such a Cartesian counter-argument carry? As developed by a mortal speaker or thinker, it would seem, none whatever. He might well be deluded in saying or thinking that he was speaking or thinking. For his utterances and thoughts might be sheer nonsense, and thus would not constitute genuine speech or thought at all. Hence no Parmenidean reality would be guaranteed by their occurrence. Moreover, Parmenides himself would not, on strict Eleatic principles, even exist as a

discrete individual, and so presumably could not really be speaking or thinking.[84] His belief that he was doing so would be no less illusory than his other beliefs about the phenomenal world. In any case, a Cartesian argument of the type just outlined would plainly be too weak to establish the single, continuous existent that Parmenides needs. For human acts of speech and thought are finite and discontinuous. Like Descartes' inferences to his own existence, Parmenides' own intermittent acts of speech and thought could guarantee a real object only on those occasions when they took place.[85] To secure a perpetual object, there would be need of a perpetual act of speech or thought.

But here we must be forcibly struck by the aptness of the poet's chosen mouthpiece. In presenting his message as the teaching of a goddess, he claims superhuman authority for it, and thereby shows a proper regard for its consistency. For a mere mortal to argue from his own speech and thought to a unique and changeless reality would be not only insufficient to prove his thesis, but blatantly at odds with it. But an immortal may argue from hers, precisely because she speaks from a superhuman perspective. Unlike a human speaker or thinker, she may claim without instant self-contradiction to be speaking and thinking of a birthless and deathless reality. Her speech and thought about it are perpetuated in Parmenides' verses: she continues to dwell upon it for all time, whether anyone heeds her words or not. Thus, her authority not only underwrites the deliverances of a mortal poet's reason; it also raises those deliverances to the only level on which they could possibly make sense.

NOTES

References are given below by author's name, with a short title if more than one work by that author is listed in the Bibliography. Full details of all works referred to will be found in the Bibliography.

1 Kahn 'The Thesis of Parmenides' 720
2 Furth 242
3 Furley 'Parmenides' 47
4 See Burnet 127, 170.
5 For the view that the proem is a 'literary device,' see Tarán *Parmenides* 30–1 with n on 1.24. For a literalist view, see West 220, n 3. For criticism of older views, see Cosgrove 81–94. For Cosgrove himself (p 93) the appellation 'Youth' marks the listener's inexperience, in contrast with the 'route of much-experience' (7.3) travelled by his fellow mortals. By implication, a detachment from experience is demanded of the reader also: '[h]e is meant to abandon the counsels of habit for the power of reason, and to stand apart from his experience, open to the goddess's discourse.'
6 This has been shown in convincing detail by Havelock 133–43 and by Mourelatos *Route* ch 1, especially 12–34.
7 Havelock 136
8 For the length of the poem, see Diels *Parmenides Lehrgedicht* 25–6; and compare Burnet 171, n 3 with West 221, n 3. Diels' estimate, that nine-tenths of the 'Way of Truth' and one-tenth of the 'Way of Seeming' have survived, would yield a poem of some 500 lines in total, whereas West puts it at more like 300. No basis for these estimates is provided by their authors, and the question of length remains a matter for speculation. It has, however, some importance for the relation between the two main parts of the poem. See p 21 with note 63 below.

9 Furley 'Parmenides' 47

10 It should be added that Parmenides' fragments are, in certain respects, far better preserved than those of other pre-Socratic philosophers. In particular, they exhibit greater coherence of design and structure, thanks especially to the exceptional length and continuity of fragment 8. But Simplicius, our principal source, lived about a thousand years after Parmenides, and cannot be expected to have inherited a perfect text. See Whittaker 19–21.

11 The modern collocations, 'Way of Truth' and 'Way of Seeming,' have no textual basis either in the poem or in other ancient sources. Nouns in the genitive case used with words for 'route' refer either to the traveller or to his divine guide (1.2–3, 1.11, 1.27, 2.4, 6.9), but not to 'Truth' or 'Seeming' as constituting or defining the routes in question. Nevertheless, I follow modern practice in using 'Way of Truth' and 'Way of Seeming' as handy labels for the two portions of the goddess's discourse. These portions are not, perhaps, as sharply distinct as we tend to assume, but I take the transition between them to occur at 8.51–52.

12 For fuller discussion of the proem, see Bowra 97–112, Jaeger ch 6, especially 93–8, Fränkel 'Studies in Parmenides' 1–47.

13 It will seem awkward to understand 'the man who knows' as an initiate, when the goddess's revelation is, at this point in the narrative, still to come. This is a problem on any view of the nature of his 'knowledge,' if it is identified with what he has yet to be told. But the verb 'carries' may perhaps be read as tenseless, placing the clause outside the time-sequence of the chariot-ride, and generalizing it from the later perspective of the poet, who 'knows' by the time he tells his story.

14 This paragraph and the next are heavily indebted to Furley 'Notes on Parmenides' 1–5. See also M.H. Miller, Jr 13, 26–7, n 3, and Nussbaum 69. For the more usual reading of 'into the light,' see Kahn 'Review' 116–17. For a useful review of alternatives, including criticism of the view adopted here, see Owens 'Knowledge and *Katabasis*' (1979) 15–29.

15 These problems cannot be pursued in depth here. The view adopted below is essentially that of Owen in his fundamental study, 'Eleatic Questions,' in Furley and Allen, vol II, 48–81. See also Stokes *One and Many* ch 5, especially 120–2. The 'veridical,' 'copulative,' and 'combined' interpretations of 'is' are advocated respectively by Kahn ('The Thesis of Parmenides' and 'More on Parmenides') Mourelatos (*Route* ch 2), and Furth. I have defended the existential reading in '"Is" or "Is Not"?' and it has been reaffirmed against other views by Barnes *Presocratic Philosophers* vol I, 160–1, 329–30, nn 11, 13. I have also adopted Owen's view of the subject as 'the legitimate subject of thought or expression.' In the present essay this subject will be referred to as 'what-is,' or 'reality,' or simply as 'the subject.' The traditional 'Being' is unsatisfactory,

if only because a verbal noun would require the infinitive *einai* in Greek, whereas Parmenides regularly uses the participle *eon* (with or without the definite article). For the grammar of *eon*, see Burnet 178, n 4, Kahn 'The Thesis' 701 with n 1, T.M. Robinson 'Parmenides on Ascertainment' 628. See also Glossary, *eon, einai, esti*.

16 Owen ('Eleatic Questions' 60) translates 6.1–2: 'what can be spoken and thought of must exist; for it *can* exist, whereas nothing cannot' (following Burnet 174 with n 1). The version given above takes 'is' in the phrase 'what is there to be spoken and thought of' to mean 'is there' or 'is available,' rather than as a full-blown potential use of the verb 'to be' (= 'is possible'). Similarly with the rest of 6.1 and the start of 6.2: 'for it is there to exist; whereas nothing is not.' For this way of understanding the grammar, see Tugwell 36–7, T.M. Robinson 'Parmenides on Ascertainment' 627–8, Barnes *The Presocratic Philosophers* vol I, 159. For other versions of 6.1–2 see note ad loc.

17 This question will be raised explicitly by the goddess at 8.16, if we translate with Burnet (175) 'Is it or is it not?' placing a question mark after the words *estin ē ouk estin*. Most translators take them as an assertion, but see Gallop 67–8.

18 Note that the concepts of 'speech' and 'thought' are coupled continually throughout the Way of Truth (2.7–8, 6.1, 8.8, 8.17, 8.35–36, 8.50).

19 The equivalence is idiomatic in Greek. Cf, eg, Plato *Phaedo* 65d4–5, 74a12.

20 The repeated use of 'point out' (*phrazein*) is notable: the goddess 'points out' to her listener, with respect to the negative route of 2.5, that he could *not* 'point it out.' There may well be intentional irony in the repetition of *phrazein*. For the exact meaning of this verb (which recurs in the middle voice, meaning 'consider,' 'ponder' at 6.2), see Mourelatos *Route* 20, n 28: 'the root of the concept must be something like our "to call attention to" and "to attend (to)". The basic idea is of selective attention and focus.' For the paradox of pointing out what cannot be pointed out, compare the opening statement that there are two routes that can be thought of (2.2), one of which proves to be 'unthinkable' (8.8–9, 8.17). Kahn ('The Thesis' 703, n 4) thinks that such an interpretation of 2.2 would saddle Parmenides with a 'gratuitous contradiction.' But it would seem in keeping with the irony that Kahn himself discerns in the double use of *phrazein* at 2.6 and 2.8 (713–14, n 18). If the irony is deliberate, the goddess is not only conscious that her prohibition is self-refuting, but is actually flaunting it as such (contrary to the view expressed in Gallop 62). For the radical incoherence of Parmenides' argument on this interpretation, see Owen 'Plato and Parmenides' 275–6.

21 For this interpretation of the modal adjunct '[it] cannot not be' (2.3), and of '[it] needs must not be' (2.5), cf Gallop 78, n 37. See also n 70 below.

22 For alternative ways of taking fr 3 see note ad loc and Gallop 69, with n 36. The interpretation that identifies thinking with being is found in both of our

sources for the fragment, Plotinus and Clement of Alexandria (pp. 94–5). It has been defended by Phillips (546–60). See also Kahn 'The Thesis' 720–4, and the same author's remarks in *Gnomon* (1968) 132–3. Admittedly, on the strict monistic interpretation of Parmenides adopted in this essay, a distinction between 'thinking' and 'being' could no more have been accepted by Parmenides than any other distinction. But that implication of his position need not control the interpretation of fr 3, and may never have been faced by Parmenides himself. See Owen 'Eleatic Questions' 61, nn 53–4, Williams 219–25, esp 223–4.

23 Barnes (*The Presocratic Philosophers* vol I, 170–1) treats Parmenides as a direct ancestor of the Berkeleian argument that whatever is thought of exists. But the link that Parmenides affirms between 'thinking' and 'being' is far removed from Berkeley's *esse est percipi*. He is not maintaining, as is Berkeley in the argument at *Principles* §23 adduced by Barnes, that reality is mind-dependent. I shall suggest below that the modern parallel is with Descartes rather than with Berkeley. However that may be, it seems to me mistaken to interpret Parmenides as an 'idealist' of any kind. On this, and for the preferable interpretation of fr 3, see Burnyeat 15.

24 As discussed, for example, by Ryle. See also Barnes *The Presocratic Philosophers* vol I, 170–2.

25 'To say nothing' (*ouden legein*) can mean in Greek 'to talk nonsense.' Ordinary idiom thus enshrines a philosophical problem which Parmenides was the first to recognize. Note that the verb *legein* can mean either 'to say' or 'to speak of,' hence its object may be either what is said or what is spoken of. This ambiguity is a potent source of confusion.

26 It is not clear whether the tongue (7.5) is thought of as the organ of taste or of speech or both. See Mourelatos *Route* 77, n 6. Barnes *The Presocratic Philosophers* vol I, 296–8, argues persuasively for speech. He also plausibly interprets 7.3–6, against long tradition, not as expressing sceptical mistrust of the senses in general, but as merely insisting that an appeal to them does nothing to disprove the preceding argument: 'Parmenides is saying no more than this: "If you think my argument wrong, then *prove* it wrong; don't fall back into the lazy habits of common sense."' (298, cf 170).

27 See Woodbury 145–53, Long 88–9, Mourelatos *Route* 181–5, and Furley 'Notes on Parmenides' 7 with n 22. Cf also Owens 'Naming in Parmenides' 16–25, Nussbaum 74–5, n 37, and most recently Burnyeat 19, n 22.

28 For alternative versions of 8.54, see translation ad loc. It must be admitted that the present tense and finite verb in the clause 'of which it is not right to name one' tell in favour of taking it as expressing the goddess's disapproval of mortal beliefs rather than as part of their content. See Fränkel 'Studies in

Parmenides' 20–1 and n 58. For some further objections, see Mourelatos *Route* 82–3. But these difficulties do not seem to me decisive.

29 Thus, fire is characterized as 'everywhere the same as itself, / *But not the same as the other*' (8.57–58). The words italicized signal the exclusion of night. The picture is of opposites being 'separated' or 'set apart' from each other (cf 8.55–56), each ranged 'against' the other, neither admitting the other to its own domain.

30 With this account of mortal error compare the interpretation of F.D. Miller, Jr (255): 'The error of mortals consists in their attempt to use names for contrary forms such as "light" and "dark". Such names function as excluders, since the application of one rules out the application of the other.' Contrast the view of Kirk and Raven (281): 'in the case of the objects of sense the acceptance of one [of a pair of contraries] involves the acceptance of the other as well. Light, for instance, can only be seen to exist in its contrast with darkness; a heavy body cannot be heavy unless there is a lighter body with which to compare it; and so with all sensible contraries.' Against this Miller argues correctly (n 11) that 'what is crucial is *not* that "There is light (somewhere)" entails "There is dark (somewhere)", but that "There is light (here)" entails "There is not dark (here)".' However, Miller's account differs from mine in that he takes 'of which it is not right to name one' to mean, from the goddess's perspective, 'not *one* of which it is right to name,' emphasizing the wide scope of her condemnation: neither 'light' nor 'dark' is, in her view, a permissible name; whereas on my account only one of them is excluded in any given context. Miller's reading (advocated earlier by Cornford *Plato and Parmenides* 46, and Furley 'Notes' 5) perhaps gives a more satisfactory sense to 'one' (*mian*) and may be correct. But on the interpretation preferred above, his crucial point, that the naming of one form excludes the naming of the other, will be explicitly attributed to mortals by the goddess, and then denounced by her as the cardinal mortal sin.

31 The sense of 'naming' required by this interpretation will be using or mentioning a name rather than appointing or assigning one. For this sense, see Liddell and Scott *A Greek-English Lexicon*, sv *onomazein* I, and cf *Iliad* X.68, XXII.415, Herodotus I.86.3.

32 Tarán (69–72) reviews the case for finding in these lines an allusion to the doctrines, if not the words, of Heracleitus. For the view taken here, supported by thorough and cogent argument, see Stokes *One and Many* 109–27, 300–8. See also Jaeger 101, Fränkel 'Studies in Parmenides' 42, n 52, Owen 'Eleatic Questions' 68–9, n 1, Barnes *The Presocratic Philosophers* vol I, 167–8.

33 The word 'things' supplied in most English versions after the ambiguous 'all' simply prejudges the question in favour of the Heracleitean interpretation. See Stokes 'Parmenides' 193–4, *One and Many* 116–17, Mourelatos *Route* 78, n 7.

34 The account given here differs from the one given on p 70 of Gallop and now seems to me more likely to be correct. But even so, it will remain misleading to illustrate Parmenides' argument in fragment 6 with a contrast between real and fictional objects. See also Stokes *One and Many* 125–6.

35 Cf 8.55–59, 9.1–4, 12.1–6.

36 Compare also 'signs' (*sēmata*) at 8.55, and the cognate adjective at 19.3: 'for each of these things did men establish a name' as a sign for it (*episēmon*). Parmenides might possibly have thought of the 'signs' on the road as alternative *names* by which the subject might properly be known. But more probably the 'signs' are to be understood, with Barnes, as 'the characterizing properties of what exists and not proofs that what exists has those properties' (*The Presocratic Philosophers* vol I, 331, n 4).

37 The translation of 8.4 is based on an emendation proposed by Wilson 32–4. For alternative versions of the line see translation ad loc.

38 Thus Stokes *One and Many* 141, following Cornford 'Parmenides' Two Ways' 103. If *atalanton*, 'in equipoise' or 'balanced,' is read at the end of 8.4, then 8.42–9 can be viewed as covering the last item on the program. But in that case, 8.34–41, if taken as a résumé, becomes an awkward intrusion, and would be better placed after 8.42–49. See Barnes *The Presocratic Philosophers* vol 1, 180, 331, n 6.

39 The brief discussion that follows presents only one side of an extremely controversial and complex question. For full discussion, see Fränkel 'Studies in Parmenides' 46, n 86, Tarán 175–88, Guthrie, vol II, 28–31, Kahn 'Review' 127–9, Owen 'Plato and Parmenides,' Stokes *One and Many* 128–34, 309–11, Schofield, Tarán 'Perpetual Duration,' Whittaker *God, Time and Being* 16–32.

40 Kneale writes of 8.5 as follows: 'The existence of the One is all at once, because it involves no temporal succession of earlier and later' (88). But this practically inverts what Parmenides writes. He does not say that the subject exists all at once because it lacks temporal succession; he says that it neither was nor will be, because it is, now, all together. The difficulty for those who would read the line as proving the subject 'timeless' is to explain how this constitutes an argument.

41 The past, however, admittedly remains a problem. At 8.20 the goddess says 'For if [it] came-to-be, [it] is not.' If she means that a past genesis entails present non-existence, her argument is invalid. But if she is arguing, validly, that an earlier genesis would entail a still earlier non-existence, then her argument is not symmetrical with 8.5. For her premiss at 8.5 is that the subject exists *now*, not that it did exist at some time prior to a supposed genesis.

42 For explanations of the unemended text printed by D-K, see Stough 91–107, Schofield 116, n 18, Mourelatos *Route* 101, n 11, Cornford *Plato and Parmenides*

37, n 1. For defence of the emendation, see Taran 95–104, Stokes *One and Many* 131, with 310, nn 76, 78, Kahn 'The Thesis' 717, n 22, and Solmsen 'Light' 10–12. Even with an emended text, it is not essential to understand the argument as dilemmatic, and a strong case against doing so has been made by Barnes (*The Presocratic Philosophers*. vol I, 184–5). First, the dilemmatic structure finds no echo in Melissus (D-K 30 B1) or Empedocles (D-K 31 B11–12), who both use similar reasoning, yet never mention the second horn of the dilemma, 'generation from what-is.' Secondly, it is plausible to take the goddess as rejecting the genesis of her subject *not* from 'what-is-not' understood as a separate generator, but simply from the subject's own previously non-existent state. If that is what is meant by genesis 'from' what-is-not in lines 7–10, then genesis from what-is, conceived as a separate generator, would seem an inept alternative to set against it in a dilemmatic argument. For the two alternatives are perfectly compatible; both feature in our ordinary concept of genesis; and the elimination of genesis by rejecting the first alternative would render rejection of the second redundant. These considerations have less force against a dilemmatic reading, however, if 'what-is' is here understood as *the* thing that is, ie, if the subject is conceived as unique. For in that case, since there can be no separate generators, the only possible alternatives will be either genesis from the subject's own previously non-existent state or else genesis from its already existent self. These alternatives are genuinely incompatible, and would thus provide suitable horns for a dilemma. With the emended text at 8.12, rendered as in the translation, it will be the second of these horns that is taken in lines 12–13. But such an argument will work only if the subject's uniqueness is assumed, and this leads to circularity at 8.36–38. See section (f) with note 53 below.

43 For further discussion of this argument see Owen 'Plato and Parmenides' 278–83, and Gallop 73 with n 50. See also Barnes *The Presocratic Philosophers* vol I, 187–8, and Stokes *One and Many* 253–5, 340, for interpretations which do not make the argument depend upon the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

44 An attractive solution to this problem has been advanced by Barnes, who accepts an emended text at 8.12, translating lines 12–13 'Nor ever from what is will the strength of trust allow / it to become something apart from itself' (*The Presocratic Philosophers* vol I, 178), and paraphrasing: '"Nor from a state of existence can *O* [the object of study] become something other than what is"; i.e., *O* cannot change from existing to not existing, *O* cannot be destroyed' (189). Read thus, he suggests, the lines embody 'an implicit argument against destruction.' This neatly accommodates the implication of 8.14 that perishing has already been disproved. In addition, some editors have imported a reference to 'perishing' by emending the text at 8.19. See the version of KR, based

upon the D-K text, given in note to translation ad loc. The emendation is, however, neither necessary nor desirable. See Tarán 104, Schofield 117, n 19, Stokes *One and Many* 132, 310, n 80.

45 Or perhaps 'For it shall not cut off etc,' supplying 'the mind' as subject from the previous line. See Tarán 46–7. The fragment is multiply ambiguous and puzzling in many other ways. Cf Barnes *The Presocratic Philosophers*, vol I, 213, 333, nn 14, 15. Bicknell ('Parmenides, DK 28, B4') places the lines at the end of the poem after fragment 19.

46 Cf Owen 'Eleatic Questions' 58–9, with n 39, and Stokes *One and Many* 134–5, 308–9, n 69. For the opposite view, see Mourelatos *Route* 111, n 30.

47 Owen ('Eleatic Questions' 63–4) reads the lines as exclusively temporal. See also Barnes *The Presocratic Philosophers* vol I, 211–12. For criticism of this view, see Guthrie 34, n 1, Tugwell 37–9, Stokes *One and Many* 135–7, Schofield 118–19, n 25, 129–34.

48 This has been plausibly elaborated by Mourelatos *Route* 116–19.

49 See Kirk and Stokes 'Parmenides' Refutation' 1–4, versus Bicknell 'Parmenides' Refutation' 1–5, Guthrie 36 with n 1. Also Mourelatos *Route* 116, n 6, with further references, and Barnes *The Presocratic Philosophers* vol I, 222.

50 It is uncertain whether the conjunction introducing 8.32 means 'because' or 'wherefore,' and consequently whether the subject's not being 'incomplete' is a premiss for the preceding statement or an inference from it. The translation 'wherefore' gives an inference from 'limit' to 'completeness' parallel to that of 8.42. See Mourelatos *Route* 121, n 18. For the alternative view, see Owen 'Eleatic Questions' 75, n 64.

51 Or, retaining *mē* at 8.33, which is often excised for metrical reasons, but which may be correct: 'for it is not lacking; but what-is-not would lack everything.' See Owen 'Eleatic Questions' 64, n 11.

52 See section (g) below and Stokes *One and Many* 140.

53 Stokes absolves Parmenides of this particular circularity (see the reference given in the previous note). But he allows that there is an appearance of circularity when 8.34 ff is placed beside fragment 2, and that 'there is already implicit in Parmenides a circle of argument' (*One and Many* 314, n 108).

54 See Mourelatos *Route* 191–3, and Ballew 189–209.

55 Doubt has been cast on this, and upon the reading *eukukleos* which gives the sense 'well-rounded truth' at 1.29, by Jameson 15–30. The present version accepts the alternative *eupeitheos*, 'well-persuasive,' at 1.29. But the case for suspecting fragment 5 would be stronger, if it were clear how Proclus – our sole authority for the fragment – might have come to misrepresent it as Parmenidean.

56 Kirk and Raven 268. For criticism of this suggestion, see Stannard 526–33. Cf also Barnes *The Presocratic Philosophers* vol I, 177.

57 Bicknell ('Parmenides, DK 28 B5' 9–11) has suggested a novel reading of fragment 5, denying any connection with circularity. He translates 'It is a basic point from which I shall begin: I shall come back to it repeatedly,' and places the lines before fragment 2, taking them to emphasize the fundamentality of the goddess's 'master argument,' that is, her derivation of 'is' from a choice between 'is' and 'is not' in fragments 2–3, 6.1–2, and 8.15–18. She is simply announcing that she will return to this basic point. This is an attractive suggestion. But it is not clear that the word *xunon*, usually rendered 'all one' or 'indifferent,' could mean 'a basic point.' Nor would the goddess's 'for' (*gar*) in the second clause seem appropriate on Bicknell's explanation, since her returning to a basic point could hardly be a reason for its being basic.

58 *Sphaira* need not mean a geometrical sphere. It is an ordinary word for 'ball,' and is used in the *Odyssey* (VI.100, 115) of the ball thrown in play by Nausicaa. Cf also Plato *Phaedo* 110b7.

59 This point is well made by Mourelatos *Route* 126, n 29.

60 Cf Stokes *One and Many* 140: 'We are not dealing with a bungler, but with one of Greece's greatest thinkers, and his thought should not be deformed in this way without the utmost necessity.'

61 Mourelatos *Route* 128

62 The account given below follows that of Long, especially 95–8. For a broadly similar view, see also Tarán 225–30. For the view that the Way of Seeming has some degree of validity, see Reinhardt 293–311, Chalmers 5–22, Owens 'The Physical World of Parmenides' 378–95, and Matson 345–60.

63 See note 8 above. Barnes refers, in this connection, to scholars who have found it incredible 'that one half of Parmenides' work should have been devoted to the propagation of untruths' (*The Presocratic Philosophers* vol I, 156). Considering the degree of detail with which the cosmology seems to have been elaborated, the proportion of the goddess's discourse that it occupied seems likely to have been far higher.

64 The text and translation are those adopted by Long 84. Reading *per onta* in 1.32 we should translate 'how the things-that-seem had to have genuine existence, being indeed the whole of things' (Owen 'Eleatic Questions' 53). Ultimately, as Long says (99, n.14), the two readings amount to much the same.

65 The text and translation are taken from Hershbell 'Parmenides' Way of Truth' 1–23. For alternative versions of the fragment see translation ad loc.

66 See Hershbell. Cf also Mourelatos *Route* 256–7, T.M. Robinson 'Parmenides on Ascertainment' 631–2.

67 Cf Mourelatos *Route* 17, with n 20, 172, n 21.

68 As Tarán (227) rightly observes.

69 The exact sense of the word is uncertain. Long (95, n 45) connects it with 'driving past,' as in chariot racing. But the sense of 'by-passing' is also apt, and perhaps suits the context of deception even better (cf Mourelatos *Route* 13, n 15, 226, n 15).

70 A related confusion has been seen in the modal adjuncts to the affirmative and negative routes of 2.3 ('[it] is and [*it*] *cannot not be*') and 2.5 ('[it] is not and [*it*] *needs must not be*'). Thus, Calvert (150–1) charges Parmenides with confusing the harmless necessary truth (E v~E) with the dangerous (necessarily E v necessarily ~E), (where 'E' stands for *esti*, 'it is'): 'The invalidity of Parmenides' position ... stems from the supposition that because a particular statement such as E v~E is a necessary truth, each of the disjuncts is also a necessary truth. This fallacy, which would most appropriately be described as a formal fallacy, may be characterised, to use mediaeval terms, as a confusion between *necessitas consequentiae* and *necessitas consequentis*.' I have myself suggested that the modal adjuncts at 2.3 and 2.5 be taken to express *necessitas consequentiae*, that is, the necessity of inferences to E and to ~E respectively (see the reference in note 21). But on this view, even though the disjunction (E v ~E) is necessary, and each disjunct follows necessarily from rejection of the other, neither disjunct need itself be necessary. Likewise, from ~E it follows necessarily that ~E, but this does not mean that ~E is itself necessary. If the goddess thinks that it does, she will be guilty of precisely the confusion between S2 and S3 suggested in the text.

71 The same diagnosis is given, in different ways, by Owen ('Eleatic Questions' 72–3, n 46) and Barnes (*The Presocratic Philosophers* vol I, 166–7). T.M. Robinson 'Parmenides on Ascertainment' (627, 633) would absolve Parmenides of the modal fallacy by rendering 6.2 'nothing is not [there to exist],' as opposed to 'it is not possible for nothing to exist.' Parmenides, he says, 'is discussing availability, not possibility.' I accept his translation. But 'availability' seems to me too close to 'possibility,' in this context, for the goddess to be exonerated.

72 The *locus classicus* is *Through the Looking-Glass* ch 7. See Heath *The Philosopher's Alice* 201–3, nn 1 and 6, with references. For a *tour de force* in this genre, see the same author's contribution to the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (V, 524–5), sv 'Nothing.' That a well-marked class of fallacies based on such equivocations was recognized in antiquity is evident from Diogenes Laertius' account of 'the Nobodies' (*outides*) in his discussion of Stoic Logic (*Lives of the Philosophers* VII.82).

73 An echo of the Cyclops may also be heard in the use of 'round-eyed' (*kuklōpos*) of the moon at 10.4.

74 For example, by Page 6

75 The equivocation cannot be fully preserved in English, since i / it depends upon the use of the negative particle (*mē*) to introduce a question expecting the answer 'No,' which has no exact English parallel; and ii / the word play on *mē tis* (not anyone) and *mētis* (cunning) cannot be captured, though clearly intended (cf IX.414 with XX.20).

76 Lattimore translates Polyphemus' crucial response in line 408: 'Good friends, Nobody is killing me by force or treachery.' This captures what his audience heard, but not what he was trying to say. He was opting for the first alternative in their question, and rejecting the second. The Cyclopes took him to be rejecting both. We may well feel that his intended response was inept. For someone who has just been lulled into a drunken stupor, and then blinded with a red-hot poker, it would seem more natural to say that he was being killed by fraud *and* by force, than to say that he was being killed by fraud *and not* by force. But this awkwardness is a price that has to be paid to achieve the desired ambiguity. The Cyclopes must be given the impression that Polyphemus is not being killed by fraud *or* by force; and 'no one,' in Greek idiom, is reinforced by a further negative before the second alternative. Other aspects of the incident are interestingly discussed by Mourelatos '"Nothing" as "Not-Being"' 322, with n 6. See also Stanford 104–5, Podlecki 129–31, and Lesher 17–18.

77 Hershbell 180

78 There is nothing inherently improper about the vocable 'No-one' as a proper name. Far more improbable names have been known, and it was a contingent fact that Odysseus was not so named. Many vocables serve as proper names, while retaining, like 'No-one,' quite different functions in their familiar use. It is, of course, upon these that puns frequently depend. Paradox may be incurred, if it is supposed that no vocable should be used as a proper name, that would be inappropriate when applied to its referent with its familiar meaning. That is what makes 'No-one' seem a paradoxical name for anyone (and 'nothing' a paradoxical name for anything). On the other hand, since the Homeric *mētis* (cunning) is, almost literally, Odysseus' 'middle name,' it makes a peculiarly apt pseudonym for him.

79 Mourelatos ('"Nothing" as "Not-Being"') thinks that the Cyclopes, when they hear Polyphemus' cry in line 408, 'assume he is complaining of a natural illness.' I take 'a sickness sent by great Zeus' (411) to mean not merely 'natural illness' but mental derangement, evidenced by Polyphemus' strange behaviour; cf Dodds 67.

80 There is one notable logical difference between 'no one' and 'nothing.' From 'I see no one' it cannot be inferred that I do not see at all (but only that I do not see any human being), whereas from 'I see nothing' it is plausible to infer that I do not see at all. It is precisely this feature of 'nothing'

that generates the line of argument developed below on Parmenides' behalf.

81 For further discussion of the subject in fragment 8, see Stokes *One and Many* 132–3, 310–11, n 82, and Gallop 72–3, with n 51. Throughout the present essay I adopt the traditional view that *to eon* means 'the thing that is,' not merely 'whatever is,' and that Parmenides' gospel is therefore 'monistic' in the radical sense that there exists only one thing. This follows from the interpretation of his basic argument expounded in IV(1) above. It has, however, been questioned whether Parmenides' text contains an argument for the subject's uniqueness, and even whether this is anywhere expressly maintained, if 'one' (*hen*) at 8.6 means 'unified' rather than 'unique.' Fragment 8 has thus been read as deducing the properties of whatever there is, whether there be one thing or many. See the challenging article by Barnes 'Parmenides and the Eleatic One' 1–21, and his *Presocratic Philosophers* vol I, 204–7.

82 Cf note 18 above.

83 The syntax of 8.34 is too obscure for that verse to lend the above interpretation much support. But if translated 'the same thing is for thinking and [is] that there is thought,' the verse would express precisely the self-verifying nature of 'thought' here suggested. As far as 'speech' is concerned, a parallel argument would be vitiated by the ambiguity in *legein* between 'say' and 'speak of' remarked upon in note 25 above. For the Cartesian parallel, see Gallop 71 and cf Plato *Republic* 476e–477a, 478b, *Theaetetus* 188c–189a, *Sophist* 237d–e. With respect to the *Theaetetus* the flaw in the argument is neatly exposed by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* §518.

84 The implications of this point, and the paradoxes it entails for the usual interpretation of Parmenides, have been developed by Matson 345–60. Paradoxes of self-refutation in both the Way of Truth and the Way of Seeming are interestingly explored by Mackenzie 1–12.

85 Descartes, *Meditation* II: 'I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it' (vol I, 150). See also the discussion by Hintikka 50–76. In the present connection see especially 61–3.

GLOSSARY

alētheia 1.29, 2.4, 8.51, noun, 'truth'; *alēthēs* 1.30, 8.17, 8.28, 8.39, adjective, 'true.' The noun is sometimes printed as a personification but has not been capitalised in this edition, except by convention when used as a title for the first part of the goddess's discourse. Noun and adjective have been consistently given as 'truth' and 'true'; but they can also mean 'reality,' 'real,' and this sense is appropriate, in that the goddess's subject is conceived as 'reality' by contrast with 'appearance.' See also *doxa*.

doxa, 1.30, 8.51, 19.1, noun, here translated 'belief,' or – as a title for the second part of the goddess's discourse – 'Seeming.' The word is also sometimes given as 'opinion.' It is cognate with *dokein*, 'to seem' or 'to appear,' whose participle occurs in the phrase *ta dokounta*, 'the things which seem,' at 1.31. Mortals' beliefs embody the way things 'seem' or 'appear' to them, and thus concern 'appearances,' in contrast with 'reality' or 'truth.' See also *alētheia*.

eidenai verb, 'to know,' used of the poet as 'the man who knows' (1.3), and of mortals who are characterized as 'knowing nothing' (6.4). The word, which is related to the Greek verb for 'to see,' normally guarantees the existence of objects or the truth of propositions that it governs, and has thus been translated 'know,' by contrast with *noein*, 'to think' (qv). However, the use of *eidenai* to mean 'knowing' the heavenly bodies (10.1, 10.5) cannot, on the view of the second part of the goddess's discourse adopted in this edition, be taken to commit her to their existence. It must mean 'come to learn them [according to the most plausible account possible].' Cf the use of verbs meaning 'learn' with similar or related objects at 1.31, 8.52 (*manthanein*) and at 1.28, 10.4 (*punthanesthai*).

einai infinitive of the verb 'to be.' Its meaning and syntax are controversial in fragments 3 and 6.1 (twice, first in an archaic form *emmenai*). Taken as a verbal noun, and as subject, it warrants the translations '... because thinking and being are the same' (3), and '... for being is' (end of 6.1), and thus might be held to justify the traditional 'Being' as a translation for Parmenides' subject. The alternative interpretation, adopted at both places in this edition, is to take it with the preceding 'is,' as meaning 'is there *to be*' or 'is *for being*.' Cf English 'there is water *to drink* (or *for drinking*).' See also *eon, esti.*

eon 2.7, 4.2, 6.1, 8.3, 8.7, 8.12, 8.19, 8.24–25, 8.32–33, 8.35, 8.37, 8.46–47, participle of *einai*, often translated 'Being,' but here consistently rendered 'what-is' (or, when conjoined with a negative, 'what-is-not'). At 7.1 the plural form with negative has been rendered 'things that are not.' The referent of *eon* is the principal theme of the first part of the goddess's discourse. Its interpretation is controversial in at least two respects. i / It may exemplify a 'complete' use of the verb *einai* requiring no complement. If so, it may mean either 'what exists' or 'what is the case,' or perhaps some fusion of these. Alternatively, it has been construed as a form of the copula, with complement suppressed, meaning 'what is ...' ii / On any reading of 'is,' *eon* remains ambiguous between a pure variable, '*whatever* is,' and a uniquely referring phrase, '*the* thing that is.' The former interpretation is compatible with the view that the subject is, in fact, unique, ie, that the variable has only a single value. See also *einai, esti.*

esti third person singular, present tense of *einai*, 'to be': 'is.' The word is frequently unproblematic in Parmenides, but its meaning is disputed in several key passages. The most important of these are 2.3 (twice), 2.5 (twice), 3, 6.1, 6.2, 8.2, 8.16. At these points it is uncertain whether 'is' is to be taken as 'exists,' 'is true,' 'is available,' 'is possible,' as a copula = 'is ... ,' or in some combination of these ways. Related uncertainties affect the interpretation of 8.5, 8.9 (second occurrence), 8.20, 8.22 (second occurrence), 8.34 (twice), 8.35–36, 8.48. In some places, notably 2.3, 2.5, 8.2, and 8.16, no subject for 'is' is either expressed or readily supplied from the context. The correct identification of the subject in these places remains crucial for interpretation of the whole poem. See also *einai, eon.*

genesis or *genna* 8.6, 8.21, 8.27, noun, 'coming-to-be'; *gignesthai* or compound 8.13 (twice), 8.19, 8.20, 8.40, 10.3, 11.4, verb, 'to-come-to-be.' Both noun and verb are misleading in their traditional translation, 'becoming,' since 'become' requires a complement, whereas the Greek verb can be used either with one ('*x* becomes *F*') or without ('*x* comes-to-be,' that is, *x* comes

into existence), and the noun can accommodate both notions. In Parmenides verb and noun are paired and contrasted with *ollusthai* ('to perish') and *olethros* ('perishing'). In this contrast their sense must be 'coming-into-existence'. But this is closely connected with 'becoming,' since a thing's 'becoming *F*' may also be thought of as *F*'s 'coming into existence' (in that thing).

gignōskein verb, 'to know,' 'to be acquainted with,' 'to recognize.' This verb, like *eidenai* (qv), can be used either of acquaintance with an object or apprehension of a proposition, and guarantees the existence of the objects or the truth of the propositions that it governs. It occurs at 2.7, 'you could not know what-is-not,' where it remains unclear whether 'what-is-not' should be taken as an object ('the non-existent') or as a proposition ('what is not the case'). The cognate noun *gnōmē* (8.53, 8.61) has some of the ambiguity of the English 'judgment' between a mental or cognitive faculty and the results of its operations. It has accordingly been translated 'mind' at 8.53 and 'opinion' at 8.61.

legein 6.1, verb, 'to say,' 'to speak of,' 'to mention.' The word has here been translated 'speak of.' But on other interpretations of 6.1, it means merely 'say,' 'state,' 'assert.' The translation preferred here makes the word connote reference to a subject of discourse. This sense is traceable to a primitive use of the verb, in which it means 'to pick out.' See also *logos*.

logos noun, translated 'reasoning' at 7.5, but 'speech' at 8.50. The word has a wide range of meanings, covering human rationality in general, and various expressions of it in thought and language. The context at 7.5 requires the sense of 'argument' or 'reasoning,' ie, logical appraisal of the goddess's own argument. At 8.50, where the word is coupled with 'thought,' 'speech' is preferable, in view of the continual linkage of 'speaking' with 'thinking' in the goddess's discourse. At 1.15 the plural signifies 'words.' See also *legein*.

noein 2.2, 3, 6.1, 8.8, 8.34, 8.36, verb, traditionally translated 'to think.' Derivatives 'thinkable' (*noēton*) and 'unthinkable' (*anoēton*) occur at 8.8 and 8.17. Some scholars would render *noein* 'to know' or 'to ascertain,' thereby guaranteeing an objective truth or reality for its object. The translation 'think' has been retained here, in view of the repeated linkage with verbs of saying (6.1, 8.8), and as better suited to the view of Parmenides' argument advocated in this edition. Cf note on translation at 2.2. See also *noēma, noos*.

noēma 7.2, 8.34, 8.50, 16.4, noun, 'thought,' meaning either the act or the content of thinking. The coupling of 'thought' with 'speech' at 8.50, in

reference to the goddess's own discourse, recalls the linking of 'speaking' with 'thinking' at 6.1. See also *noein, noos.*

noos 4.1, 6.6, 16.2, noun, archaic form of *nous,* here translated 'mind,' but in other philosophical contexts often given as 'intelligence,' 'intellect,' 'intuition,' or 'reason,' representing the highest of mental faculties or cognitive states. Note, however, that a 'wandering mind' is ascribed to mortals at 6.6, suggesting that *noos* is not, as such, guaranteed an infallible grasp of reality or truth. See also *noein, noēma.*

peithein verb, 'to persuade' (1.16), or (in certain forms) 'to trust,' 'to be persuaded' (8.39). The cognate noun *peithō* is personified at 2.4 as 'Persuasion,' whose path is identified with the affirmative route of 'is,' and is said to 'attend upon truth.' The concepts of 'persuasion' and 'trust' pervade the goddess's account of truth, which (on the text adopted at 1.29) is itself characterized as 'persuasive.' By contrast, it is said that in the beliefs of mortals there is 'no true trust (*pistis*)' (1.30). The 'strength of trust' appears as a powerful constraint at 8.12, and 'true trust' recurs as a forceful agent at 8.28. At 8.50 the goddess calls her discourse 'trustworthy' (*piston*), by contrast with her 'deceitful' presentation of mortal beliefs (8.52). The common translation of *pistis* as 'belief' or 'conviction' fails to bring out the sense of 'fidelity' to a binding commitment suggested by the Greek word-group.

peiras 8.26, 8.31, 8.42, 8.49, 10.7, noun, given here as 'limit.' In its first two occurrences the word is closely associated with bondage. Cf 'the limits of great chains' (8.26), and 'chains of a limit' (8.31). *peiras* is thus an image for rigid constraint, like the 'shackles' with which the subject is said to have been 'fettered' (8.14, 8.37). In the phrase 'furthest limit' at 8.42, and in its plural use at 8.49, it need not be understood as a spatial boundary, but may be taken to express the utterly changeless state in which the subject is held captive.

pelein, pelenai verb, originally 'to be in motion', but used simply as a synonym for *einai,* 'to be' (qv), at 6.8, 8.11, 8.18, 8.19, 8.45. It is notable that verbs connoting motion or change may be mere synonyms for 'to be,' and that the goddess can thus use them consistently with her denial that motion, in their original sense, can occur. Note also the frequent images in the Way of Truth of motion thwarted, arrested, or reversed (for example, 6.3, 6.9, 7.2, 8.7, 8.12–15, 8.26, 8.31–32, 8.37–38, 8.46–47, 8.49–50). See also *telethein.*

telethein verb, 'to come into being,' 'to be fully developed,' used in Cornford's fragment (if genuine) as a synonym of *einai,* 'to be.' See also *pelein, pelenai.*

Text and Translation of the Fragments

The text that follows is based upon that of L. Tarán's edition (T: Princeton 1965), which is generally superior to that of the fifth and subsequent editions of Diels-Kranz (D–K). I have, however, deviated from Tarán's text at 1.3, 1.29, 6.3–4, 8.4, 8.38, 8.53, 8.55, 12.4, 16.1, and 17 (see Note). Textual variants in these and a few other places are noted below the Greek, with brief references to sources that defend the readings here preferred or alternatives to them. Full references for these sources will be found in the Bibliography. Tarán's punctuation has been altered at 1.9–10, 6.9, 8.16, 8.42–43, 8.60, 18.1–2, and 18.4. In addition D–K fragment 15a, though not given by Tarán, has been printed here, as has the line quoted by Plato at *Theaetetus* 180e, which is believed by some scholars to be an independent fragment. See references ad loc. References at the foot of the Greek text are to the main contexts in which the fragments have been preserved. Surrounding material will be found under Fragment Contexts (pp 93ff).

Words in the translation for which no counterpart occurs in the Greek have been placed in square brackets. Words representing Greek text supplied conjecturally appear in angle brackets. Notes below the translation give cross-references to relevant sections of the Introduction and alternative versions of disputed phrases or passages. For abbreviations used in the notes, see page xi.

NOTE

I also deviate from Tarán's accentuation of ἐστί in three places (8.22, 8.34, 8.48), following an arbitrary modern practice whereby ἐστί is accented on the first syllable when it means 'exists'. Since I have translated it 'exists' in those places, I have accented it on the first syllable accordingly. ἐστί is properly accented on the first syllable when it stands in initial position, as at 8.9, 8.18, 8.27, 8.33. For a discussion of its accentuation, see Kahn *The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek* 420–4.

ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ

Fragment 1

ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ᾽ ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι,
πέμπον, ἐπεί μ᾽ ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσαι
δαίμονος, ἣ κατὰ πάντ᾽ ἀσινῆ[1] φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα·
τῆι φερόμην· τῆι γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι
ἅρμα τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραι δ᾽ ὁδὸν ἡγεμόνευον.
ἄξων δ᾽ ἐν χνοίηισιν ἵει σύριγγος αὐτήν
αἰθόμενος (δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπείγετο δινωτοῖσιν
κύκλοις ἀμφοτέρωθεν), ὅτε σπερχοίατο πέμπειν
Ἡλιάδες κοῦραι, προλιποῦσαι δώματα Νυκτός[2]
εἰς φάος, ὠσάμεναι κράτων ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας.

1–30: Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* VII.111–14.
28–32: Simplicius, Commentary on *De Caelo* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* VII, 557)

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1 Mss κατὰ παντ᾽ ἄτη. Coxon 'The Text of Parmenides' has shown that ἄστη has no ms authority. D–K, T: ἄστη. But see Jaeger, 98, 225, nn 20–3, M *Route* 22, nn 31, 32 for the conjecture ἀσινῆ. For an interpretation based on the mss reading, see Tarrant, 1–7.
2 T, D–K place a comma at the end of this line.

PARMENIDES' *ON NATURE*

Fragment 1

The mares that carry me, as far as impulse might reach,
Were taking me, when they brought and placed me upon the much-speaking route
Of the goddess, that carries everywhere unscathed the man who knows;
Thereon was I carried, for thereon the much-guided mares were carrying me,
Straining to pull the chariot, and maidens were leading the way.
The axle, glowing in its naves, gave forth the shrill sound of a pipe,
(For it was urged on by two rounded
Wheels at either end), even while maidens, Daughters of the Sun, were hastening
To escort me, after leaving the House of Night for the light,
Having pushed back with their hands the veils from their heads.

For comment, see Introduction, pp 6–7, 21, 23 with nn 12, 13, 14, 64. See also Glossary on *alētheia, doxa, eidenai, peithein.*

1.2 T: 'resounding road'; B, KR: 'renowned way'; M: 'route of much-speaking' (41–4).
1.3 T: 'which carries through all places the man who knows'; KR: 'which leads the man who knows through every town' (cf B, 172, with n 1). These versions follow the D-K text, which has, however, no ms authority.
1.4 T: 'well-discerning horses'; B, KR: 'wise steeds'; M: 'much-guided' or 'much attending,' 'very careful' (22, with n 33).
1.9–10 T: 'hastened to escort me towards the light'; B, KR: 'hasting to convey me into the light.' For the above version see Introduction p 6 with n 14.

ἔνθα πύλαι Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἡματός εἰσι κελεύθων,
καί σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει καὶ λάινος οὐδός·
αὐταὶ δ' αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοισι θυρέτροις·
τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύποινος ἔχει κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς.
τὴν δὴ παρφάμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν
πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὥς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὀχῆα
ἀπτερέως ὥσειε πυλέων ἄπο· ταὶ δὲ θυρέτρων
χάσμ' ἀχανὲς ποίησαν ἀναπτάμεναι πολυχάλκους
ἄξονας ἐν σύριγξιν ἀμοιβαδὸν εἰλίξασαι
γόμφοις καὶ περόνησιν ἀρηρότε· τῆι ῥα δι' αὐτέων
ἰθὺς ἔχον κοῦραι κατ' ἀμαξιτὸν ἅρμα καὶ ἵππους.

There are the gates of the paths of Night and Day,
And a lintel and a threshold of stone surround them,
And the aetherial gates themselves are filled with great doors;
And for these Justice, much-avenging, holds the keys of retribution.
Coaxing her with gentle words, the maidens
Did cunningly persuade her that she should push back the bolted bar for them
Swiftly from the gates; and these made of the doors
A gaping gap as they were opened wide,
Swinging in turn in their sockets the brazen posts
Fitted with rivets and pins; straight through them at that point
Did the maidens drive the chariot and mares along the broad way.

1.14 T: 'the rewarding keys'; B: 'the keys that fit them'; KR: 'the double bolts.' For the above translation see M 26, with n 44 and Solmsen, *'Amoibē'* 631–2.

καί με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρί
δεξιτερὴν ἕλεν, ὧδε δ᾽ ἔπος φάτο καί με προσηύδα·
ὦ κοῦρ᾽ ἀθανάτοισι συνάορος ἡνιόχοισιν,
ἵπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν ἱκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ,
χαῖρ᾽, ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι
τήνδ᾽ ὁδόν (ἦ γὰρ ἀπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν),
ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ἠμὲν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος[1] ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.
ἀλλ᾽ ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα
χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.[2]

1 Most citations give this text. But D-K, T follow Simplicius and print εὐκυκλέος. Proclus gives εὐφεγγέος here. See also Introduction, n 55.
2 Some mss give περ ὄντα.

And the goddess received me kindly, and took my right hand with her hand,

And uttered speech and thus addressed me:

'Youth attended by immortal charioteers,

Who come to our House with mares that carry you,

Welcome; for it is no ill fortune that sent you forth to travel

This route (for it lies far indeed from the beaten track of men),

But right and justice. And it is right that you should learn all things,

Both the steadfast heart of persuasive truth,

And the beliefs of mortals, in which there is no true trust.

But nevertheless you shall learn these things as well, how the things which seem

Had to have genuine existence, permeating all things completely.'

1.29 T, B, KR (following the D-K text): 'well-rounded truth.'

1.32 T: 'how the appearances, which pervade all things, had to be acceptable'; B: 'how passing right through all things one should judge the things that seem to be' (172 with n 3); KR (267–8, with n 2): 'how the things that seem, as they all pass through everything, must gain the semblance of being'; M: 'how it would be right for things deemed acceptable to be acceptably: just being all of them together' (216, reading *per onta*); Owen: 'how the things-that-seem had to have genuine existence, being indeed the whole of things.' See Introduction p 21 with n 64.

ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ

Fragment 2

εἰ δ᾽ ἄγ᾽ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας,
αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι·
ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι,
Πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος (ἀληθείηι[1] γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ),
ἡ δ᾽ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι,
τὴν δή τοι φράζω παναπευθέα[2] ἔμμεν ἀταρπόν·
οὔτε γὰρ ἄν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐόν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν)
οὔτε φράσαις.

1–8: Proclus, Commentary on *Timaeus* (Diehl, vol I, 345)
3–8: Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 116)

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1 An emendation for ἀληθείη in the ms.
2 Variant reading: παναπειθέα.

TRUTH

Fragment 2

Come, I shall tell you, and do you listen and convey the story,

What routes of inquiry alone there are for thinking:

The one – that [*it*] *is*, and that [*it*] *cannot not be*,

Is the path of Persuasion (for it attends upon truth);

The other – that [*it*] *is not* and that [*it*] *needs must not be*,

That I point out to you to be a path wholly unlearnable,

For you could not know what-is-not (for that is not feasible),

Nor could you point it out.

For comment, see Introduction p 7–8 with notes 15–21, 70, and Glossary on *alētheia, eon, esti, gignōskein, noein, peithein*.

2.1 T: 'pay attention to the account when you have heard it'; C: 'listen and lay my word to heart.' But see Introduction p 00 with n 67.

2.2 'thinking': some would translate 'knowing.' See M, 68–70, R 626. The standard translation 'think' is, however, defended by Barnes, *Presocr. Phil.* vol I, 158–9, 329, n 6. See also Gallop 66, 70–71, with n 41, and Glossary on *noein*.

2.3 T: 'the one [says]: "exists" and "it is not possible not to exist"'; M: 'the one, that—is—and that it is not possible that—be not—(55); KR: 'the one way, that it *is* and cannot not-be'; B: 'The first, namely, that *It is*, and that it is impossible for it not to be.'

2.5 T: 'the other [says]: "exists-not" and "not to exist is necessary"'; M: 'the other, that—is not—and that it is right that—be not—' (55); KR: 'the other, that it *is-not* and needs must not-be'; B: 'The other, namely, that *It is not*, and that it must needs not be.'

2.6 T: 'a path wholly unknowable'; M: 'a path from which no tidings ever come' (55); KR: 'a path altogether unthinkable'; B: 'a path that none can learn of at all'.

2.7–8 T: 'For you could not know that which does not exist (because it is impossible) nor could you express it'; M: 'for you could neither come to know that which is not — (for it cannot be consummated) nor could you single it out' (55); KR (similarly B): 'For thou couldst not know that which-is-not (that is impossible) nor utter it.'

Fragment 3

... τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι

Clement *Miscellanies* VI.2, 23; Plotinus *Ennead* V.1.8

Fragment 4

λεῦσσε δ' ὅμως ἀπεόντα νόωι παρεόντα βεβαίως·
οὐ γὰρ ἀποτμήξει τὸ ἐὸν τοῦ ἐόντος ἔχεσθαι
οὔτε σκιδνάμενον πάντηι πάντως κατὰ κόσμον
οὔτε συνιστάμενον

Clement *Miscellanies* V.2, 15

Fragment 3

... because the same thing is there for thinking and for being.

For comment, see Introduction, p 8, with nn 22–23, and Glossary on *noein, einai.*

T: 'for the same thing can be thought and can exist'; B: 'for it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be'; KR: 'for the same thing can be thought as can be'; R: 'for ascertaining and being real are one and the same' ie, necessarily interconnected (626); Vlastos (and many others): 'Thinking and Being are the same thing' ('Review' 168). Sparshott (110) writes: 'Parmenides long ago said "To be, and to be thought about, are one and the same." Or did he say "Only what can think can exist?" Or even "Thinking and being are the same?" A certain crankiness in his venerable syntax, perhaps even in his venerable character, prevents us from ever being quite sure.'

Fragment 4

Look upon things which, though far off, are yet firmly present to the mind;

For you shall not cut off what-is from holding fast to what-is,

For it neither disperses itself in every way everywhere in order,

Nor gathers itself together.

For comment, see Introduction, p 16 with n 45.

4.2 T: 'For it cannot cut off Being from holding fast to Being'; B: 'Thou canst not cut off what is from holding fast to what is.' See Introduction p 16, n 45.

4.3–4 T: 'either by dispersing it all everywhere in order or by bringing it together.' But since the subject, whether 'it' (ie, 'the mind') or 'you,' is masculine, the neuter participles 'scattering' and 'gathering' can only qualify the object. Thus rightly B, KR: 'scattering itself,' 'coming together.'

Fragment 5

ξυνὸν δέ μοί ἐστιν,

ὁππόθεν ἄρξωμαι· τόθι γὰρ πάλιν ἵξομαι αὖθις.

Proclus, Commentary on *Parmenides* (Cousin 708)

Fragment 5

And it is all one to me

Where I am to begin; for I shall return there again.

For comment, see Introduction, p 19 with nn 55–7.

P.J. Bicknell 'Parmenides, DK 28 B5' 9: 'It is a basic point from which I shall begin: I shall come back to it repeatedly.' See Introduction n 57.

Fragment 6

χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ᾽ ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι,
μηδὲν δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν· τά σ᾽ ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα.
πρώτης γάρ σ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἴργω>,[1]
αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν
πλάττονται, δίκρανοι· ἀμηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν
στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον· οἱ δὲ φοροῦνται
κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα,
οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν νενόμισται
κοὐ ταὐτόν·[2] πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος.

1–9: Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 117)
8–9: Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 78)

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1 <εἴργω> supplied by Diels (cf 7.2). This text follows D–K. T places a full stop after <εἴργω> and marks a lacuna of indeterminate length after line 3. For the textual problem, see Stokes *One and Many* 112–15, 302–3, nn 18–27.

2 D–K, T place a comma, not a semicolon, after ταὐτὸν. The above text follows Stokes 'Parmenides, Fragment 6' 193–4.

Fragment 6

It must be that what is there for speaking and thinking of *is*; for [it] is there to be,
Whereas nothing is not; that is what I bid you consider,
For <I restrain> you from that first route of inquiry,
And then also from this one, on which mortals knowing nothing
Wander, two-headed; for helplessness in their
Breasts guides their distracted mind; and they are carried
Deaf and blind alike, dazed, uncritical tribes,
By whom being and not-being have been thought both the same
And not the same; and the path of all is backward-turning.

For comment, see Introduction as follows: 6.1–2 pp 8–9, 26–7, with notes 15–16, 84; see also *Glossary* on *einai, eon, esti, legein, noein*. 6.4–9 pp 11–12, with notes 32–4; see also Glossary on *eidenai, noos*.

6.1–2 T: 'It is necessary to say and to think Being; for there is Being, but nothing is not'; B (similarly KR): 'It needs must be that what can be spoken and thought *is*; for it is possible for it to be, and it is not possible for what is nothing to be'; Kahn ('Thesis of Parmenides' 722): 'Cognition and statement must be what-is (i.e. must be true and real)' or 'Knowing and asserting what-is must *be* (real)'; Cordero (1–4): 'Il est necessaire de dire et de penser qu'il y a de l'être (ou que l'être existe): parce qu'être est possible, et le néant n'existe pas'; R (627): 'Necessarily, what is there to pick out and ascertain is real; for it is *there* to *be* real, whereas *nothing* is not'.

6.3 The translation follows Diels in supplying a verb meaning 'I restrain' to fill a metrical gap at the end of this line. This filling, assumed by most modern editors, has been challenged by Cordero (1–32), who argues for a verb meaning 'you shall begin.' 'That first route of inquiry' will then mean the route which the goddess affirms, not one that she rejects; and in 6.3–4 she will be specifying the two 'starts' to be made by her pupil, in learning the Way of Truth and the Way of Seeming respectively.

6.8–9 T (similarly KR): 'by whom to be and not to be are considered the same and yet not the same, for whom the path of all things is backward turning'; B: 'who hold that it is and is not the same and not the same, and all things travel in opposite directions' (174, with nn 2–3). For the above translation see Introduction p 11 with n 33.

Fragment 7

οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆι εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα·
ἀλλα σὺ τῆσδ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα
μηδέ σ᾽ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,
νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν
καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγωι πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.

1–2: Plato, *Sophist* 237a
1: Aristotle, *Metaphysics N*2, 1089a2
3–6: Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* VII.114

Fragment 7

For never shall this prevail, that things that are not *are;*

But do you restrain your thought from this route of inquiry,

Nor let habit force you, along this route of much-experience,

To ply an aimless eye and ringing ear

5 And tongue; but judge by reasoning the very contentious disproof

That has been uttered by me.

For comment, see Introduction, p 9, with n 26, and Glossary on *eon, logos*.

7.1 T: 'For never shall this be forced: that things that are not exist'; B (similarly KR): 'For this shall never be proved, that the things that are not are.'

7.3 T: 'nor let inured habit force you, upon this road'; B: 'nor let habit by its much experience'; KR: 'nor let custom, born of much experience.'

7.5 T: 'the much contested argument which has been given by me'; B: 'the much disputed proof uttered by me'; KR: 'the strife-encompassed proof that I have spoken'; M: 'the very contentious challenge' (91, with n 46).

Fragment 8

... μόνος δ' ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο
λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν· ταύτηι δ' ἐπὶ σήματ' ἔασι
πολλὰ μάλ', ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,
οὖλον μουνομελές τε καὶ ἀτρεμὲς ἠδὲ τελεστόν·[1]
οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν,[2]
ἕν, συνεχές· τίνα γὰρ γένναν διζήσεαι αὐτοῦ;
πῆι πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὔτ'[3] ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσσω
φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν· οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητόν
ἔστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. τί δ' ἄν μιν καὶ χρέος ὦρσεν
ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν, τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον, φῦν;
οὕτως ἢ πάμπαν πελέναι χρεών ἐστιν ἢ οὐχί.

1–52: Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 144)
1–14: Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 78)
50–61: Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 38)
53–59: Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 179)

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1 There are well attested variant readings for the beginning and end of this line. Editors have also suggested emendations as follows: D–K: ἐστι γὰρ οὐλομελές τε καὶ ἀτρεμὲς ἠδ' ἀτέλεστον; T: οὖλον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμὲς ἠδὲ τελεστόν; Owen: οὖλον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμὲς ἠδὲ τελεῖον ('Eleatic Questions' 76–7); Preller: ἠδ' ἀτάλαντον. See Schofield 115, n 16, Reilly 57. For the conjectures in the text printed, see Introduction, n 37.

2 For discussion of an inferior text of this line, see T 188 and n 37; also Whittaker 16–32.

3 D–K: οὐδ' for οὔτ'

Fragment 8

A single story of a route still
Is left: that [*it*] *is*; on this [route] there are signs
Very numerous: that what-is is ungenerated and imperishable;
Whole, single-limbed, steadfast, and complete;
Nor was [it] once, nor will [it] be, since [it] is, now, all together,
One, continuous; for what coming-to-be of it will you seek?
In what way, whence, did [it] grow? Neither from what-is-not shall I allow
You to say or think; for it is not to be said or thought
That [*it*] *is not*. And what need could have impelled it to grow
Later or sooner, if it began from nothing?
Thus [it] must either be completely or not at all.

For comment, see Introduction as follows: 8.1–2: p 7 and Glossary on *esti*. 2–4: p 12 with notes 36–8, and Glossary on *eon*. 5–6: pp 13–14 with notes 39–41. 6–11: pp 15–16 with notes 42–3, and Glossary on *genesis*.

8.1 T: 'There is a solitary word still left to say of a way: "exists"'; B (similarly KR): 'One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that *It is*'; M: 'Sole the account still remains of the route, that — is —' (94, with n 1).

8.3 Barnes (*Presoc. Phil.*, 178): 'that, being, it is ungenerated and undestroyed'; KR: 'that what *is* is uncreated and imperishable'; T: 'that Being is ungenerated and imperishable'; M (94): 'that what-is is ungenerable and imperishable'. Alternatively, perhaps, 'that [it] is [an] ungenerated and imperishable being.'

8.4 T: 'whole, unique, immovable and complete'; B (with D–K text): 'for it is complete, immovable and without end' (similarly KR); Schofield (see note on text): 'whole and unique and changeless and in equipoise.' For the above translation see Introduction, p 13, with n 37.

8.5 T: 'It was not once nor will it be'; B (similarly M 105–6): 'Nor was it ever, nor will it be'; KR: 'It *was* not in the past, nor *shall* it be'. See Introduction, p 13–14 with nn 39–41.

8.10 B: 'later rather than sooner'; KR: 'at a later time rather than an earlier'; M: 'later or earlier' (98).

οὔτε ποτ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ[1] ἐόντος ἐφήσει πίστιος ἰσχύς
γίγνεσθαί τι παρ᾽ αὐτό· τοῦ εἵνεκεν οὔτε γενέσθαι
οὔτ᾽ ὄλλυσθαι ἀνῆκε Δίκη χαλάσασα πέδηισιν,
ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει· ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῶιδ᾽ ἔστιν·
ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;[2] κέκριται δ᾽ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη,
τὴν μὲν ἐᾶν ἀνόητον ἀνώνυμον (οὐ γὰρ ἀληθής
ἔστιν ὁδός), τὴν δ᾽ ὥστε πέλειν καὶ ἐτήτυμον εἶναι.
πῶς δ᾽ ἂν ἔπειτα πέλοι τὸ ἐόν;[3] πῶς δ᾽ ἄν κε γένοιτο;
εἰ γὰρ ἔγεντ᾽, οὐκ ἔστ(ι), οὐδ᾽ εἴ ποτε μέλλει ἔσεσθαι.
τὼς γένεσις μὲν ἀπέσβεσται καὶ ἄπυστος ὄλεθρος.

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1 D-K, the best mss: οὐδέ ποτ᾽ ἐκ μη ἐόντος. The emendation of μὴ to τοῦ is accepted by T and others. See Introduction, nn 42, 44.
2 D-K, T place a semicolon after the second ἐστιν. But see Introduction, n 17.
3 D-K emends πέλοι: πῶς δ᾽ ἄν ἔπειτ᾽ ἀπόλοιτο ἐόν; πῶς δ᾽ ἄν κε γένοιτο; but see Introduction p 15 with n 44.

Nor will the strength of trust ever allow anything to come-to-be from what-
is
Besides it; therefore neither [its] coming-to-be
Nor [its] perishing has Justice allowed, relaxing her shackles,
But she holds [it] fast; the decision about these matters depends on this:
Is [*it*] *or is* [*it*] *not*? but it has been decided, as is necessary,
To let go the one as unthinkable, unnameable (for it is no true
Route), but to allow the other, so that it is, and is true.
And how could what-is be in the future; and how could [it] come-to-be?
For if [it] came-to-be, [it] is not, nor [is it] if at some time [it] is going to be.
Thus, coming-to-be is extinguished and perishing not to be heard of.

For comment, see Introduction as follows: 8.12–14: pp 15–16, with nn 42, 44, and Glossary on *genesis, eon*. 15–18: p 8, with nn 17–18, and Glossary on *esti*. 19–20: p 14, with n 41, 44.

8.12–13 B (text of D–K): 'Nor will the force of truth suffer aught to arise beside itself from that which is not'; M (101, text of D–K): 'Nor will the hold of trust permit that something out of what-is-not should come to be alongside it'; T: 'Nor will the force of conviction permit anything to come to be beyond itself'; Barnes (*Presocr. Phil.*, 178): 'Nor ever from what is will the strength of trust allow it to become something apart from itself'.

8.15–16 KR: 'and the decision on these matters rests here: it *is* or it is not'; T: 'Concerning these things the decision rests in this: is or is not'; M (153): 'And the decision about these lies in this: "— is — or — is not —."'

8.19 T: 'How could Being be hereafter?'; KR (text of D–K): 'How could what *is* thereafter perish?'; M (102): 'And how could that-which-is be later on? And how could it possibly *get* to be?'

8.20 T: 'If it was, it is not, nor if it is going to be in the future'; M (102): 'For if it *got* to be, then it *is* not; and no more so if it intends ever to be'; B: 'If it came into being, it is not; nor is it if it is going to be in the future.'

οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἔστιν ὁμοῖον·[1]
οὐδέ τι τῆι μᾶλλον, τό κεν εἴργοι μιν συνέχεσθαι,
οὐδέ τι χειρότερον, πᾶν δ᾽ ἔμπλεόν ἐστιν ἐόντος.
τῶι ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστιν· ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει.
αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν
ἔστιν ἄναρχον ἄπαυστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος
τῆλε μάλ᾽ ἐπλάχθησαν, ἀπῶσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθής.
ταὐτόν τ᾽ ἐν ταὐτῶι τε μένον καθ᾽ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται
χοὕτως ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ Ἀνάγκη
πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἔέργει.
οὔνεκεν οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὸν θέμις εἶναι·
ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδευές· ἐὸν[2] δ᾽ ἂν παντὸς ἐδεῖτο.

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1 D-K, T: πᾶν ἐστιν ὁμοῖον. See Introduction, n 46.
2 Some editors retain μὴ before ἐὸν by reading ἐπιδεές. See T 114–15, and, for a defence of ἐπιδεές, Coxon 'The Text of Parmenides' 72–3.

Nor is [it] divisible, since [it] all alike *is*;

Nor is [it] somewhat more here, which would keep it from holding together,

Nor is [it] somewhat less, but [it] is all full of what-is.

Therefore [it] is all continuous; for what-is is in contact with what-is.

Moreover, changeless in the limits of great chains

[It] is un-beginning and unceasing, since coming-to-be and perishing

Have been driven far off, and true trust has thrust them out.

Remaining the same and in the same, [it] lies by itself

And remains thus firmly in place; for strong Necessity

Holds [it] fast in the chains of a limit, which fences it about.

Wherefore it is not right for what-is to be incomplete;

For [it] is not lacking; but if [it] were, [it] would lack everything.

For comment, see Introduction as follows: 8.22–25: pp 16–17, with nn 45–7, and Glossary on *eon, esti*. 8.26–33: pp 17–18, with nn 48–52, and Glossary on *peiras, peithein*.

8.22–24 B: 'Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike, and there is no more of it in one place than in another, to hinder it from holding together, nor less of it, but everything is full of what is'; KR similarly except 8.24: 'but it is all full of what is'; T similarly except 8.24: 'but all is full of Being.'

8.32 KR: 'because it is not lawful that what is should be unlimited'; B: 'Wherefore it is not permitted to what is to be infinite'; T: 'because it is not right for Being to be incomplete.'

8.33 See note on text, and Introduction n 51.

ταὐτὸν δ᾽ ἔστι νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκεν ἔστι νόημα·
οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ὧι πεφατισμένον ἐστίν,
εὑρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἢ> ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται[1]
ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ᾽ ἐπέδησεν
οὖλον ἀκίνητόν τ᾽ ἔμεναι· τῶι πάντ᾽ ὀνόμασται[2]
ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,
γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναι τε καὶ οὐχί,
καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διά τε χρόα φανὸν ἀμείβειν.

1 For the textual difficulty in this line, see T 128–9 defending the text printed.
2 Woodbury and others, following one ms; but D–K, T, following another: τῶι πάντ᾽ ὄνομ(α) ἔσται. See Introduction, n 27.

The same thing is for thinking and [is] that there is thought;

For not without what-is, on which [it] depends, having been declared,

Will you find thinking; for nothing else <either> is or will be

Besides what-is, since it was just this that Fate did shackle

To be whole and changeless; wherefore it has been named all things

That mortals have established, trusting them to be true,

To come-to-be and to perish, to be and not to be,

And to shift place and to exchange bright colour.

For comment, see Introduction as follows: 8.34: p 27, with n 83, and Glossary on *esti, noein, noēma*. 35–38: pp 18–19, with n 53, and Glossary on *eon*. 38–41: pp 10–12, with n 27, and Glossary on *genesis, peithein*.

8.34–36 B: 'The thing that can be thought and that for the sake of which the thought exists is the same; for you cannot find thought without something that is, as to which it is uttered'; KR: 'What can be thought is only the thought that it is. For you will not find thought without what is, in relation to which it is uttered'; M (170–2): 'And the same is to think of and wherefore is the thinking. For not without what-is, to which it stands committed, will you find thinking'; T: 'It is the same to think and the thought that [the object of thought] exists, for without Being, in what has been expressed, you will not find thought.'

8.38–39 (with text of D–K) KR: 'Wherefore all these are mere names ...'; T: 'therefore, all that mortals posited convinced that it is true will be [mere] name ...' The translation given above follow Burnyeat 19, n 22.

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστί,
πάντοθεν[1] εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκωι,
μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντηι· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον
οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῆι ἢ τῆι.
οὔτε γὰρ οὐκ ἐὸν ἔστι, τό κεν παύοι μιν ἱκνεῖσθαι
εἰς ὁμόν, οὔτ᾽ ἐὸν ἔστιν ὅπως εἴη κεν ἐόντος
τῆι μᾶλλον τῆι δ᾽ ἧσσον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἔστιν ἄσυλον·[2]
οἳ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἶσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει.

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1 D-K, T place no comma after ἐστί in v 42, but a comma after πάντοθεν. But see M, *Route* 123, n 24.

2 D-K, T: ἐστιν. But see note on p 47 and Stokes *One and Many* 308–9, n 69.

Since, then, there is a furthest limit, [it] is completed,

From every direction like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere,

Everywhere from the centre equally matched; for [it] must not be any larger

Or any smaller here or there;

For neither is there what-is-not, which could stop it from reaching

[Its] like; nor is there a way in which what-is could be

More here and less there, since [it] all inviolably *is*;

For equal to itself from every direction, [it] lies uniformly within limits.

For comment, see Introduction, pp 19–21 with nn 58–61, and Glossary on *peiras*.

8.44–45 KR: 'for it needs must not be somewhat more here or somewhat less there'; B: 'for it cannot be greater or smaller in one place than in another'; T: 'for it need not be somewhat more here or somewhat less there'; M (123): 'For this [what-is] may not be somewhat bigger or smaller here or there.'

8.47–48 KR: 'nor can what is be more here and less there than what is, since it is all inviolate'; B: 'nor can aught that is be more here and less there than what is, since it is all inviolable'; T: 'nor is there Being so that it could be more than Being here and less than Being there, since it is all inviolable'; M (123): 'nor is it in any way possible that what-is should be here more and there less than what-is, since all of it is inviolate'.

ἐν τῶι σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα
ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας
μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων·
μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμαις[1] ὀνομάζειν,
τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιν – ἐν ὧι πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν –
ἄντια[2] δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο
χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τῆι μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ,
ἤπιον ὄν, μέγ' ἐλαφρόν, ἑωυτῶι πάντοσε τωὐτόν,
τῶι δ' ἑτέρωι μὴ τωὐτόν· ἀτὰρ κἀκεῖνο κατ' αὐτό
τἀντία νύκτ' ἀδαῆ, πυκινὸν δέμας ἐμβριθές τε.
τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον ἐοικότα πάντα φατίζω·[3]
ὥς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσηι.

1 D–K, T: γνώμας. Both readings are reported in mss. But see Furley 'Notes on Parmenides' 5.
2 So one ms. D–K, T emend: τἀντία (cf 8.59). But see Long 93–4.
3 D–K, T place only a comma at the end of this line and print ὡς without accent in line 61.

Here I stop my trustworthy speech to you and thought
About truth; from here onwards learn mortal beliefs,
Listening to the deceitful ordering of my words;
For they established two forms in their minds for naming,
Of which it is not right to name one – wherein they have gone astray –
And they distinguished opposites in body and established signs
Apart from one another: here, on the one hand, aetherial fire of flame,
Which is gentle, very light, everywhere the same as itself,
But not the same as the other; but on the other hand, that one too by itself
In contrast, dark night, a dense and heavy body;
All this arrangment I proclaim to you as plausible;
Thus no opinion of mortals shall ever overtake you.

For comment, see Introduction as follows: 8.50–51: p 27, with nn 83–4, and Glossary on *alētheia, logos, noēma, peithein*. 51–61: pp 10, 21–3, with nn 62, 68, 69, and Glossary on *doxa*. 53–54: p 10, with nn 28–31. 55–59: p 11, with nn 29, 35. 60–61: p 23, with nn 67–9, and Glossary on *gignōskein*.

8.53–54 (With the reading of D–K) KR: 'For they made up their minds to name two forms, of which they must not name one only ...'; T: 'for they decided to name two forms, a unity of which is not necessary ...'; B: 'Mortals have made up their minds to name two forms, one of which they should not name.' Similarly M (81).

8.60–61 T: 'I tell you all the likely arrangement in order that the wisdom of mortals may never outstrip you'; B: 'Of these I tell thee the whole arrangement as it seems likely; for so no thought of mortals will ever outstrip thee'; KR: 'The whole ordering of these I tell thee as it seems likely, that so no thought of mortal men shall ever outstrip thee.'

ΔΟΞΑ

Fragment 9

αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ πάντα φάος καὶ νὺξ ὀνόμασται
καὶ τὰ κατὰ σφετέρας δυνάμεις ἐπὶ τοῖσί τε καὶ τοῖς,
πᾶν πλέον ἐστὶν ὁμοῦ φάεος καὶ νυκτὸς ἀφάντου
ἴσων ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπεὶ οὐδετέρωι μέτα μηδέν.

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 180)

SEEMING

Fragment 9

But since all things have been named light and night,

And these [have been applied] according to their powers to these things and to those,

All is full of light and obscure night together,

Of both equally, since for neither [is it the case that] nothing shares in them.

For a general view of the Way of Seeming (frs 8.51, 9–19), see Introduction, pp 21–3, with nn 62–9. The present fragment, which Simplicius cites as coming 'a few lines' after 8.59, proceeds to derive a cosmogony from the assumption that there are two irreducibly different, and equally real, elements in the universe. For an interpretation linking light and night with other opposites of earlier and later tradition (some of which have already appeared at 8.56–59), see Guthrie, vol II, 57–60.

In line 3, 'all' must mean 'the totality of things', rather than 'all things individually,' since, as Tarán observes (162), some things consist of one element only (12.1). The point is not that both elements are present in every item, but that (according to the system here adumbrated) both elements alike are present in the universe. On this view, 'equal' in line 4 need not, *pace* Guthrie (57), mean 'equal in quantity,' but only that light and night have equality of status: both are equally 'real.' For, contrary to what the Way of Truth would dictate for both of them, neither is a sheer nonentity, uninstantiated in any object whatever. For the interpretation of line 4, see also T 163–4, M 85–6.

9.1–2 KR: 'And when all things have been named light and night, and things corresponding to their powers have been assigned to each.'

9.4 KR: 'both equal, since neither has any share of nothingness'; T: 'of both equally, since there is nothing which does not belong to either'; B: 'both equal, since neither has aught to do with the other'; M (85): 'both equal, since nothingness partakes in neither.'

Fragment 10

εἴσηι δ᾽ αἰθερίαν τε φύσιν τά τ᾽ ἐν αἰθέρι πάντα
σήματα καὶ καθαρᾶς εὐαγέος ἠελίοιο
λαμπάδος ἔργ᾽ ἀίδηλα καὶ ὁππόθεν ἐξεγένοντο,
ἔργα τε κύκλωπος πεύσηι περίφοιτα σελήνης
καὶ φύσιν, εἰδήσεις δὲ καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀμφὶς ἔχοντα
ἔνθεν ἔφυ τε καὶ ὥς μιν ἄγουσ(α) ἐπέδησεν ᾽Ανάγκη
πείρατ᾽ ἔχειν ἄστρων.

Clement *Miscellanies* V.14, 138

Fragment 10

And you shall know both the nature of the aether and all

The signs in the aether, the destructive works of the splendid sun's

Pure torch, and whence they came-to-be,

And you shall learn the wandering works of the round-eyed moon,

5 And its nature, and you shall also know the surrounding sky,

Whence it grew and how Necessity did guide and shackle it

To hold the limits of the stars.

This fragment is printed by D–K and T as part of the Way of Seeming. It has, however, been assigned with great plausibility to the end of the Proem (fragment 1), following line 32, by Bicknell ('Parmenides, Fragment 10' 629–31). It can be read as part of a synopsis of topics that the goddess promises to cover in the second part of her discourse. Note, especially, the second-person future-tensed verbs in lines 1, 4, and 5, which match 'you shall learn' in 1.31. See also Glossary on *eidenai*.

Fragment 11

πῶς γαῖα καὶ ἥλιος ἠδὲ σελήνη
αἰθήρ τε ξυνὸς γάλα τ᾽ οὐράνιον καὶ ὄλυμπος
ἔσχατος ἠδ᾽ ἄστρων θερμὸν μένος ὡρμήθησαν
γίγνεσθαι

Simplicius, Commentary on *De Caelo* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* VII, 559)

Fragment 11

How earth and sun and moon

And the common aether and Milky Way and the outermost heaven

And the hot strength of the stars did thrust forward

To come-to-be

Fragments 11–12 and 14–15 contain remnants of Parmenides' astronomy, further details of which are mentioned in the testimonia (A1, A37–44). He is credited with identification of the Morning with the Evening Star (A1), and also with postulating a spherical earth, which remains in equipoise because it has no reason to move in one direction rather than another (A44). The argument for equipoise, which Aristotle attributes to Anaximander (*De Caelo* 295b10–296a23), may not be genuinely Parmenidean. But it depends upon the Principle of Sufficient Reason, like Parmenides' actual argument at 8.9–10 (see Introduction, p 15, n 43). The hypothesis of a spherical earth may be merely an inference from 8.42–49 rather than a genuine tenet of Parmenides himself. See Barnes, *Presocr. Phil.*, 23–24, 314, nn 9, 12. Compare also Kahn *Anaximander* 115–18 with Guthrie vol II, 64–5. It should be borne in mind that the nature of Parmenides' commitment to any of these postulates remains uncertain, in view of the problematic status of the whole Way of Seeming. If Parmenides' claim to have discovered the sphericity of the earth is accepted, then, as Guthrie remarks, 'it is a strange freak of history that so fundamental a discovery should have been made by one for whom the whole physical world was an unreal show' (65, n 1).

Fragment 12

αἱ γὰρ στεινότεραι πλῆνται[1] πυρὸς ἀκρήτοιο,
αἱ δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς νυκτός, μετὰ δὲ φλογὸς ἵεται αἶσα·
ἐν δὲ μέσωι τούτων δαίμων ἥ πάντα κυβερνᾶι·
πάντων[2] γὰρ στυγεροῖο τόκου καὶ μίξιος ἄρχει
πέμπουσ' ἄρσενι θῆλυ μιγῆν τό τ' ἐναντίον αὖτις
ἄρσεν θηλυτέρωι

1–3: Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 39)
2–6: Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 31)

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1 The emendation accepted by T; D–K: πλῆντο.
2 T and others read πάντηι for the unmetrical πάντα of most mss. D–K: πάντα γὰρ <ἦ>. πάντων is the reading of one ms unknown to Diels. See Sider 67–9.

Fragment 13

πρώτιστον μὲν Ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων ...

Plato *Symposium* 178b; Aristotle *Metaphysics* A4, 984b23; Plutarch *Amatorius* 756f; Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 39)

Fragment 12

For the narrower [rings] are filled with unmingled fire,

And those next upon them with night, and a portion of flame is sent forth;

In the midst of these is the goddess who steers all things;

For she rules over hateful birth and union of all things,

5 Sending female to mingle with male, and again conversely

Male with female ...

This fragment should be read in conjunction with the paraphrase of Aëtius (A37), whose account of 'circular bands' or 'garlands' (*stephanai*) enables the word 'rings' to be supplied here in the first line. These rings recall the wheels of fire posited by Anaximander to explain the true nature and appearance of the heavenly bodies. For the cosmological details, and the identity of the goddess in line 3, see Guthrie vol II, 61–4.

Fragment 13

She devised Love first of all the gods ...

The subject of this line is evidently the goddess who presides over birth and sexual union at 12.3–6. The mention of Love (*Erōs*) as her first creation suggests that Parmenides propounded a theogony in the manner of Hesiod. Compare the passage from Cicero at A37, and see T 249–50. For a broader comparison of Parmenides with Hesiod, see M 33. For the notion of *Erōs* in Parmenides, and some related themes in Plato, see M 162.

Fragment 14

νυκτιφαὲς περὶ γαῖαν ἀλώμενον ἀλλότριον φῶς

———

Plutarch *Reply to Colotes* 1116a

Fragment 15

αἰεὶ παπταίνουσα πρὸς αὐγὰς ἠελίοιο

———

Plutarch *On the Face of the Moon* 929a; *Quaestiones Romanae* 282b

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Fragment 15a

[Παρμενίδης ἐν τῆι στιχοποιίαι] ὑδατόριζον [εἶπεν τὴν γῆν].

———

Scholion XXV on St Basil *Homiliae IX in Hexameron*

Fragment 14

Night-shiner, wandering around the earth, an alien light

This and the following fragment, both quoted by Plutarch, describe the moon. It is not clear whether either line implies that the moon borrows its light from the sun. For Parmenides' title to this discovery, cf A42; but contrast *Cratylus* 409a–b, where Plato attributes the discovery to Anaxagoras. For a brief discussion, see Guthrie vol II, 66. For other associations of fragment 14, see M 224–5.

Fragment 15

Always looking towards the rays of the sun

See note on fragment 14.

Fragment 15a

[Parmenides in his verse called the earth] rooted-in-water.

This one-word fragment is printed by D–K. For discussion, see M 236–7.

Fragment 16

ὡς γὰρ ἕκαστος ἔχει κρᾶσιν μελέων πολυπλάγκτων,[1]
τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρέστηκεν·[2] τὸ γὰρ αὐτό
ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν
καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί· τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα.

Aristotle *Metaphysics* Γ5, 1009b21; Theophrastus *On Sense* 1–4 (*Dox. Gr.* 499–500)

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1 Variant readings: ἑκάστοτ' for ἕκάστος, πολυκάμπτων for πολυπλάγκτων. T: ἑκάστοτ' ... κρᾶσις
2 Variant reading: παρίσταται, accepted by D–K.

Fragment 16

For as each man has a union of the much-wandering limbs,

So is mind present to men; for it is the same thing

Which the constitution of the limbs thinks,

Both in each and every man; for the full is thought.

This fragment has been much discussed, but its meaning and position in the poem remain entirely problematic. Quoted by Aristotle (*Metaphysics* Γ 5, 1009b21) and Theophrastus (A46), it is usually assigned to the Way of Seeming; but see Introduction, p 22, with nn 65–6. On the interpretation there preferred, 'the full is thought' in verse 4 means that the *plenum*, ie, the subject whose nature has been expounded in the Way of Truth (cf 'full' at 8.24), is the sole content of thought. On this view, the clause gives a justification for the preceding one (verses 2–4): since 'the full' is the sole content of thought, it follows that what the human constitution thinks is the same for all men, ie, what-is. Such an account would connect the fragment with the basic teaching of the Way of Truth, that thought is inseparable from what-is (frs 2, 3, 8.34–36). See also Glossary on *noēma, noos*.

Some, however, would render the last clause in verse 4 'for what preponderates is thought,' and take it to mean (as verses 1–2 also suggest) that human cognition depends upon the dominant element in men's physical make-up. Accordingly, some form of 'mind-body interactionism' has often been attributed to Parmenides on the strength of these verses. For an attempt to render such a doctrine consistent with the Way of Truth, see Vlastos, 'Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge.'

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16 R (631): 'The *quality* of each man's ascertainment depends on the way his much-wandering body-components are co-ordinated, for *what* the body's nature knows is identical for all men and every man. For the *plenum* is ascertainment'; KR: 'According to the mixture that each man has in his wandering limbs, so thought is forthcoming to mankind; for that which thinks is the same thing, namely the substance of their limbs, in each and all men; for that of which there is more is thought'; T: 'For as at any time the mixture of the much wandering body is, so does mind come to men. For the same thing is that the nature of the body thinks in each and in all men; for the full is thought.'

Fragment 17

δεξιτεροῖσι [μὲν] κόρους, λαιοῖσιν δ' αὖ <κτίσε> κούρας[1]

Galen, *Commentary on Sixth Book of Hippocrates' Epidemics* II.46 (Kuhn 1002; Wenkebach-Pfaff 119)

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1 Mss: δεξιτεροῖσι μὲν κούρους, λαιοῖσι δ' αὖ κούρας; D–K, T: δεξιτεροῖσιν μὲν κούρους, λαιοῖσι δὲ κούρας. The above text is that of the most recent editors of Galen (see p 101). <κτίσε>: sc. μήτρης μέρεσιν ἡ δαίμων. cf 12.3.

Fragment 18

femina virque simul Veneris cum germina miscent
venis, informans diverso ex sanguine virtus
temperiem servans bene condita corpora fingit.
nam si virtutes permixto semine pugnent,
nec faciant unam permixto in corpore, dirae
nascentem gemino vexabunt semine sexum.

Caelius Aurelianus *On Chronic Diseases* IV.9

Fragment 17

<She placed> young males on the right side [of the womb], young females on the left.

With the text printed, the subject of this line will be the goddess, referred to at 12.3 as presiding over birth. The line is a fragment from Parmenides' embryology. Cf A53–54. For discussion see Guthrie vol II, 78 ff, Kember 70–9, and Lloyd, 178–9.

Fragment 18

When man and woman mingle the seeds of love

That spring from their veins, a formative power

Maintaining proper proportions moulds well-formed bodies from this
diverse blood.

For if, when the seed is mingled, the forces therein clash

5 And do not fuse into one, then cruelly

Will they plague with double seed the sex of the offspring.

The text of this fragment is not extant in Greek. It has survived only in a Latin version, composed in the fifth-century AD, by the medical writer, Caelius Aurelianus, in order (he says) to avoid interspersing Latin with a quotation in Greek. The translation, together with contextual material on p 101, is reprinted from I.E. Drabkin's edition of Caelius (Chicago 1950) by permission of the University of Chicago Press.

The context of the fragment is a discussion of the causes of homosexuality. See Drabkin 902–5. For comment, see T 263–5 and the references noted under fragment 17.

Fragment 19

οὕτω τοι κατὰ δόξαν ἔφυ τάδε καί νυν ἔασι
καὶ μετέπειτ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦδε τελευτήσουσι τραφέντα·
τοῖς δ᾽ ὄνομ᾽ ἄνθρωποι κατέθεντ᾽ ἐπίσημον ἑκάστωι.

Simplicius, Commentary on *De Caelo* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* VII, 558)

Cornford's Fragment

οἷον[1] ἀκίνητον τελέθει, τῶι παντ(ὶ) ὄνομ(α) εἶναι.

Plato *Theaetetus* 180e; Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 29, 16–18, 143, 10)

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1 Cornford and Woodbury read οἷον; M 185, n 47, defends οἷον.

Fragment 19

Thus according to belief, these things were born and now are

And hereafter, having grown from this, they will come to an end,

And for each of these did men establish a distinctive name.

This fragment, which has sometimes been thought to contain the closing lines of the Way of Seeming, is related to two passages about naming in the Way of Truth, 8.38–41 and 8.53–54. For comment on these, see Introduction pp 10–12, with nn 27–31, 36.

Cornford's Fragment

Such, changeless, is that for which as a whole the name is: 'to be.'

This line is preserved by Plato and quoted twice by Simplicius. Its status as an independent fragment, rather than a misquotation of 8.38, was first suggested by Cornford 'A New Fragment' 122–3. See also Woodbury 148–9, 153–5; and M 185–8. It is discussed more sceptically by Barnes 'Parmenides and the Eleatic One' 14–16. See also Glossary on *telethein*.

Woodbury (154): 'One and unmoved is the name of the all -- "being"'; M (186): 'Such [or Alone], immobile, is that for which as a whole the name is: "to be."' Alternatively, reading the first word as *hoion* and taking it as Plato's rather than as part of the quotation: 'for instance, "'unchanging' is by nature such as to be a name for the whole"' (*Theaetetus* tr McDowell). But against this see Woodbury 158, n 10.

Fragment Contexts, Testimonia, and Sources and Authorities

FRAGMENT CONTEXTS

This section contains translations of the contexts for all the B fragments, as printed by Diels-Kranz. References have been adapted for contemporary readers. When needed, particulars of the editions used are given at the end of the relevant item in Sources and Authorities (pp 124 ff). Short excerpts from the poem have been given in italics. Longer passages have been indicated by fragment and line references to the complete text. Some editorial comments and references by D-K have been omitted.

1

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* VII.111–14

But his [Xenophanes'] friend Parmenides rejected the doxastic reason – I mean that which has weak conceptions – and assumed as criterion the epistemic, that is, the infallible reason, even abandoning trust in the senses. Thus in the opening of his work *On Nature* he writes in this fashion:

Sextus here quotes 1.1–30, followed immediately by the lines now printed as 7.2–7. He continues:

For in these verses Parmenides means that the mares which carry him along are the irrational impulses and appetites of the soul, and that 'the much-speaking route of the goddess' they travel is that of inquiry according to philosophical reason; this reason, like a divine guide, points the way to the knowledge of all things. And the maidens that lead him on are the senses; of these, he alludes to auditory faculties in a riddling manner by saying 'it was urged on by two rounded wheels,' that is with the circles of the ears, by means of which they receive sound; and visual faculties he calls 'maidens, Daughters of the Sun, leaving the House of Night' and 'hastening into the light,' because it is impossible to make use of them without light. And the approach to 'much-avenging Justice' who also holds 'the keys of requital' is to intelligence which holds a reliable apprehension of things.

And she, after welcoming him, promises to teach him two things: 'both the steadfast heart of persuasive truth', which is the immovable foundation of knowledge, and secondly 'the beliefs of mortals in which there is no true credence,' that is to say, everything which lies in the realm of belief, because all such things are uncertain.

Simplicius, Commentary on *De Caelo* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* VII, 557)
Those men posited two levels: that of what truly is, the intelligible; and that of what comes-to-be, the sensible, which they thought one should not speak of as 'being' *simpliciter*, but as 'apparent being.' Hence they say that truth concerns what-is, whereas opinion concerns what comes-to-be. Parmenides at any rate says:

Simplicius here quotes 1.28–32.

2

Proclus, Commentary on *Timaeus* (Diehl, vol I, 345) (after 1.30: see A17, p 107, below)
And again:

Proclus here quotes 2.1–6.

and:

Proclus quotes 2.7–8.

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 116)
And if anyone wishes to hear Parmenides himself making these assertions, the one that says that apart from what-is there is what-is-not or nothing, which amounts to the proposition that what-is is spoken of univocally, he will find it in these verses:

Simplicius here quotes 2.3–8.

3

Clement, *Miscellanies* VI.2, 23
Aristophanes said 'For thinking is equal in power to doing,' and before him Parmenides of Elea said:

*For thinking and being are the same.**

* Both Clement and Plotinus evidently construed this line as an identity statement, and it has been translated accordingly here. But this differs from the interpretation adopted in the main text. See note to translation ad loc and Introduction, p 8 with note 22. An alternative, inaccurate, version of the line, not cited by D-K or Tarán, is given by Proclus in Commentary on *Parmenides* (Cousin 1152).

Plotinus, *Ennead* V.1.8
Parmenides too fastened earlier upon this sort of view, inasmuch as he identified being with thought and refused to place being in the sensible world. Saying:

*For thinking and being are the same**

he also calls this reality changeless, despite attributing thinking to it and removing all corporeal change from it.

* See note to Clement VI.2 above.

4

Clement, *Miscellanies* V.2, 15
But Parmenides too in his poem, hinting cryptically at things of that kind with regard to hope, says:

Clement here quotes 4

because someone who hopes, like one who believes, also sees intelligible things and future events with his mind. If, then, we say that justice is real, and we say this of beauty as well, surely we must assert that truth is real also; but we have never seen any of such things with our eyes, but only with the mind.

5

Proclus, Commentary on *Parmenides* (Cousin 708) [after 8.25]

It is all one to me
Where I am to begin; for I shall return there again

6

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 117) [after 2]
But that the contrary statement is not true at the same time, he asserts in those verses in which he censures those who reduce opposites to the same: for saying

for it is there to be
Whereas nothing is not; that is what I bid you consider,
For <I restrain you> from that first route of inquiry (6.1–3)
<he continues:>*
Simplicius' text continues with 6.4–9

* The translation follows D-K in supplying a word ('I restrain you') to complete 6.3, which is metrically one foot short, and another word ('he continues'), in order to provide Simplicius' sentence with a main verb. For the textual problems posed by these lines, and their implications for the interpretation of Parmenides, see Stokes, *One and Many* 112–15, 302, nn 18–27; see also note to 6.3, p 61 above.

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 78)
For after censuring those who combine what-is with what-is-not in the intelligible world,

Simplicius here quotes 6.8–9

and after turning away from the road that seeks what-is-not

But do you restrain your thought from this route of inquiry (7.2)

he continues:

Simplicius here quotes 8.1–14.

7

Plato, *Sophist* 237a
[Eleatic Visitor speaking] But, my young friend, when we were your age the great Parmenides testified against this from beginning to end, constantly telling us in prose what he also says in his poem:

For never shall this prevail, that things that are not are,
But do you restrain your thought from this route of inquiry (7.1–2).

Aristotle, *Metaphysics N*2, 1089a2
For it seemed to them that all things would be one, what-is itself, unless someone could resolve and come to grips with the dictum of Parmenides,

For never shall this prevail, that things that are not are (7.1)

ie, that one must show that what-is-not *is*.

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* VII.114
And at the end he adds by way of clarification that one must pay attention not to the senses but to reason; for he says:

*Sextus here quotes 7.3–6.**

This thinker himself, then, as is clear from his statements, proclaimed the cognitive reason to be the standard of truth in things that are, and gave up paying attention to the senses.

* Sextus ends this quotation in mid-line with the words 'uttered by me.' In his fuller quotation of the lines along with fragment 1, he includes 7.2, and continues down to 'is left' at the start of 8.2. In that quotation (at *Against the Mathematicians* VII.111) fragment 1.30 carries straight into fragment 7.2.

8

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 144)
[After A21] The verses after the elimination of what-is-not go as follows:

Simplicius here quotes 8.1–52 in full.

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 78)
[After 7.2] He continues:

Simplicius here quotes 8.1–3.

And he next imparts the signs of what-is in the strict sense:

Simplicius here quotes 8.3–14.

In saying these things about what-is in the strict sense, he clearly proves that this existent is ungenerated; for it did not come from what-is, since no other being existed before it; nor from what-is-not, since what-is-not does not even exist. And why did it come into being just then, rather than sooner or later? Nor, again, could it have come from what in one way is but in another way is not, as what has been generated comes into being: for what in one way is, but in another way is not, could not exist before what-is *simpliciter*, but is posterior to it.

Clement, *Miscellanies* V.14, 112
Parmenides ... writes about God somewhat as follows:

Clement here quotes 8.3–4.

Plato, *Theaetetus* 180d
[Socrates speaking] There are others too who have declared doctrines that are the opposite of those: 'Such, changeless, is that for which as a whole the name is: "to be," '* and all the other things which people like Melissus and Parmenides insist on, in opposition to all those others.

* This line has been translated from Plato's text, on the assumption, made by D–K when they included it here, that it was a misquotation of 8.38. It may, however, be an independent fragment of the poem. See note on translation of 'Cornford's fragment' (p 91).

With 8.39 cf Melissus D-K 30 B8
For if there exist earth and water ... and all the other things which men say are real.

For 8.42 cf Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 147)
If 'the universe together' (8.5) and 'furthest limit' (8.42) are indeed one.

Plato, *Sophist* 244e
[Eleatic Visitor speaking] Then if it is a whole – as indeed Parmenides says,

The speaker here quotes 8.43–5

– if what-is is like that, it has a middle and extremities.

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 143)
And therefore his sayings do not even apply to the universe, as some supposed, Eudemus says, on hearing the words

from every direction like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere (8.43);

for the universe is not indivisible, nor again is it like a sphere, but the most perfect of physical objects *is* a sphere.

Aristotle, *Physics* III.6, 207a15
So Parmenides was nearer the mark than Melissus; for Melissus speaks of 'the universe' as 'unlimited,'* whereas Parmenides sets boundaries to his 'universe' that is 'everywhere from the centre equally matched' (8.44).

* Reading ἄπειρον τὸ ὅλον with Bonitz.

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX 38)
For after completing his discourse on the intelligible world, Parmenides continues as follows:

Simplicius here quotes 8.50–61.

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 30)
Proceeding from intelligible to sensible things, or from truth to seeming, as he himself says where he declares:

Simplicius here quotes 8.50–2.

Parmenides himself too put forward the elemental principles of generated things as the primary opposition, which he calls light and darkness, or fire and earth, or dense and rare, or the same and [the] other, declaring in the verses following upon those preceding:

Simplicius here quotes 8.53–9.

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 147)
He calls the ordering of his verses concerning mortal opinions 'deceitful' (8.52).

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 179)
For he too, in the verses concerning seeming, makes hot and cold principles; and he calls them fire and earth, and light and night or darkness; for after the verses on truth he says:

Simplicius here quotes 8.53–9.

9

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 180) [after 8.59]
And again, a few lines later,

Simplicius here quotes 9

But if 'nothing shares in neither,' it is made clear that both are principles, and that they are opposites.

10

Clement, *Miscellanies* V.14, 138
So, after coming to true understanding [that of Christ], let him who wishes hear Parmenides of Elea, who promises:

Here Clement quotes 10.

Cf Plutarch, *Reply to Colotes* 1114b
... he [Parmenides] has actually made a cosmic order, and by blending as elements the light and the dark produces out of them and by their operation the whole world of appearances. Thus he has much to say about earth, heaven, sun, moon, and stars,* and has recounted the genesis of man; and for an ancient natural philosopher – who has put together a book of his own, and is not pulling apart the book of another – he has left nothing of real importance unsaid.

* D-K inadvertently omit the words 'and stars.'

11

Simplicius, Commentary on *De Caelo* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* VII, 559)
Parmenides says that he is beginning to speak on sensible things:

Simplicius here quotes 11

and he gives an account of the genesis of things that come-to-be and pass-away, going as far as the parts of living things.

12

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 39) [after 8.61]
And again, a few lines later, he continues speaking of the two elements and refers to the active agent as follows:

Simplicius here quotes 12.1–3.

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 31)
And Parmenides has clearly indicated the active agent responsible not only for corporeal things in the world of coming-to-be, but also for incorporeal things which complete that world, when he says:

Simplicius here quotes 12.2–6.

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 34)
And he [Parmenides] posits a single common active agent as responsible, the goddess situated 'in the midst of all things,' and responsible for all coming-to-be. Cf A37.

13
Plato, *Symposium* 178b
[Phaedrus speaking] Parmenides says of birth:
She devised Love first of all the gods ...

Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A4, 984b23
One might suspect that Hesiod was the first to look for such a thing – or someone else who put love or desire among existing things as a principle, as Parmenides also does; for in constructing the genesis of the universe, he says:
She devised Love first of all the gods ...

Plutarch, *Amatorius* 756f
Hence Parmenides declares Love to be the oldest of the works of Aphrodite, writing in his cosmogony:
She devised Love first of all the gods ...

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 39)
And he says that she [the goddess] is also the cause of the gods, when he asserts:
She devised Love first of all the gods ...
And he says that at one time she sends souls from the visible to the invisible world, and at another time back again.

14
Plutarch, *Reply to Colotes* 1116a
Nor indeed does someone abolish the use of iron or the reality of moonlight who denies that a lump of ignited iron is fire, or who says that moonlight is not sunshine, calling it instead in the words of Parmenides:
Night-shiner, wandering around the earth, an alien light.

15
Plutarch, *On the Face in the Moon* 929a
Of all the heavenly bodies, so many in number, only it [the moon] moves around in need of a borrowed light, according to Parmenides:
*Always looking towards the rays of the sun.**
* This line is also quoted by Plutarch in *Quaestiones Romanae* 282b.

15a

Scholion XXV on St Basil, *Homiliae IX in Hexameron**

Parmenides in his work of poetry called the earth 'rooted-in-water.'†

* Doxographical fragments first published by G. Pasquali, 'Doxographica aus Basiliusscholien,' *Nachrichten von der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, Phil. Hist. Klasse (1910) pp 194–228.

† For an account of this one-word fragment see Mourelatos, *Route* 236–7.

16

Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Γ5, 1009b21*

Aristotle here quotes 16.

* Cf A46. Aristotle quotes 16 *à propos* of a discussion of Empedocles.

17

Galen, *Commentary on the Sixth Book of Hippocrates' Epidemics* II. 46 (Kühn 1002; Wenkebach-Pfaff 119)

Others among the earliest thinkers have also said, however, that the male is conceived on the right side of the mother. Thus Parmenides declared:

<She placed> young males on the right side [of the womb],
young females on the left.

18

Caelius Aurelianus, *On Chronic Diseases** IV.9

Parmenides in his work *On Nature* indicates that effeminate men or pathics may come into being as a result of a circumstance at conception. Since his account is contained in a Greek poem, I shall also give my version in poetry. For I have done my best to compose Latin verses of the same kind, to avoid the commingling of the two languages.

Here Caelius quotes 18.

Thus Parmenides holds that the seminal fluids are not merely material bodies but possess active principles, and if these fluids mingle in such a way as to form a unified force in the body, they will thereby produce a desire appropriate to the sex of the individual. But if, despite the mingling of the seminal matter, the active principles fail to merge, a desire for both forms of love will harass the offspring.

* The translation is taken from the edition by I.E. Drabkin (Chicago 1950). See note to translation of 18.

19

Simplicius, Commentary on *De Caelo* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* VII, 558)

After imparting the arrangement of sensible things, he continued again:

Here Simplicius quotes 19.

TESTIMONIA ON PARMENIDES

This section contains all of the A fragments printed in Diels-Kranz, giving evidence regarding Parmenides' life and thought. Occasional deviations from the D-K text have been noted below. References are given in the same manner as for fragment contexts.

LIFE

A1

Diogenes Laertius IX.21–3

(21) Parmenides, a native of Elea, son of Pyres, was a pupil of Xenophanes (Theophrastus in his *Epitome* makes him a pupil of Anaximander). Parmenides, however, though he was instructed by Xenophanes, was no follower of his. According to Sotion he also associated with Ameinias the Pythagorean, who was the son of Diochaetas and a worthy gentleman though poor. This Ameinias he was more inclined to follow, and on Ameinias' death Parmenides built a shrine to him, as he was of illustrious birth and possessed of great wealth; moreover, it was Ameinias and not Xenophanes who led him to adopt the quiet life.[1]

He was the first to declare that the earth is spherical and is situated in the centre.[2] He held that there were two elements, fire and earth, and that the former performed the function of a craftsman, the latter that of his material. (22) The generation of man proceeded originally from the sun; the hot and the cold were causes[3] from which all things were composed. Again he held that soul and mind are one and the same, as Theophrastus mentions in his work on physics, where he is setting forth the tenets of almost all the schools. He divided his philosophy into two parts, the one dealing with truth, the other with opinion. Hence he somewhere says:

Here 1.28–30 are quoted.

Our philosopher also commits his doctrines to verse, as did Hesiod, Xenophanes, and Empedocles. He made reason the criterion and declared sensations to be inexact. At all events his words are:

Here 7.3–5 are quoted.

Hence Timon says of him:

And the strength of high-minded Parmenides, of no popular opinions,
Who rescued thoughts from the delusion of appearance.

It was about him that Plato wrote a dialogue with the title *Parmenides* or *Concerning Ideas.*

He flourished in the sixty-ninth Olympiad.[4] He is believed to have been the first to detect the identity of Hesperus, the evening star, and Phosphorus, the morning-star; thus Favorinus in the fifth book of his *Memorabilia.* But others attribute this to Pythagoras. And Callimachus holds that the poem was not the work of Parmenides. He is said to have served his native city as a legislator; so we learn from Speusippus in his book *On Philosophers.* Also to have been the first to use the argument known as 'Achilles'; so Favorinus tells us in his *Miscellaneous History.* There was also another Parmenides, a rhetorician who wrote a treatise on his art.

1 Ie, the Pythagorean way of life.
2 For these discoveries cf A44. For discussion see the references noted under 11 (p 81).
3 Reading αἴτια with Diels for the mss' αὐτὸν
4 504–501 BC

A2

Suda (Sv Parmenides)

Parmenides of Elea, son of Pyres, philosopher, who was a student of Xenophanes of Colophon, and, according to Theophrastus, of Anaximander of Miletus. His successors were Empedocles, the philosopher and physician, and Zeno of Elea. He wrote natural philosophy in verse, and some other things in prose, which Plato mentions.[1]

1 *Sophist* 237a, cf context for 7 (p 96).

A3

Diogenes Laertius II.3

Anaximenes of Miletus, son of Eurystratus, was a student of Anaximander, and some say that he was a student of Parmenides as well.

A4

Iamblichus, *On the Pythagorean Life* 166

Moreover, all who have made any mention of the natural philosophers do, in fact, give first place to Empedocles and to Parmenides of Elea.

Proclus, Commentary on *Parmenides* (Cousin 619)
So on this festival occasion, as we said, Parmenides and Zeno came to Athens, Parmenides as teacher and Zeno as his student; both were from Elea, and what is more, both drew upon the Pythagorean school, as Nicomachus[1] too has somewhere recorded.

1 The ms reads 'Callimachus' which is retained by Cousin. Cf A1, end.

Photius, *Bibliotheca* chapter 249, 439a
Zeno and Parmenides of Elea: they too shared the Pythagorean way of life.

A5

Plato, *Theaetetus* 183e
[Socrates speaking] Parmenides seems to me, as Homer puts it, venerable and awesome. I met the great man when I was very young and he was very old, and he seemed to me to have a sort of depth which was altogether noble.

Plato, *Sophist* 217c
[Socrates speaking] Or do you prefer to use the method of asking questions, as Parmenides himself did on one occasion in developing some magnificent arguments in my presence, when I was young and he quite an elderly man?

Plato, *Parmenides* 127a–c
According to Antiphon, then, this was Pythodorus' account. Zeno and Parmenides once came to Athens for the Great Panathenaea. Parmenides was a man of distinguished appearance. By that time he was well advanced in years, with his hair almost white; he may have been sixty-five. Zeno was nearing forty at the time, a tall and attractive figure. It was said that he had been Parmenides' boy-love. They were staying with Pythodorus outside the walls in the Ceramicus. Socrates and quite a number of others came there, anxious to hear a reading of Zeno's treatise, which the two visitors had brought for the first time to Athens. Socrates was then very young.

Athenaeus, *The Deipnosophists* XI 505f
The age of Plato's Socrates is hardly consistent with his having joined in discussions with Parmenides, for he couldn't have contributed or listened to such discussions. But the most vile and [false][1] accusation of all, when there is no pressing need to make it, is that Zeno, Parmenides' fellow-citizen, was his boy-love.[2]

1 The text is uncertain. Kranz has added 'false.' Diels omitted 'and.'
2 Cf Macrobius *Saturnalia* I.1.5.

Diogenes Laertius IX.25
Zeno of Elea. Apollodorus in his *Chronology* says that he was the son of Teleutagoras by birth, but of Parmenides by adoption ... Zeno, then, was a pupil of Parmenides and his boy-love.

A6
Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A5, 986b22
For Parmenides is said to have been his [Xenophanes'] student.

A7
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on *Metaphysics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* I, 31 = *Dox. Gr.* 482)
Theophrastus too, in the first book of his work on the natural philosophers, has this to say about Parmenides and his doctrine: 'This man' (he is speaking of Xenophanes) 'was succeeded by Parmenides of Elea, son of Pyres, who travelled both routes. For he proves that the universe is eternal, and also tries to account for the coming-into-being of existent things; he does not hold the same views about both of these, but according to truth he takes the universe to be one, ungenerated, and spherical, whereas according to the opinions of the many, he takes two of the phenomena, with a view to accounting for coming-into-being, namely fire and earth, and makes these into first principles, the one as matter, the other as cause or agent.'

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 22)
... Xenophanes of Colophon, Parmenides' teacher.

A8
Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 28 = *Dox. Gr.* 483)
Leucippus of Elea or Miletus (he is associated with both places), though he shared Parmenides' philosophical concern, did not take the same route as Parmenides and Xenophanes regarding existent things, but rather, it would seem, the opposite one. For whereas they made the universe one, motionless, ungenerated, and limited, and agreed that the non-existent could not even be investigated, he postulated an infinite number of elements, always in motion, namely the atoms.

A9
Diogenes Laertius VIII.55
Theophrastus affirms that he [Empedocles] was an admirer of Parmenides and imitated him in his verses, for Parmenides too had published his treatise on nature in verse.

A10

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 25)

Empedocles of Acragas, who came not long after Anaxagoras, and was an admirer and follower of Parmenides, and even more so of the Pythagoreans.

A11

Eusebius, *Chronica* [for the year 456 BC]

Empedocles and Parmenides were known as natural philosophers.

Eusebius, *Chronica* [for the year 436 BC]

At that time Democritus of Abdera was also known as a natural philosopher, and Empedocles of Acragas and the philosophers Zeno and Parmenides, and Hippocrates of Cos.

Inscriptiones Graecae vol XIV, 349[1]

Then [between the invasion of Xerxes 480 BC and the Peloponnesian War 431 BC] Socrates the philosopher and Heraclitus of Ephesus and Anaxagoras and Parmenides and Zeno ... years ...

1 Inscription 1297, a fragmentary text found near Rome. It contains a chronicle of Greek and Roman events and seems to have been written in the early first century AD.

A12

Strabo VI.1.1

On doubling this promontory one comes immediately to another gulf, in which there is a city which was called 'Hyele' by the Phocaeans who founded it, and by others 'Ele,' after a certain spring, but is called by the men of to-day 'Elea.' This is the native city of Parmenides and Zeno, the Pythagorean philosophers. It is my opinion that not only through the influence of these men but also in still earlier times the city was well governed.[1]

1 Parmenides' activity at Elea has been dramatically confirmed by modern archaeological discoveries. His name has been found there on an inscription in the ruins of what was apparently a medical school of later origin (*Illustrated London News*, 31 August 1963, 306–7); he is referred to as a natural philosopher and a medical man. Later excavations have turned up a sculpture of his head in stone (A.D. Trendall, Archaeological Reports for 1966–67, *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 87 (1967), 32–3).

Plutarch, *Reply to Colotes* 1126a

Parmenides appointed for his native city the best of laws, so that every year the citizens bind the magistrates by oath to abide by Parmenides' laws.

COMPOSITION

A13
Diogenes Laertius I.16
Others left no more than one treatise each, as did Melissus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras.

A14
Simplicius, Commentary on *De Caelo* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* VII, 556)
Is it because both Melissus and Parmenides entitled their books *On Nature*? ... and indeed in these books they discussed not only things beyond the realm of nature, but also natural things; and perhaps that is why they were not reluctant to entitle them *On Nature*.

A15
Plutarch, *How a Young Man should Study Poetry* 16c
The verses of Empedocles and of Parmenides, the *Theriaca* of Nicander, and the *Maxims* of Theognis are merely compositions which have borrowed[1] from poetic art its metre and lofty style, as a vehicle in order to avoid the prosaic.
1 Reading κιχράμενοι with Madvig.

A16
Plutarch, *On Listening to Lectures* 45a–b
One might find fault with Archilochus for his subject-matter, Parmenides for his versification, Phocylides as common-place, Euripides for his loquacity, and Sophocles for his unevenness.

A17
Proclus, Commentary on *Timaeus* (Diehl, vol I, 345)
Parmenides, though he is unclear because of his poetic style, nevertheless himself says, to prove these things: [here Proclus cites a version of 1.29–30]

A18
Proclus, Commentary on *Parmenides* (Cousin 665)
Parmenides himself in his poem: and yet although obliged, because of the poetic form itself, to use metaphorical terms, figures, and turns of phrase, he nevertheless embraced the most unbecoming, dry, and austere form of expression. He exhibits this characteristic in such places,[1] and every other feature of the same kind; so that his discourse reads more like prose than poetry.
1 8.25, 8.5, and 8.44–5 are cited.

A19

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 36)

Since we shall be hearing Aristotle refuting the views of the earlier philosophers, and before Aristotle Plato is evidently doing the same thing, and before both of them Parmenides and Xenophanes as well, one must recognize that these writers, catering for a rather superficial audience, refuted what seemed strange in their arguments, since the early thinkers tended to express their views enigmatically.

A20

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 146–7)

Do not be surprised if he says that the one existent is 'like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere': it is because of his poetic style that he fastens upon a sort of fanciful fiction. Indeed, how does saying this differ from saying, with Orpheus, 'a silver-white egg'?

Menander or Genethlius, *On Epideictic* (Spengel 333)

[Hymns] about nature, such as the followers of Parmenides and Empedocles composed.[1]

1 The text here is corrupt and has been restored by editors. 'Composed' is the emendation of Bernhardy.

Menander or Genethlius, *On Epideictic* (Spengel 337)

[Hymns are] of this type [about nature], when uttering a hymn to Apollo we declare him to be the sun, and discuss the sun's nature, and say of Hera that she is air, and that Zeus is the hot; for such hymns are descriptive of nature. Both Parmenides and Empedocles use that genre in a masterly way ... For Parmenides and Empedocles give full expositions, whereas Plato recalls[1] it briefly.

1 Spengel and the mss have ἀνυμνεῖ, 'celebrate with a hymn.'

A21

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 144)

Without wishing to seem pedantic, I should like to transcribe in this commentary Parmenides' verses concerning the one existent, which are, in fact, of no great number, both for the sake of credence in the things I say, and because of the rarity of Parmenides' treatise.[1]

1 Simplicius proceeds to quote 8.1–52 *in extenso*.

TEACHINGS

Philoponus, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* XVI, 65)
They say that a separate book has been written by him [Aristotle] dealing with the doctrine of Parmenides.

A22
[Plutarch], *Miscellanies* 5 (*Dox. Gr.* 580–1)
Parmenides of Elea, friend of Xenophanes, both accepted his views and at the same time adopted the contrary position. For he declares the universe to be eternal and changeless according to the truth of things: for it is

alone, only-begotten, steadfast, and ungenerated[1]

But he declares that coming-into-being belongs to appearances based upon a false notion. Moreover, he expels the senses from the realm of truth. He says that if anything exists apart from what-is, then that thing is not a being; but what-is-not does not exist in the universe. Thus he leaves only what-is, ungenerated; and he says that the earth came into being from the downflow of the dense.

1 8.4 The text is this source is μοῦνον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμὲς ἠδ' ἀγένητον. This has been translated above, though it differs significantly from the reading adopted in the main text. See Introduction p 13 with nn 37–38.

A23
Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* I.11 (*Dox. Gr.* 564)
Furthermore Parmenides suggests that the universe is one, eternal, ungenerated, and spherical – nor does even he himself avoid the belief of most people, when he calls fire and earth the first principles of the universe, treating earth as matter, and fire as cause or agent. He asserted that the cosmos perished, but he did not say in what way. The same thinker said that the universe was eternal, ungenerated, spherical, and homogeneous, having no space within itself, both changeless and perfect.

A24
Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A5, 986b18
Parmenides seems to fasten on what is one in definition.

Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A5, 986b27
But Parmenides seems in places to speak with more insight. For claiming that besides the existent, nothing non-existent exists, he thinks that of necessity one thing exists, viz. the existent and nothing else ... but being forced to follow the observed facts, and supposing the existence of that which is one in definition, but more than one according to sensation, he

now posits two causes and two principles, the hot and the cold, ie, fire and earth; and of these he ranges the hot with the existent, and the other with the non-existent.[1]

1 Cf Alexander, Commentary on *Metaphysics* ad loc (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* I, 45).

Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Γ5, 1010a1
They examined the truth about existents, but they assumed the only existents to be sensible things.

A25

Aristotle, *De Caelo* III.1, 298b14
Some of them flatly denied generation and destruction, maintaining that nothing which is either comes into being or perishes; it only seems to us to do so. Such were the followers of Melissus and Parmenides. Of them we must hold that, though some of what they say may be right, yet they do not speak as students of nature, since the existence of certain substances subject neither to generation nor to any other kind of motion is not a matter for natural science but rather for another and higher study. They, however, being unaware of anything beyond the substance of sensible objects, and perceiving for the first time that unchangeable entities [were demanded] if knowledge and wisdom were to be possible, naturally transferred to sensible objects the description of the higher.

Aristotle, *On Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away* I.8, 325a13
As a result, then, of these arguments, passing over and disregarding sense-perception, on the ground that one should follow reason, they assert that the universe is one and immovable; some add that it is infinite as well, for a limit would be a limit against the void. Some philosophers, then, set forth their views about the truth in this manner and held them for these reasons. Furthermore, these opinions seem to follow in the light of the arguments, but to hold them in the light of the facts seems almost madness.

Philoponus ad loc (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* XIV.2, 157–8)
[Aristotle] reproaches the followers of Parmenides, because they believed that one should pay no attention at all to the manifest nature of the facts, but only to the implications of arguments.

A26

Plato, *Theaetetus* 181a
But if there seems to be more truth in what's said by the partisans of the whole, we'll escape from those who try to change what's unchanging, and run away to them.

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* X.46

The non-existence of motion is affirmed by the followers of Parmenides and Melissus, whom Aristotle has called 'stationers' of nature[1] from their stationary state, and 'non-nature men,' because nature is the source of change, and in saying nothing changes they did away with it.

1 Some mss and D-K omit 'of nature.'

A27

Aristotle, *Physics* III.6, 207a9

For we define a whole precisely as that from which nothing is absent, for example, a 'whole man' or a 'whole chest.' And as with a particular whole, so when the word is used in the strict sense:[1] the Whole is that outside which there is nothing whatsoever; whereas that from which something, no matter what, is missing and left outside is not 'All.' And 'whole' and 'complete' if not absolutely the same, are very closely akin, and nothing is complete unless it has an end; but an end is a limit. So Parmenides was nearer the mark than Melissus; for Melissus speaks of 'the Whole' as unlimited, whereas Parmenides sets boundaries to his 'whole,' that is 'equipoised on the centre.'[2]

1 'Aristotle refers to the use of τὸ ὅλον and τὸ πᾶν to mean "the universe" – *the* Whole "in the strict sense," because it is not also part of any larger whole' (F.M. Cornford, Loeb edition, ad loc).

2 See 8.44. It is by no means clear that Parmenides meant to set boundaries to his universe, as Aristotle assumes. Nor is 'equipoised on the centre' the most likely interpretation of 8.44. See Introduction p 19–21 with n 58.

A28

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 115–16)

According to Alexander's account, Theophrastus in the first book of his enquiry on natural science[1] expresses Parmenides' argument as follows: 'Anything beyond what-is is what-is-not; what-is-not is nothing; therefore what-is is one'; but Eudemus puts it thus: 'Anything beyond what-is is what-is-not; furthermore, what-is is spoken of univocally; therefore what-is is one.' Whether Eudemus has written this so clearly elsewhere I cannot say; but in his *Physics* he writes the following about Parmenides, from which the aforesaid can perhaps be inferred: 'Parmenides does not seem to prove that what-is is one, not even were one to grant him that what-is is spoken of univocally, except what is predicated of each thing in the category of substance, as 'man' is of men. When definitions of particular things are being given, the definition of what-is will inhere in everything, one and the same, just as that of living thing inheres in living things. But just as, if all existing things were beautiful, and one could find nothing that was not

beautiful, then indeed all things will be beautiful, but nevertheless what is beautiful will not be one thing but many (for colour will be beautiful, and so will a way of life, and so will anything at all) – so too all things will indeed be 'beings,' but not one nor the same thing; for water will be one thing, but fire another. One should not then be surprised at Parmenides for following arguments unworthy of credence, and for being taken in by such things, which had not at that time been clarified (for no one then talked of multiple meaning – Plato was the first to introduce double meaning – nor of *per se* and *per accidens*); and he seems to have been misled by those things. But they, and syllogistic reasoning, were brought to light as a result of arguments and counter-arguments; for they would not be agreed upon, if they did not seem necessary. But the earlier thinkers used to declare their views without proper demonstration.

1 Ie, the *Opinions of the Natural Philosophers* (*Dox. Gr.* 483)

A29

Aëtius I.24.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 320)

Parmenides and Melissus did away with coming-to-be and destruction by regarding the universe as changeless.

A30

Ammonius, Commentary on *De Interpretatione* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.*, IV.5. 133)

For first, as the *Timaeus* taught us, and as Aristotle himself declares in his theology, and before them Parmenides (not only the Platonic speaker, but also the poet in his own verses), with the gods nothing is either past or future, assuming that each of these is non-existent, the former as existing no longer, the latter not yet, and the former as having changed, the latter as being naturally liable to change; but it is impossible to apply such concepts to things that truly exist, and do not admit of change even in thought.

A31

Aëtius 1.7.26 (*Dox. Gr.* 303)

According to Parmenides the changeless and perfect spherical being [is god].

A32

Aëtius I.25.3 (*Dox. Gr.* 321)

According to Parmenides and Democritus, everything is of necessity; and fate, justice, providence, and the maker of the universe are the same thing.

A33
Clement, *Protrepticus* 5.64
Parmenides of Elea introduced fire and earth as gods.

A34
Plutarch, *Reply to Colotes* 1114d
Parmenides, however, abolishes neither the one world nor the other [neither that of intelligible nor that of sensible things]. He gives each its due and puts what belongs to the world of the intellect under the head of 'one' and 'being,' calling it 'being' because it is eternal and imperishable, and 'one' because it is uniform with itself and admits of no variation, while he puts what belongs to the world of sense under the head of disordered motion. Of these we may further observe the criteria:

Both the steadfast heart of persuasive truth (1.29),

which deals with what is intelligible and for ever unalterably the same,

And the beliefs of mortals, in which there is no true trust (1.30),

because they consort with objects admitting all manner of changes, accidents, and irregularities.

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist. Gr.* IX, 39)
He calls this discourse [a way of] 'seeming' and 'deceitful,' not as outright false, but because the sensible world has fallen from the intelligible reality into the domain of appearing and seeming.

Simplicius, Commentary on *Physics* (*Comm. Arist.* Gr. IX, 25)
And of those [who say that first principles] are finite, some maintain, as does Parmenides in what he says about 'seeming,' that there are two, namely earth and fire, or rather, light and darkness.

A35
Aristotle, *On Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away* II.3, 330b13
But those who hold from the beginning that there are two [elements] – as Parmenides held that there were fire and earth – make the intermediates, air and fire, mixtures of these.

Aristotle, *On Coming-to-be and Passing-Away* II.9, 336a3
For since, as they assert, it is the nature of the hot to separate and of the cold to bring together, and of each of the other qualities the one to act and the other to be acted upon, it is out of these and by means of these, so they say, that all the other things come to be and pass away.

Cicero, *Academica* II.118
Parmenides [held that the basic elements are] fire to serve as a motive force, and earth to be formed by it.[1]
1 Cf A23.

A36
Aëtius II.1, 2 (*Dox. Gr.* 327)
[According to] Parmenides and Melissus ... the universe is one.

Aëtius II.4.11 (*Dox. Gr.* 332)
Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus [make] the universe ungenerated, eternal, and indestructible.

A37
Aëtius II.7.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 335–6)
Parmenides [says that] there are circular bands, woven around one another, one made of the rare, the other of the dense;[1] and between these are others mixed <of> light and darkness. What surrounds them all is solid like a wall, and beneath this is a fiery band, and what is in the very middle of them all [is solid],[2] around which again there is a fiery band. The midmost of the mixed bands is the <origin> and <cause>[3] of movement and coming-to-be for all of them, and it is this that he calls 'the goddess who steers,'[4] 'holder of the keys,'[5] 'Justice,' and 'Necessity.'[6] The air is separated from the earth, vaporized because of the earth's more violent compression, and the sun is an exhalation of fire, as is the circle of the Milky Way.[7] The moon, however, is a mixture of both, of air[8] and fire. Surrounding these at the uppermost level of all is the aether, with that fiery region which we call heaven ranged beneath it; and beneath this come the regions about the earth.

1 Or perhaps 'one sort formed of the rare, another of the dense.' Thus J.M. Robinson, 121, meaning that the concentric bands are made alternately of the rare and the dense. Cf also Guthrie, Vol II, 61, n 1.
2 Thus Guthrie. Robinson gives 'the midmost of all the rings is solid.' But if 'midmost' here refers to the centre of the whole concentric series, then its 'solidity' would make it no longer a ring. Moreover, if the reference were to a ring, we should expect ἡ μεσαιτάτη rather than τὸ μεσαίτατον. The text is uncertain. 'Is solid' is supplied in D-K to complete the obvious sense. Cf *Dox. Gr.* ad loc.
3 The text is corrupt. The translation follows D–K, supplying <ἀρχήν> and <αἰτίαν>. Diels restored the text differently in *Dox. Gr.*
4 Cf 12.3.
5 Reading with D–K κληιδοῦχον for the mss' κληροῦχον.

6 Cf 8.30, 10.6.
7 Cf 11.2.
8 Guthrie gives 'earth and fire'; but although, given the preceding sentence, 'both' would more naturally refer to earth and fire, the text of Aëtius says 'air and fire.'

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* I.28
For Parmenides invents a fanciful sort of thing; he makes up an unbroken circle of lights,[1] like a crown (his word is *stephanē*), which encircles the heavens, and this he calls 'god.' But no one can suppose that such a thing possesses a divine form or sensation. This philosopher[2] produces other freakish entities – for he deifies war, discord, desire, and similar notions, which can be destroyed by illness or sleep or forgetfulness or old age. He treats stars in the same way, but let us pass over that point here, for it has been criticised in connection with another philosopher.
1 With the text of Pease, omitting *lucis* as a gloss.
2 With the text of Pease, omitting Heindorf's supplement accepted by D-K.

A38
Aëtius II.11.4 (*Dox. Gr.* 340)
According to Parmenides, Heracleitus, Strato, and Zeno, the heaven is fiery.

A39
Aëtius II.13.8 (*Dox. Gr.* 342)
According to Parmenides and Heracleitus, the stars are compressed masses of fire.

A40
Anonymus Byzantinus, *On Heavenly Phenomena* 14 (Martin 26–7)
Of the fixed stars that revolve with the universe, some cannot be named nor grasped by us, as Parmenides the natural philosopher has also said, while according to Aratus there are a thousand that have been named as far as the sixth magnitude.[1]
1 The text of D-K is retained, but recent editors emend the text differently: ὡς ἐκ τοῦ instead of ἕως ἕκτου; ms ἕως ἐκ τοῦ.

A40a
Aëtius[1] II.15.4 (*Dox. Gr.* 345)
First in the aether Parmenides places the morning star, which he believes to be the same as the evening star; after that he places the sun, beneath which

he places the stars in the fiery region that he calls heaven (10.5).
1 This text is mistakenly attributed in D-K to the Anonymus.

Diogenes Laertius VIII.14
It was he [Pythagoras] who first declared that the evening and the morning stars are the same, as Parmenides asserts.[1]
1 Cf A1, p 103.

A41
Aëtius II.20.8 (*Dox. Gr.* 349)
According to Parmenides and Metrodorus the sun is fiery.

A42
Aëtius II.25.3 (*Dox. Gr.* 356)
According to Parmenides the moon is fiery.

Aëtius II.26.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 357)
According to Parmenides the moon is equal to the sun; for the fact is that it gets its light from it.

Aëtius II.28.5 (*Dox. Gr.* 358)
Thales was the first to say that it received its light from the sun. Pythagoras and Parmenides ... likewise.

A43
Aëtius II.20.8a (*Dox. Gr.* 349)
According to Parmenides the sun and moon were separated off from the circle of the Milky Way, the former from the rarer part of the mixture or 'hot,' the latter from the denser or 'cold.'

A43a
Aëtius III.1.4 (*Dox. Gr.* 365)
According to Parmenides the mixture of the dense and the rare gave rise to the milk-like colour.

A44
Diogenes Laertius VIII.48
Further, we are told that he [Pythagoras] was the first to call the heaven *cosmos* and the earth spherical; though Theophrastus says it was Parmenides, and Zeno that it was Hesiod.

Aëtius III.15.7 (*Dox. Gr.* 380)
According to Parmenides and Democritus, because it is equidistant in every direction, it remains in equipoise, having no reason why it should incline in one direction rather than another; this accounts for the fact that it only trembles, and does not move.

Iamblichus, *Theologoumena Arithmeticae* (De Falco-Klein 6) reporting Anatolius
In addition they [the Pythagoreans] said that around the centre of the four elements there lies a kind of unified fiery cube,[1] whose central position was known to Homer, when he says 'so far beneath Hades as heaven is from earth' (*Iliad* VIII.16). On this point, at least, the followers of Empedocles and Parmenides, and the broad majority of early thinkers, seem to have followed the Pythagoreans, maintaining that the unified nature is situated in the centre like a hearth, and keeps the same position because of equipoise.

1 The meaning is uncertain. ἑναδικὸς is found in Neo-Platonic authors as a rare synonym of μοναδικὸς, which occurs in the present text just below. The idea seems to be that the central cube contained the units from which, according to Pythagorean teaching, the physical world is composed. The phrase 'the unified nature' seems to mean the central generating source.

A44a
Strabo II.2.2
Poseidonius, then, says that Parmenides was the originator of the division into five zones, but that he represents the torrid zone[1] as almost double its real breadth, falling beyond both the tropics and extending into the two temperate zones.

1 Omitting τῆς μεταξὺ τῶν τροπικῶν with D–K.

Aëtius III.11.4 (*Dox. Gr.* 377)
Parmenides was the first to mark off the inhabited regions of the earth by two zones, the tropics.

A45
Macrobius *Commentary on Scipio's Dream*, I.14.20
According to Parmenides it [the soul] consists of earth and fire.

Aëtius IV.3.4. (*Dox. Gr.* 388)
According to Parmenides and Hippasos, it is fiery.

Aëtius IV.5.5. (*Dox. Gr.* 391)
Parmenides ... [says that] the mind[1] is situated throughout the chest.
1 See note to Aëtius, IV.5.12, below.

Aëtius IV.5.12 (*Dox. Gr.* 392)
According to Parmenides, Empedocles, and Democritus, mind[1] and soul are the same thing; for them, nothing lacking reason would, strictly, be a living being.
1 Two different words are used, but Aëtius probably used ἡγεμονικόν and νοῦς as synonyms.

A46
Theophrastus, *On Sense* 1–4 (*Dox. Gr.* 499–500)
Most views generally about sense-perception are of two kinds. Some say it occurs by what is like [the perceived object], some by the opposite: Parmenides and Empedocles by what is like, the followers of Anaxagoras and Heracleitus by the opposite. As for Parmenides, he has given no full account of it, but has simply said that cognition depends upon the dominant of the two existing elements. According as the hot or the cold predominates, so the understanding varies, that one being better and purer which is due to the hot – although even that understanding needs a certain proportion:

Theophrastus here quotes 16[1]

For he speaks of perceiving and thinking as the same. That is why remembering and forgetting arise from these sources owing to the mixture; but if they are equal in the mixture, he has not specified further whether there will be thinking or not, and what its state will be. That he also attributes sense-perception to the opposite in its own right is clear in places where he says that a corpse does not perceive light or heat or sound because of its lack of fire, but that it does perceive cold and silence and the relevant opposites. And in general everything that exists has some cognition. It is in that way, then, that he seems to exclude by his assertion consequences that are uncongenial because of his supposition.
1 Ostensibly, the verses here cited by Theophrastus (as also by Aristotle at *Metaphysics* Γ5, 1009b21) contain a physiological theory of thought: each man's thought is determined by the mixture of elements in his body. Such a theory, however, would seem a highly unlikely position for the goddess to have adopted as an account of genuine thought, given her total rejection of the physical world in the Way of Truth. It might perhaps have figured in the Way of Seeming, although if the teaching of that section is taken to be entirely

deceptive, it could not be meant as a serious explanation of human cognition. But it is possible that Theophrastus misunderstood these verses, especially if he took them direct from Aristotle without a full text of the poem before him. If so, the perceptual context in which he quotes the fragment should be discounted in interpreting it; indeed, it may not propound a physio-psychological theory at all. See the references in Introduction, nn 65–6, and the note on fragment 16 ad loc. For a reconstruction of Parmenides' doctrine of sense-perception on the basis of A46, see Vlastos, 'Parmenides' Theory,' 66–77. See also Guthrie, vol II, 67–70.

A46a
Aëtius V.30.4 (*Dox. Gr.* 443)
Parmenides says that old age develops along with a decrease of the hot.

A46b
Tertullian, *De Anima* 43.2
Sleep, according to Empedocles and Parmenides, is a cooling.

A47
Aëtius IV.9.6. (*Dox. Gr.* 397)
According to Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Epicurus, and Heracleides, the various sensations arise by way of commensurate passages, each appropriate percept fitting in at each point.

A48
Aëtius IV.13.9–10 (*Dox. Gr.* 404)
Hipparchus says that rays from each of the eyes reach out with their ends, fasten around external bodies as if touching them with hands, and thus render them apprehensible by vision. Some associate this view with Pythagoras also, as founder of the sciences, and besides him with Parmenides, who expounds it in his poems.

A49
Philodemus, *Rhetoric* fr inc. 3 (Sudhaus, vol II, 169)
Not even according to Parmenides and Melissus who say that the universe is one, and because the senses are deceptive.

Aëtius IV.9.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 396)
According to Pythagoras, Empedocles, Xenophanes, and Parmenides the senses are deceptive.

A50

Aëtius IV.19.4 (*Dox. Gr.* 398)

According to Parmenides and Empedocles, desire [arises] owing to lack of nourishment.

A51

Censorinus, *De Die Natali* 4.7, 8

Empedocles affirms something of that sort. First, individual limbs were put forth everywhere from the earth, as if it were pregnant; then they united, and made up the matter of whole men, which was mingled together with fire and moisture ... the same view is also found in Parmenides of Elea, who did not differ[1] from Empedocles, except on a very few points.

1 The text is corrupt. The translation is based on Diels' conjecture <*non*> *dissentiente* for *dissensis*.

A52

Aristotle, *On Parts of Animals* II.2, 648a25

For some say that water animals are warmer than land animals, maintaining that their natural heat compensates for the coldness of their habitat. Further, they assert that bloodless animals are warmer than those that have blood, and females warmer than males. Parmenides and some others, for instance, say that women are warmer than men, on account of the menstrual flow which they say is due to their heat and the abundance of their blood, whereas Empedocles maintains the opposite.

A53

Aëtius V.7.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 419)

Parmenides conversely:[1] those towards the north develop as males (for they have a greater share of the dense); but those towards the south as females because of the rareness.

1 Ie, in opposition to Empedocles, who held that males originated in the south and east, females in the west. See D–K 31 A81, lines 9–12.

Aëtius V.7.4 (*Dox. Gr.* 420)

Anaxagoras and Parmenides say that those [sperms] coming from the right side are discharged into the mother's right side, those from the left into the left. But if the direction of the discharge is changed, females are born.[1]

1 CF Aristotle, *Generation of Animals* IV.1, 763b30 (=D–K 59 A107).

Censorinus, *De Die Natali* 5.2
The learned authorities are not agreed as to where the seed comes from. Thus Parmenides thought that it originates sometimes from the right-hand parts, sometimes from the left.

A54
Aëtius V.11.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 422)
According to Parmenides, when the seed is separated from the right side of the mother, [children are born resembling] their fathers, and when from the left side, their mothers.

Censorinus, *De Die Natali* 6.8
But Parmenides' opinion is that when the right parts have provided the seeds, then the sons resemble the father; when the left, they resemble the mother.

Censorinus, *De Die Natali* 6.5
Parmenides held the view that females and males vie with each other, and that according as one or the other is victorious, the character of that one is reproduced.

Lactantius, *De Opificio Dei* 12.12–13
Natures are also believed to become ill-matched in the following way: when the seed of a male off-spring happens to fall on the left side of the uterus, it is supposed that the offspring is male, but because it is conceived on the female side, it possesses some female characteristic beyond what is appropriate for males, such as physical beauty, a very pale colour, lightness of body, delicate limbs, short stature, soft voice, a weak mind, or several of those things. Again, if the seed of the female kind has flowed into the right side, then the offspring is female, but because it is conceived on the male side, it possesses some male characteristic beyond what the plan of its sex permits, such as powerful limbs, immoderate height, dark colour, a hairy face, unbecoming features, a strong voice, a spirited mind, or several of those things.[1]
1 Cf fragment 18.

SOURCES AND AUTHORITIES

For useful accounts of the sources and of their value see Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[4], 31–8, and Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 1–7.

AETIUS, an eclectic philosopher, author of a compilation of the views of earlier Greek thinkers, the pre-Socratic portion of which is based ultimately on the *Opinions of the Natural Philosophers* of Theophrastus (qv). Aëtius' date is uncertain, but the first century AD is probable. The portions of his work preserved by later authors are edited by Diels, pp 273–444 of *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin 1879).

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, a Peripatetic philosopher who lectured at Athens in the late second and early third centuries AD. His commentaries on Aristotle's works are of great value. The commentary on the *Metaphysics* is found in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, vol I (Berlin 1891).

AMMONIUS, a Platonist of the mid-sixth century AD who worked in Alexandria. He wrote commentaries on Plato, Aristotle, and Ptolemy, many of which are lost. The commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* is found in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (Berlin 1897), vol IV.5.

ANATOLIUS, bishop of Laodicea in the third century AD; a well-educated man, fragments of whose work on number philosophy are preserved, especially in Iamblichus' *Theologoumena Arithmeticae*, ed V. De Falco and U. Klein (Stuttgart 1975).

ANONYMUS BYZANTINUS, a scholiast who wrote notes on the *Phaenomena* of

Aratus, which are edited in *Scholia in Aratum Vetera* by J. Martin (Stuttgart 1974).

APOLLODORUS of Athens, a scholar of the second century BC whose work, the *Chronology*, was used by later biographers and historians of philosophy. The fragments are collected in F. Jacoby ed *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker.*

ARISTOTLE (384–22 BC), the founder of the Peripatetic school of philosophy, who studied in Plato's Academy and left Theophrastus (qv) as his most important student. His works are an invaluable source for the pre-Socratics.

ATHENAEUS of Naucratis (late second to early third century AD) wrote the *Deipnosophists*, a miscellany in symposiac form which is valuable for its wide range of quotations from lost works. It is edited in the Loeb Classical Library by C.B. Gulick (vol V of the Athenaeus set, London 1933).

CAELIUS AURELIANUS, a physician from Numidia of the fifth century AD. His *On Acute Diseases* and *On Chronic Diseases* are edited and translated by I.E. Drabkin (Chicago 1950).

CENSORINUS, a Roman grammarian and scholar of the third century AD. His *De Die Natali* (ed Otto Jahn, Berlin 1845, reprinted Olms, Hildesheim 1965) was composed in AD 238 and transmits information from various earlier sources, especially Varro and Suetonius.

CICERO (106–43 BC), Roman statesman and orator, whose philosophical works are more reliable for the information they provide about Hellenistic philosophy than they are for the pre-Socratic period. The *De Natura Deorum* is edited in two volumes by A.S. Pease (Cambridge, Mass. 1955 and 1958). The *Academica* are edited by J.S. Reid (London 1885). Both works are found in the Loeb volume, *De Natura Deorum, Academica*, ed H. Rackham (London 1933).

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, a Christian writer of the late second and early third centuries. He had a pagan education before his conversion and his extant works show a wide acquaintance with ancient texts. His works, including the *Miscellanies* (or *Stromateis*) and the *Protrepticus*, are edited by Otto Stählin in the series *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhun-*

derte. The *Protrepticus* is in volume 12 (Leipzig 1905); the *Miscellanies* (in a second edition by L. Früchtel) is in volume 52 (Berlin 1960).

DIOGENES LAERTIUS, second or third century AD, author of a compendium, *The Lives of the Philosophers*, which preserves much valuable material. The work is edited by H.S. Long in the Oxford Classical Text series (Oxford 1964) and is also included in the Loeb Classical Library.

EUDEMUS of Rhodes (late fourth century BC) was a student and associate of Aristotle. Among other works, he wrote histories of earlier work in arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. His fragments are edited by F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles* vol VIII (Basel 1955).

EUSEBIUS, bishop of Caesarea, lived in the late second and early third centuries. A scholar as well as a Christian apologist, his *Chronica* (ed A. Schoene, A. Petermann, E. Roediger, Weidmann 1866, reprinted Zurich 1967; also vol XLVII of *Die griechische christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte*, ed R. Helm, Berlin 1956) gave an outline of history from the time of Abraham. The *Praeparatio Evangelica* is edited by J. Sirinelli and E. des Places (Paris 1974).

FAVORINUS, rhetor and sophist with philosophical interests, active in the second century AD; he knew Plutarch (qv).

GALEN, of Pergamum, second century AD, physician and author, who lived for many years in Rome. His *Commentary on Book Six of Hippocrates' Epidemics* is edited by E. Wenkebach and F. Pfaff as volume V 10.2.2 of the *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* (second edition, Berlin 1956).

GENETHLIUS, late third century AD, a rhetorician. It is not clear whether the work *On Epideictic* (in volume III of *Rhetores Graeci* edited by L. Spengel, Leipzig 1856) is by him or by Menander Rhetor (qv).

HIPPOLYTUS, bishop of Rome in the late second and early third centuries. Book One of his *Refutation of All Heresies* is edited in *Doxographi Graeci* 551–76. The whole work is edited by P. Wendland (Leipzig 1916, reprinted Olms, Hildesheim 1977). See also Anatolius for the *Theologoumena Arithmeticae*.

IAMBLICHUS, third to fourth century AD, a Neoplatonist from Syria. He wrote particularly on Pythagoreanism. The *De Vita Pythagorica Liber* is edited by L. Deubner and U. Klein (Stuttgart 1975).

LACTANTIUS, third to fourth century, a Christian convert and apologist. His *De Opificio Dei* is found in *Opera Omnia* part II.1 ed S. Brandt (Vienna 1893) = volume XXVII of the *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclasiasticorum Latinorum*.

MACROBIUS, a Latin writer of the early fifth century AD. His commentary on Cicero's *Dream of Scipio* shows Neoplatonist tendencies. It is edited in Macrobius' *Opera* by F. Eyssenhardt (Leipzig 1893).

MENANDER RHETOR, third-century AD, a rhetorician from Laodicea. See Genethlius.

PHILODEMUS, first century BC, an Epicurean philosopher. His *Rhetorica* are edited by S. Sudhaus (Leipzig 1896).

PHILOPONUS, a sixth-century Christian commentator on Aristotle. The commentary on *On Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away* is in volume XIV.2 of *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (Berlin 1897); that on the *Physics* is in volume XVI (Berlin 1887).

PHOTIUS, ninth-century AD, a Byzantine scholar, Patriarch of Constantinople. His *Bibliotheca* is edited by R. Henry (Paris 1959–77).

PLATO (ca 429–347 BC), the Athenian philosopher, and founder of the Academy.

PLOTINUS (205–69/70 AD), the Neoplatonic philosopher. His works, the *Enneads*, are edited by P. Henry and H.-R Schwyzer in three volumes (Paris and Brussels 1951–73).

PLUTARCH, from Chaeronea in Greece, was a Platonist and author of a wide range of works. He lived in the late first and early second centuries AD. The works of interest here are all essays from the series entitled *Moralia*. The *Reply to Colotes* is cited from the Loeb edition by B. Einarson and P. DeLacy (*Moralia* vol XIV, London 1967). The other essays are also in the Loeb series, but the Teubner texts (volumes I, IV, and V.3) are more reliable.

[PLUTARCH], a section from an anonymous history of philosophy in doxographic tradition is preserved by Eusebius (qv) in the *Praeparatio Evangelica* 1.7.16 ff, who refers to it as the Miscellanies of Plutarch. It is edited separately by Diels in *Doxographi Graeci* pp. 579–83.

PROCLUS, fifth century AD, a Neoplatonist. His works include commentaries on Plato's *Timaeus* (ed E. Diehl, *Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum Commentaria*, 3 vols, Leipzig 1903–6) and *Parmenides* (ed V. Cousin as vol III of *Procli Philosophi Platonici Opera Inedita*, Paris 1864, reprinted Olms, Hildesheim 1961).

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, a Greek physician and sceptical philosopher of uncertain date (ca AD 200?). His *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* is in vol I of H. Mutschmann's Teubner text (Leipzig 1912) and vol I of the Loeb Classical Library edition. *Against the Mathematicians* is composed of several shorter treatises. Books VII and VIII ('Against the Logicians') are in vol II of the Loeb and Books IX and X ('Against the Physicists') are in vol III. Books VII–X are in vol II of the Mutschmann Teubner edition (Leipzig 1914).

SIMPLICIUS, sixth century AD, an Aristotelian commentator of unparalleled importance for the study of Parmenides. His commentary on the *Physics* is in volumes IX–X (Berlin 1882 and 1895) of *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca;* the commentary on *De Caelo* is in volume VII (Berlin 1894).

SPEUSIPPUS, Plato's nephew and successor as head of the Academy.

STRABO, first century BC to first century AD. His *Geography* is found in the Loeb Classical Library (eight volumes edited by H.L. Jones, London 1917–32) and in the Budé series, edited by G. Anjac (Paris 1969–).

SUDA, an encyclopedic lexicon compiled from ancient sources in the late tenth century AD. It is edited by A. Adler (Leipzig 1928–38).

TERTULLIAN, an African of the late second and early third centuries. He converted to Christianity and became a powerful apologist. His *De Anima* is edited by J.H. Waszink (Amsterdam 1947).

THEOPHRASTUS, Aristotle's student, associate, and successor, lived from the mid-fourth century to 288–5 BC. He founded the Peripatetic school. He wrote a great deal, but much of it is lost. Most important here is his history of doctrines in the area of natural philosophy – *The Opinions of the Natural Philosophers* – which was the origin and main source for the ancient doxographical tradition. Fragments of it are edited by Diels in *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin 1897), 473–95. The extract from this work, *On Sense*, is found on 497–527; it is also separately edited and translated by G.M. Stratton, *Theophrastus and the*

Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle (London 1917, reprinted Amsterdam 1964). This is the only fragment long enough to give a clear indication of the nature of the work.

TIMON, of Phlius, late fourth to third century BC, a follower of the Sceptic Pyrrho. His *Silloi* or *Lampoons* are satires in verse dealing with other philosophers.

Bibliography and Index

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Eleatic scholarship manifests a state of flux more appropriate to Heracleitus than to Parmenides. Amidst the ever rising floods of literature, it may be helpful to identify some foundational works upon which all serious discussion must build, and certain other materials suitable for more specialized or advanced study. Figures in brackets refer to the numbers assigned to each item in the Bibliography.

A lucid and concise outline is given by D.J. Furley (32). Other useful introductory accounts are those of J. Burnet (12), F.M. Cornford (20), G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven (55), J.M. Robinson (91), and E. Hussey (44). A balanced approach and comprehensive discussion, particularly valuable for the 'Way of Seeming,' are provided by W.K.C. Guthrie (37).

For more advanced readers, a soundly argued and detailed analysis of key problems in Parmenides can be found in the work of M.C. Stokes (102). A.P.D. Mourelatos' study of word, image, and argument (71) is a sensitive and imaginative treatment of Parmenides, both as philosopher and as poet. A stimulating philosophical exegesis and critique of Parmenides' arguments is offered by J. Barnes (5). L. Tarán's edition (105) is invaluable on textual matters, but his commentary is densely argued and difficult to use.

A small group of articles should be mentioned as essential reading for all who wish to come to grips with Parmenides on fundamentals. These include the groundbreaking work of G.E.L. Owen (78); an entertaining philosophical essay by M. Furth (35); an illuminating study by C.H. Kahn (51); a persuasive treatment of the cosmogony by A.A. Long (63); and a careful reconsideration of some basic problems by D.J. Furley (33).

Rewarding studies of specific aspects of Parmenides' thought include articles by J. Barnes (4), M.R. Cosgrove (21), E.A. Havelock (38), G. Jameson (46), F.D. Miller, Jr (67), A.P.D. Mourelatos (74), Ç.E.L. Owen (79), J.

Owens (81), E.D. Phillips (85), T.M. Robinson (92), M. Schofield (95), S. Tugwell (110), G. Vlastos (112), and L.E. Woodbury (118). Although these studies have a somewhat narrower focus than those listed in the previous paragraph, there is much to be learnt from them about Parmenides in general.

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